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CONFIDENTIAL.

(7423.)

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PART III.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

AFFAIRS

IN

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND THE SOUDAN.

April to June 1900.

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Further Correspondence respecting Affairs in North-East Africa and Soudan.

Part III.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 1.)

Berbera, March 31, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) P.

I HAVE received a letter from the Governor of Harrar from Jig-Jiga informing me that on the 21st instant he was attacked at Jig-Jiga by a large force of Dervishes whom he routed with great loss.

The whereabouts of the Mullah are not known.

(Repeated to Cairo).

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 2.)

(No. 59.)

Cairo, March 24, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram received by the Governor-General of the Soudan from Major Peake, who is in command of the sudd-cutting expedition, reporting the progress of his operations.

Major Peake hopes to have completed the work before him by the end of April next.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 174.)

Khartoum, March 23, 1900.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING from Major Peake:—

"*March* 12.—Block Bahr-el-Jebel, latitude 8° 49′, sixth block, latitude 8° 55′, length 400 yards, opened on the 23rd February, but on the opening of this block about half-a-mile of sudd came down from the seventh block, which had to be cleared away.

"Seventh block begun, latitude 8° 53′, length unmeasured. While working on this block it gave way during the night, and carried down with it steamers and barges. However, they finally managed to secure them without damage. This mass of sudd took thirty hours passing one spot, but it is now reported past Sobat, and so no fear of blocking. After this sudd came away the Bahr-el-Jebel rose about 6 feet,

and the Nile at base camp on the 9th March was 8 centim. higher than on the 27th December, when we first arrived there. Here the Bahr-el-Jebel has just begun to fall slowly.

"Ninth block is 5 miles from here, length about 800 yards. I have been up to it, but, owing to strong current in the narrow channel of the eighth block, was not able to get through with barge and men. I am, however, joining on to-morrow.

"Belgians came to the conclusion that they could not get back the way they had come, and have now gone up the Bahr-ez-Zeraf to try and force a passage. I did all I could for them.

"I think we shall be through all the obstructions by the end of April.

"Rain has fallen here the last two mornings. Heat has been great for the last week."

No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 4.)

Sir,

India Office, April 3, 1900.

IN reply to your letter, dated the 5th March, regarding the question of leave allowances and pensions in the Somaliland Protectorate, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to observe that the annual charge of 9,000 rupees a-year, to which my letter of the 21st November referred, did not relate to the entry in the estimate framed by Consul-General Sadler, which had not then been seen by Lord George Hamilton, but to that contained in the statements inclosed in the letter from the Government of India, dated the 3rd February, 1898, which was transmitted to you on the 29th of the following month.

I am, however, desired to state that, on further consideration of the question of the incidence of the pensionary liabilities connected with the Protectorate, the Secretary of State in Council suggests the following arrangement for the consideration of the Marquess of Salisbury.

In view of the right, under the Superannuation Act of 1892, of officers who serve under more than one authority, to civil pension in respect of the whole period of their service, it seems best that, on final retirement, such officers should receive the pension to which they would be entitled according to the Rules framed under that Act. This would apply to the case of Mr. Malcolm Jones, to which you drew attention on the 8th September, 1899.

In such cases the Government of India would bear the portion chargeable in respect of the period during which the officer was paid from the Somali revenues, while the administration was under the Government of India, subject to the condition that the Indian Government should not be liable for a greater pension than could under Indian Regulations have been chargeable for the same period, had the officer retired from service in India with the salary that he received at the close of his service. That is to say, the pension for the full period of continuous service being awarded under the Foreign Office Regulations, the portion chargeable to India would be that rateably due in respect of the service paid by the Indian Government, subject to a maximum limit of 2,000 rupees per annum to an officer who has completed a service of ten years, with an addition of 200 rupees a-year for each year of service under the Government of India in excess of that period, up to a maximum of 5,000 rupees a-year.

As regards officers belonging to the Indian services, who have been, or may be, temporarily employed in the Protectorate after the 1st October, 1898, it appears to his Lordship that they should be required to make a contribution under Indian Regulations to the Government of India, who would then bear the whole liability for pensions.

Lord George Hamilton does not, at present, make objection to the proposal that this should be based on the Egyptian precedent, the Protectorate accepting the cost of allowances during leave; but, before giving his assent thereto, he desires to ascertain the views of the Government of India on this point, and has addressed a despatch to them accordingly.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 4.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 7.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, March* 29, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a telegram which I have received from Sir Reginald Wingate, and in which, as your Lordship will observe, he suggests that Sheikh Ali Dinar, who at present rules in Darfur, should be requested to hoist the British and Egyptian flags in that province. I also inclose a copy of my reply, in which I have intimated that it would be desirable to postpone any action of this nature until I have had an opportunity of discussing the matter verbally with Sir Reginald Wingate, and until Slatin Pasha, who is, I understand, at present travelling in Darfur, has let us know something about the present condition of that province.

In submitting to your Lordship a few observations on this subject, I should wish to add that the views to which I now incline are subject to modification by the light of such further information as Sir Reginald Wingate and Slatin Pasha may possibly supply at some later period.

The frontier arrangement which was negotiated with the French Government subsequent to the Fashoda affair, would appear to afford a sufficient guarantee against the interference of any European Power in the affairs of Darfur. The question may, therefore, be considered almost exclusively from the point of view of local politics.

Your Lordship may remember that when General Gordon went to the Soudan in 1884, a fundamental portion of his original programme was to reinstate the rule of the "local Sultans." Subsequent events showed that the only part of the country where there was any chance of giving effect to this policy was in Darfur. In that province the reigning family, which had been dispossessed by the Egyptian Government at a period not long anterior to the outbreak of the Mahdist revolt, still had some real hold on the public opinion of the country. In Darfur, however, the policy initiated by General Gordon failed. This failure was due partly to the fact that the individual member of the Darfur family, through whose agency it was proposed to act, did not possess the personal qualities necessary to insure the accomplishment of his task, and partly to the predominance of Mahdist power, which at that time could not have been overthrown without the employment of military force.

Nevertheless, there is much to be said in support of the policy advocated by General Gordon, and it is well worthy of consideration whether, under the more favourable auspices which now exist, recourse should not again be had to it. Indeed, it is on these lines that the late and present Sirdar have been acting since the reoccupation of the Soudan. Sheikh Ali Dinar is a member of the family which formerly ruled Darfur. After a good deal of tribal dissension, and after, I believe, some vacillation as to whether he would or would not throw in his lot with the Khalifa, he seems to have established his authority, and has been practically recognized by the Soudan Government as the *de facto* ruler of the country. I am inclined to think that it would be advisable to govern through him, rather than to attempt to administer the country directly through Anglo-Egyptian agency. The Province of Darfur is remote and difficult of access. In the event of any serious trouble occurring there, it would probably be difficult, and would certainly be costly, to assert Anglo-Egyptian authority.

I cannot believe that the province would, under any circumstances, yield any considerable revenue. It would more probably prove an additional financial burthen. In fact, it seems to me that all Soudan requirements will be met, if the province is kept fairly quiet and trade permitted. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps questionable whether it is necessary or desirable to insist too strongly on any outward and visible signs of allegiance on the part of Sheikh Ali Dinar. He is at present friendly, but from what little I know on the subject, I conceive that his friendship might easily be converted into hostility.

Your Lordship will observe that Sir Reginald Wingate thinks that the Sheikh would hoist the British and Egyptian flags if requested to do so. I have no reason whatever for supposing that this view is erroneous. At the same time, if, as is possible, the Sheikh resented the proposal, it might throw him into an attitude of hostility. Inasmuch, therefore, as there does not appear to be any pressing reason for asserting Anglo-Egyptian authority at this moment, I think it would perhaps be wiser not to incur any risk, at all events until more is known of the conditions of the province and the disposition of its ruler.

Another consideration rather points to the desirability of exercising caution in the treatment of this question just at present.

For some while past rumours have been current that great activity prevails amongst the Senoussiyeh sect. It has been stated, both in the British and continental press, that a general anti-European movement is contemplated, that Sheikh Senoussi is likely to declare himself to be the Mahdi, &c.

There can be no doubt that Sheikh Senoussi exercises a very predominant influence over a large portion of Northern Africa, and that his followers are very fanatical and often very warlike.

I believe the rumours on this subject to be greatly exaggerated.

In the first place, for reasons which were stated at length in my despatch No. 179, Secret, of the 9th April, 1889, I doubt the Sheikh—who when last heard of was moving towards Bornu—declaring himself to be the Mahdi. Should he do so, it is certain that a schism would occur in the Moslem world, and that the Sultan, in his quality of Khalif, would be thrown into strong opposition.

In the second place, I do not believe that any revival of the offensive power of Islamism in general, or of Senoussiism in particular, is at all probable. It was at one time very generally held that the aggressive power of Mahdiism constituted a real danger. These fears turned out to be groundless. The same, I believe, will be the case with Senoussiism.

The Senoussiyeh may cause some trouble to the French, but I have no apprehension that they will take any serious offensive action against Egypt or the Soudan. Their defensive power is, however, without doubt, formidable.

If this view is correct, it is important to leave the Senoussiyeh alone, and to avoid, as far as is possible, being brought in contact with them. Officers who have recently returned from Kordofan confirm the impression, which I had previously entertained, that Senoussi exercises little or no influence in that province. In Darfur the case is different. It is not at all improbable that there may be a good many followers of Senoussi in those regions. I trust that Slatin Pasha may be able to afford information on this point. If my surmise is correct, it would afford an additional plea for not taking any very active steps to assert Anglo-Egyptian authority in Darfur.

Such are the considerations which led me to send to Sir Reginald Wingate the telegram inclosed in this despatch. I trust that my answer will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Khartoum, March* 27, 1900.

I AM answering the different requests of Ali Dinar, and sending presents. His messengers who arrived lately will shortly return. Do you think it desirable to give them the British and Egyptian flags to fly at El Fasher? Judging from our relations with Ali Dinar, he will fly them if instructed to do so.

I will lay details before you on my return to Cairo.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, March* 27, 1900.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 184, I think it advisable for the present not to hoist the British and Egyptian flags in Darfur. As Slatin has gone there, we had better wait and hear his views; and I shall be glad to discuss the subject with you when you return to Cairo.

No. 5.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 8.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, April 8, 1900.

INFORMATION received from Commandant at Kassala that Gallabat was evacuated on the 27th March by Abyssinian post.

No. 6.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 9.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, April 9, 1900.

WITH regard to the Abyssinian frontier arrangements, Colonel Talbot, who was sent to Asmara to negotiate with Governor of Erythræa, has not been able to come to any agreement.

He reports that the conclusions arrived at in Rome last November are not being acted upon, but that the Governor's views are distinctly opposed both to the spirit and partially also to the letter of those arrangements.

The matter should, I think, be again referred to Rome, and Talbot ordered to return at once. Sir. R. Rodd can discuss the subject further with Lord Currie, proceeding to Rome on his way to England on leave of absence.

No. 7.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 9.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, April 9, 1900.

THE question of the British detachment at Khartoum has again been discussed by the Sirdar, General Talbot, and myself.

The medical authorities on the spot are of opinion that even with the expenditure of 600*l.* already granted suitable accommodation for the summer cannot be provided. We therefore reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that the detachment had on the whole better be withdrawn. The General is about to issue orders to this effect. The opinion of the Sirdar, notwithstanding, is that Khartoum should have a permanent British garrison, and I concur in his opinion. Our view is that a whole battalion would be best, but if there are difficulties in agreeing to this on the score of expense, or for other reasons, I would urge that immediate steps be taken by the War Office for the speedy construction of permanent barracks in which two companies may be accommodated.

The 600*l.* can in the meanwhile be spent on improving the existing temporary accommodation for the detachment when it returns in the autumn. In order to stop as far as possible expenditure on temporary buildings it is important to arrive at an early decision regarding permanent accommodation.

No. 8.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 10.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Rome, April 10, 1900.

THE Marquis Visconti-Venosta, whom I saw to-day, stated that he would at once telegraph for a report on the Soudan–Erythræa frontier negotiations which formed the subject of Lord Cromer's telegram No. 70 to your Lordship.

No. 9.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1900.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 70 of the 9th April, stating that Colonel Talbot has found it impossible to come to any agreement with the Governor of Erythræa respecting the settlement of the Egypto-Erythræan frontier.

I agree to your proposal that Colonel Talbot should return at once, and that Sir R. Rodd should proceed to Rome later on and discuss the matter again with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

No. 10.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Cromer.

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 13, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 65 of the 29th ultimo, reporting a suggestion made by Sir R. Wingate that the Sheikh of Darfur should be requested to hoist the British and Egyptian flags in that province.

I concur in your Lordship's view that it is desirable to postpone for the present any action of this nature, and I approve the reply which you have sent to Sir R. Wingate on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 11.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berbera, March* 27, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 23, Confidential, of the 9th instant, I have the honour to submit copy of a letter from Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent, Harrar, reporting that the Abyssinian expedition against the Aysa has been abandoned, and that consequently the Harrar-Zeyla caravan route has been reopened.

The merchants at Zeyla were notified to this effect as soon as intimation was received at that port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Harrar, March* 20, 1900.

REFERRING to your letter No. 171, Confidential, dated the 9th March last, I have the honour to inform you that the expedition against the Aysa is abandoned, the Akils having promised to restore the goods looted three months ago by the camelmen, and consequently the caravan route Harrar-Zeyla has been opened.

The expedition under Azaz Vold Tadik has been only into the Dankalis country, and after having killed a good deal of Dankalis and devastated their country, returned back to Addis Abbaba.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.
Consular Agent.

No. 12.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, March* 31, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of an Intelligence Report by Captain Johnston Stewart of the 2nd British Central Africa Rifles, reporting on the movements of the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah; and extract from a note to my address from Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent at Harrar, dated the 20th instant; and translation of a letter I received this morning from Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, intimating the result of an engagement which took place at Jig-Jiga, on the 21st instant, between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces.

It seems that after raiding the Rer Ali the Abyssinians did not, as was at first supposed, advance on Daghabur, but remained at Jig-Jiga, where they were attacked by a large force of the Mullah's followers on the 21st instant, with the result described in Garazmach Bante's letter.

The Mullah seems to have taken care to keep in the background; no certain information as to his whereabouts is available. It is said that, previous to the fight at Jig-Jiga, the Ogaden had risen *en masse* to oppose the Abyssinians, which would account for the large force of Dervishes reported by Garazmach Bante. It is also said that the Mullah's influence now extends to the Webbe Schebele, where the tribes, including the Negro Adone, have joined his cause and sent him assistance in men and supplies.

The messenger who brought in Garazmach Bante's letter, reports that after the defeat of the Mullah's force the survivors were set upon by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroum, who said that they and the Mullah had led them to destruction by falsely representing that the arms of the Abyssinians were powerless against them.

It is further reported that the Mullah left all his followers from the Dolbahanta, and his rifles, said to number 500, at Harradiggit, and sent on the Ogaden tribes with spears to attack the Abyssinians at Jig-Jiga. This is confirmed by news which has just been brought in, that a raiding party of the Habr Yunis who were out in the Ogaden after the Rer Ali, stumbled on the Mullah's force near Harradiggit, and lost from 100 to 150 men, all killed by rifle fire.

The defeat at Jig-Jiga has doubtless dealt a heavy blow to the Mullah's movement in the Ogaden, but if he gets away with the number of rifles he is supposed to have, his power for evil will have been by no means checked.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Department, Simla.

J. H. S.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Lieutenant Stewart to Consul-General Sadler.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Adadleh, March* 23, 1990.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have gathered the following information regarding the movements of Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah :—

A Habr Yunis and Habr Awal trading caravan, after suffering loss in lives and property at the hands of the Mullah, left Digwein, in Ogaden, on the 15th March, and arrived at Adadleh on the 21st instant.

They report that the first force of Abyssinians (probably from 1,500 to 2,000 men) arrived in Dagabhur on the 10th instant.

The Mullah with his main body moved out from Harradiggit, in Digwein, on the 11th instant. He previously informed his men that the rifles of the Abyssinians were harmless against him, and that he would defeat them with spears and bows and arrows only. He therefore left about 1,000 men with his guns and most of his ponies in zareeba at Harradiggit. He said he would delay his attack on the Ishak tribes and Berbera till he had settled with the Abyssinians

He himself appears to have halted at Bulaleh on the 12th instant, but his advanced party continued their march to Dagabhur, where they arrived on the 14th instant. They had instructions not to engage the Abyssinians till the arrival of the Mullah himself. They found the Abyssinians entrenched in a strong double zareeba, built to surround the watering-place at Dagabhur. The Mullah's men did not build a zareeba, but remained round the Abyssinian position.

Reinforcements of Abyssinians are said to be on the way to Dagabhur, and a third party to be forming at Harrar.

No engagement had up to the 15th instant been fought between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces, though the former on arrival had successfully raided parties of the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun.

The Mullah has sent word to the Habr Yunis that if they do not give up all the camels recently looted by them from the Rer Ali, he will attack them. Eight of his men with four water camels have arrived at Waba-ado in the Haud to watch the movements of the Habr Yunis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. JOHNSTON STEWART, *Lieutenant*,
2nd Battalion, C. A. Rifles.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

(Extract.) *Harrar, March* 20, 1900.

THE Abyssinian expedition into the Ogaden has ended. The Acting Governor, Garazmach Bante, with his troops, after having devastated all the country through which he passed, has returned to Jig-Jiga, and is expected here in three or four days.

Especially he destroyed the tribe of the Girad Abdi, who escaped, and who, it seems, is a follower of the Mullah.

The Garazmach has been unable to find the Mullah. He has written here to say that he has not seen any of the Mullah's men.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

Governor of Harrar to Consul-General Sadler.

(After compliments.) *22nd Zitkada*, 1317 (*March* 24, 1900).

THIS letter has been sent from Jig-Jiga, and conveys good news of the fight which took place with the Eastern Sheikh on Wednesday, 13th Majabeet, 1892.

At 8 o'clock the [enemy's] force arrived in front of the fort. Their numbers were innumerable. The fight did not last five minutes before they fled, followed by our soldiers, who destroyed them, but he [the Sheikh] hid himself, and it is said that he did not join the force against us. A few of his force escaped, some on horseback, and others running and seeking for the safety of their lives have been made prisoners. We hear, by the favour of God, there are only a few of them left in Harradiggit. We were going after them, but waited to ask the permission of King John Hawa. Then we will go after them, and by all means we will attack them at Harradiggit.

This we send you for your information.

(Seal of Garazmach Bante.)

No. 13.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 69.)
My Lord, *Cairo, April* 3, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith paraphrase of a telegram which I have received from Captain Harrington relative to the movements of the survey parties on the Abyssinian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Jibuti, April* 3, 1900.

NEWS has been received from the survey parties Austin's party reported well at Goré on 2nd March. Gwynne left Gadami for Sobat on 9th March, having been delayed by local Chief.

No. 14.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(Confidential.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards the following Tables, throwing a certain amount of light on the vast amount of warlike stores recently imported into Abyssinia:—

1. *Table* (*A*).—List of warlike stores which have passed through the port of Zeyla from October 1898 to May 1899.

2. *Table* (*B*).—The contents of Consul Gurney's Secret Memoranda Nos. 2 and 13, dated the 27th December, 1899, and 13th March, 1900, respectively, in tabular form.

3. *Table* (*C*).—List of warlike stores embarked at Marseilles for Abyssinia in November 1899 and February 1900, and at Manchester in November 1899 and March 1900, taken from a Report derived from a reliable source, copy inclosed and marked (E).

4. A summary of Tables (A), (B), and (C).

5. *Table* (*D*).—A summary of cartridges taken from Tables (A), (B), and (C).

Sir John Ardagh desires to point out that Table (A) represents the warlike stores that have passed through the port of Zeyla only, and that Tables (B) and (C) show the importations from Marseilles and Manchester only and during a very limited period, and that none of them can be taken as an accurate list of all the warlike stores imported into Abyssinia during the periods they embrace.

Sir John Ardagh forwards also in a Memorandum, marked (F), certain further miscellaneous information on the subject as tending to show the present vast resources of the Negus in warlike material, and he would suggest the advisability of transmitting the inclosed papers to the Consul-General of the Somaliland Protectorate and to Her Majesty's Agent at the Court of the Emperor Menelek for their observations.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
April 12, 1900.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Table (A).—KING MENELEK's Munitions passed through Zeyla, 1898–99.

Date.	Cases War Material, Projectiles, Implements, Caps, &c.	Bundles, Rifles, (Gras) each containing 14.	Bundles, Swords, each containing 60.	Gunpowder Cases, each weighing 1½ cwt.	Ammunition, Ball (Russian make), Cases each containing 1,000 rounds.	Ammunition, Ball (French make), Cases each containing 1,000 rounds.	Ammunition, Ball (Winchester), Cases containing 1,000 rounds.	Remarks.
1898.								
October	183	..	..	..	384	200	169	All these cases of munitions were passed through Zeyla by Ato Joseph, King Menelek's Agent, and all were brought to Zeyla from Jibuti by bugalow.
November ..	12	..	50	..	1,281	..	..	
December ..	253	..	10	..	1,502	..	..	
1899.								
January	..	16	43	..	..	16	..	
February	..	43	..	58	..	..	..	
March	..	..	..	33	1,000	..	..	
April	..	41	..	..	83	..	..	
May	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	
Total ..	448	100	103	91	4,252	216	169	

Consul-General J. Hayes Sadler's despatch.

Berbera, May 26, 1899.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

Table (B).—Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

Date.	Name of Ship.	Nationality of Company.	Cases of Rifles.	Cases of Cartridges (1,000 each).	Cases of Carbines.	Cases of Caps.	Cases of Miscellaneous Arms.	Remarks.
1899.								
October	Pei-Ho	French	10	11	..	..	1	The stores carried on the "Djemnah" are shown in Table (C); they were reported both by Consul Gurney and by the reliable informant mentioned in Table (C).
November	Yang-tsze	„	..	100	..	..	..	
November	Caledonien	„	7	..	..	..	..	
November	Cholon	„	7	9	..	1	..	
December	Kurdistan	British	..	11	..	..	..	
1900.								
January	Saghalien	French	..	..	14	..	1	
January	Yang-tsze	„	..	200	..	..	2	
		Total	24	331	14	1	4	

Consul Gurney's Secret Memorandum No. 2, of December 27, 1899, and Secret Memorandum No. 13, of March 13, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 14.

Table (C).—Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

Information from a reliable source.

Date.	Ship.	From what Port.	Rifles, Lee-Met'ord, ·303	Cases of Cartridges, Lee-Metford (1,000 each).	Army Revolvers.	Revolver Cartridges (Number).	Miscellaneous Arms.	Remarks.
1899.								
November ..	Arabistan ..	Manchester ..	44	..	..	..	..	Samples.
November ..	Djemnah .	Marseilles ..	..	40	..	..	..	This vessel also took 1,400,000 Lee-Metford and 100,000 Gras cartridges. Further particulars unknown. Consul Gurney reports in his Secret Memorandum No. 13 of April 13, 1900, that the "Djemnah" had besides five cases of carbines.
1900.								
February	Goolistan ..	Marseilles ..	6,000	635	250	80,000	..	
March	Afghanistan ..	Manchester ..	..	542*	..	..	1 Mauser rifle .. 1 Mauser carbine 1 repeating rifle 1 short bayonet	Samples.
Total ..			6,044	1,217	250	80,000		

* Includes nine cases of expanding bullets.

Inclosure 4 in No. 14.

Total of Tables (A), (B), and (C).—Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

By whom reported.	Cases War Materials, Projectiles, Implements, Caps, &c.	Bundles Rifles, Gras, each containing 14.	Rifles, Lee-Metford, ·303-inch.	Rifles, Miscellaneous, Cases of.	Ammunition, Ball, Cases of, 1,000 in each.	Army Revolvers, 6 chambers.	Ammunition, Ball, for Revolvers.	Bundles Swords, each containing 60.	Gunpowder, Cases, each weighing 1½ cwt.	Carbines, Cases of.	Miscellaneous Arms, Cases of.	Remarks.
			Number.				Number of Rounds.					
Consul-General Hayes Sadler (Table A)	448	100	..	..	4,637	..	..	103	91	..	..	
Consul Gurney (Table B) ..	1	..	..	24	331	..	..	..	..	14	4	
Reliable information (Table C)	..	..	6,044	..	1,217	250	80,000	..	..	..	..	1,500,000 cartridges also reported as embarked, destination unknown.
Total	449	100	6,044	24	5,185	250	80,000	103	91	14	4	

See also paragraph 9 of Memorandum marked F.

Inclosure 5 in No. 14.

Table (D).—CARTRIDGES shipped to Abyssinia.

Compiled from Tables (A), (B), and (C).

Ammunition, Lee-Metford, ·303.	Ammunition, French make.	Ammunition, Russian make.	Ammunition, Winchester.	Ammunition, Revolver.	Ammunition, description not stated.	Remarks.
Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	
1,217,000	216,000	4,252,000	169,000	80,000	331,000	1,400,000 Lee-Metford and 100,000 Gras cartridges also shipped, destination unknown.

See also paragraph 9 of Memorandum marked F.

Inclosure 6 in No. 14.

Table (E).—Information from a reliable source of Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

A B M (in a diamond) Djibouti.		Steam-ship "Arabistan" to Djibouti from Manchester, November 1899— (A. B. Meusulman, now at Harrar, for Carling and Co.). 4 cases Lee-Metford rifles (10-shot magazine, calibre ·303), 44 rifles in all (samples).
A B M A H K 9155 2 (in a diamond) Djibouti.		Steam-ship "Djemnah" to Djibouti from Marseilles, no date— 40 cases containing 40,000 Lee-Metford cartridges ·303. This vessel also took 1,400,000 Lee-Metford cartridges and 100,000 Gras cartridges shipped by a French firm, further particulars unobtainable.
A B M (in a diamond) Djibouti.	160/72	Steam-ship "Goolistan" to Djibouti from Marseilles, February 1900— 13 cases revolver cartridges. 80,000 C. F. ·450.
A B M R (in a diamond) Djibouti.		4 cases army revolvers, 250. C. F. ·450 bore, 6 shot. This vessel also carried 50/60* tons Lee-Metford cartridges ·303, and 6,000 rifles rifles, Lee-Metford ·303. The cartridges were supplied by the Société Française des Munitions, Paris. The Messageries Maritimes de France Company inform that "they have all the room booked full for arms and ammunition for Djibouti for the next six months."
P T O (in a diamond) Djibouti.	50/67	Steam-ship "Afghanistan" to Djibouti from Manchester, March 1900— 18 cases Lee-Metford cartridges, nickel covered, cordite powder, smokeless— 9,000 expanding bullets ·303. 9,000 ordinary bullets ·303.
A A (in a diamond) Djibouti.		1 Mauser rifle, military pattern, calibre 7 millim. 1 Mauser carbine, calibre 7 millim. 1 repeating rifle, calibre 11 millim. 1 short magazine bayonet. The above are samples on which a large quantity with cartridges are pending. This vessel also took 50 tons of cartridges, among them being 510 cases, each of 1,000, Lee-Metford ·303, all being supplied by the Société Française des Munitions, Paris.
A B M (in a diamond).		14 cases cartridges, 14,000 Lee-Metford ·303. Mr. E. W. Carling just arriving at Harrar (2nd April). Inquiry has been placed with Carling and Co. for 7,000 Mauser rifles, 4,000 Mauser carbines, and 1,500 Mauser repeating rifles, and 400 rounds per rifle if order is placed.

Inclosure 7 in No. 14.

Miscellaneous information regarding Resources of Abyssinia in Arms and Ammunition.

1. PRÉCIS of information obtained by the British Mission to Abyssinia 1897 :—

p. 31. "Nearly every system of single loader is represented. The larger proportion of rifles are Remingtons, then come Gras, Vetterli-Vitali magazine rifles, and Berdans; amongst other systems noted were Chassepots, Mausers (single loaders), a Styrian rifle with falling block and lever (name unknown), occasional Winchesters and Peabody-Martinis, Martini-Henrys being rare and much prized. . . .

"Besides the rifles in the hands of the troops, there are sufficient in reserve to bring the whole number of rifles in the country up to considerably over 200,000." . . . .

* This statement is slightly vague. Consul Gurney reports that this vessel carried 648 cases of cartridges, of which 13 were revolver, leaving 635 for Lee-Metford.

p. 32. "The cargo of the 'Doelwyck' (reported at 120,000 rifles and 2,500,000 cartridges) is now being sold throughout the country, but only half these rifles have reached Shoa; the remainder are at Jibuti awaiting transport.

"The artillery consists of 33 Italian 75-millim. mountain-guns (mule) and 2 machine-guns, taken in the last campaign; 2 old French mitrailleuses; 31 old-fashioned small brass guns, mostly taken from the Egyptians; and 15 to 20 of modern make (reported as Hotchkiss). All these are mountain-guns of small calibre (6 centim. to 8 centim.)."

2. Sir F. Plunkett, in his No. 7, Confidential, dated Brussels, the 15th January, 1898, mentions a Report by the Managing Engineer of the "Fabrique Nationale d'Armes" at Hersthal that the Emperor Menelek was known to be in possession of 300,000 military rifles, principally old French Gras rifles and some Spanish Remingtons.

3. M. de Courcy Perry's No. 15, dated Antwerp, the 14th April, 1898, inclosed in Sir F. Plunkett's No. 81, mentions steam-ship "Irena" as transporting 2,404 cases of safety cartridges, weighing 149½ tons, and 521 cases of arms, weighing 72¼ tons, consigned to M. Garriques, Jibuti, for Count Leontieff.

4. Quarterly Returns of warlike stores shipped from England shows:—

April to June, 1898.

300,000 safety cartridges.
2,500 iron shells (empty).
2,500 shrapnel shells (empty).
52 packages of renewal parts of cannon fittings.
66 cases of renewal parts of rifles.
450 lb. gunpowder.
2 cases of friction tubes.
64 cases of fuzes.
Parts of Nordenfelt 48 millim. mark E 1 guns.
Parts of carriages for same.
31,240 rifles.
30 gun-carriage wheels and 27 cases of cleaning materials.

The above on steam-ship "Irena" consigned to Leontieff at Jibuti, which ship was temporarily detained in the Thames. Also 6 rifles and 6 bayonets for Leontieff on steam-ship "Rosendaal."

January to March, 1899.

2 automatic guns.
2 Maxim guns
60,000 S.A. cartridges.

Consigned to Leontieff.

October to December, 1899.

100 rifles to Jibuti.

5. D.A.A.G., Aden, writing to I.B., Simla, the 1st March, 1897, reported the Abyssinian artillery as consisting of 2 field batteries of Krupp guns, 96 Hotchkiss Q.F. guns, and a battery of siege guns drawn by elephants, and the supply of small-arm ammunition as ample, 3,000,000 rounds having been brought back from the battle of Adowa.

6. Von Lobell's annual Report on changes and progress in military matters during 1896 gives the following details of Abyssinian artillery:—

For employment in the field—

24 Hotchkiss guns (arranged for pack transport).
2 Maxim guns.
Several mitrailleuses (American).

Also not for field use—

18 8-cemtim. muzzle loaders.
2 8-centim. breech loaders.
2 guns of position, taken from the Egyptians.
Several obsolete guns.

Also—

60 7-centim. mountain guns, captured from the Italians.

7. From a reliable source there is information that Count Leontieff is now placing an order for 8 Maxims complete and 250,000 Lee-Metford cartridges for the same.

8. Colonel Hayes Sadler's No. 7, dated the 2nd February, 1900, shows Leontieff's agent to be trying to pass 8,000 rifles through Zeyla.

9. Consul Gurney's No. 12, Secret, dated the 1st March, 1900, states from a reliable source that one firm alone at St. Étienne has supplied 350,000 carbines for Abyssinia (of which 150,000 within the last fortnight). These were "Gras Mousqueton" carbines, used till lately in the French artillery.

The same firm had also sent to Abyssinia hundreds of thousands of Remington cartridges, with the Lebel ball.

Several firms have been exporting any amount of cartridges from Marseilles to Jibuti.

No. 15.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1900.

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th August, 1898, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copies of correspondence which has passed between this Department and the India Office and with Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast regarding the question of leave allowances and pensions in that Protectorate.

The arrangement now proposed by the Secretary of State for India is that, in the case of officers who have served both the Government of India and the Protectorate as independent of that Government, the portion of their pension chargeable in respect of the period during which they were paid from the Somali revenues while administered by the Government of India should be borne by India.

To this proposal are attached two conditions: that the Government of India shall not be liable for a greater pension than may actually have been earned by any officer at the close of his service with them, and that in no case shall they be liable for any pension exceeding 5,000 rupees a-year, that being the limit laid down by Indian regulations for ordinary pensions.

I am to inquire whether the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury see any objection to the acceptance of the conditions proposed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H SANDERSON.

No. 16.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 34.)
My Lord, *Berbera, April* 3, 1900.

RULES for the grant of leave of absence to British officers on the staff of the Protectorate have already received your Lordship's sanction in the "Regulations for the employment of officers in the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast," which have lately been issued.

Those Regulations do not apply to the subordinate staff of the Protectorate such as the Indian and other officials and clerks in the various Departments, and the members of the police forces, Customs peons, and others. It is desirable that Rules for the grant of leave to these should be laid down, and I have now the honour to

submit, for your Lordship's approval, a draft of Regulations for leave, embracing all classes of officials serving in, or likely to serve in, the Protectorate.

In this draft the form followed in the East Africa Regulations has been adopted, but there are reasons why I have not seen my way to follow those Regulations in their entirety.

I will briefly explain these reasons. Prior to the transfer of the coast to Her Majesty's Government, the officials in this Protectorate have been serving for some fourteen years under the Indian Leave Rules. These Rules are laid down in Chapters XII and XIV of the Indian "Civil Service Regulations," and provide for two classes of leave—short or privilege leave on full pay, and long leave on half-pay; the latter of which is again divided into leave on "medical certificate," leave on "private affairs," and "furlo."

Under Chapter XII an official is entitled to leave on full pay for one month per annum, which can be accumulated up to a maximum of three months.

Under Chapter XIV leave on "medical certificate" is admissible for three years in all; leave on "private affairs" is granted for six months after six years' service; and one year's "furlo" is given after ten years' service, and thereafter at intervals of not less than eight years.

Again, under the Indian Rules when an official took leave temporary promotion followed in his Department, carrying with it acting allowances, which were not deducted from the salary of an official proceeding on privilege leave. With the transfer these acting allowances ceased; they were a recognized charge on the Administration, and the saving effected thereby will go far to cover the cost of passages for the few officials to whom I would propose passages should be given, a concession which has never been allowed under the Indian Rules.

I think the principle of one month's leave on full pay per annum should be maintained; and I would follow the East Africa Regulations in allowing this to be accumulated up to four months only, deducting a quarter of the salary of officials to whom passages are accorded, as an allowance for a substitute.

For officials domiciled in the Protectorate, leave on full pay should only accumulate to three months, being what they were entitled to under the Indian Rules.

The Indian Rules as they stand for long leave would be quite inapplicable to the conditions of the Protectorate now it is separated from India, and there is no large service to fall back upon to fill temporary vacancies. My experience of Indian officials is that they but rarely avail themselves of long leave on half-pay, but set very great store on their short leave on full pay. Still, it seems necessary in the case of officials domiciled outside the Protectorate to have some provision by which long leave may be occasionally granted should they have urgent reasons for repairing to their homes, and I think this will be met by the Rules I have drafted for special leave. I would also extend these Rules to officials domiciled in the Protectorate, more especially to meet the cases of those proceeding on pilgrimage.

As I have already said, passages have never been allowed under the Indian Rules. By the East Africa Regulations they are apparently provided for all classes of officials coming under class 2, section A, but only half-pay is allowed. I think it will be sufficient, in the case of this Protectorate, if passages are allowed to officials not domiciled in the Protectorate, who draw a salary of not less than 100 rupees a-month, with the deduction noted above. The number of officials to whom passages would thus be given would now be eight, and this number would include the principal officials who are domiciled in India and Goa.

Owing to the climate, expense of living, and other conditions of life, service on the coast is not popular, and I think that granting passages to a few of the senior officials will tend to make the service more popular. The junior officials not domiciled in the Protectorate will still be in the same position as they were as regards their leave on full pay, with the additional advantage of being able to accumulate it for another month, and they will benefit by the rules as to passage when they reach the higher posts in their turn.

As regards acting allowances, there will be the deductions from the salary of those officials to whom passages are accorded on proceeding on ordinary leave, and the half-pay available from the salary of all officials taking special leave. Besides, establishments have lately been increased, and the position of several of the appointments has been improved, which has given promotion.

I have thought it desirable only to allow passages to the conntry of domicile. There is, for instance, no necessity to give an official, domiciled in Aden, a

passage to Bombay; and as the cost of passage between the coast and Aden would be a small consideration, he would naturally take his leave on full-pay and forego a passage to Aden.

It will be observed that I have followed the system of the East Africa Regulations in dividing class 2 into two sections, but I have thought it simpler to differentiate the sections merely by domicile outside or inside the Protectorate.

To provide against repeated extensions of leave on sick certificate or otherwise, it seems desirable to lay down the rule that salary cannot be claimed for any absence from duty beyond six months. Special cases might be taken into consideration in serious cases of illness, but any claim to salary after an absence of six months should not be admitted as a matter of right.

The same reservation should be made in the case of officials resigning the service without returning to duty at the expiration of their leave.

Finally, the principle is affirmed, that leave will only be granted in accordance with the exigencies of the public service, and cannot be claimed as a right.

I may add that the price of a second-class return ticket from Aden to Bombay and back is 265 rupees, adding 30 rupees as the cost of the passages to and fro between the coast and Aden, the maximum cost of passage to be allowed to Indian officials proceeding to India would be 295 rupees.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Draft Regulations for Leave of Absence of Officers of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast.

THE officers of this Administration are for the purposes of these Regulations divided into two classes :—

CLASS I.

All officers who are in receipt of a sterling salary of not less than 250*l.* per annum, exclusive of allowances, and whose appointments have been directly sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

CLASS II.

All other officials are subdivided into two sections .—

Section (A).

All European officers, whose annual salaries do not amount respectively to 250*l.* per annum, and all officials who are domiciled in Asia or Africa, but not in the Somali Coast Protectorate.

Section (B).

All officials domiciled in the Somali Coast Protectorate.

Class I: Officers of the first class come under the "Regulations for the employment of officers" which have received the sanction of the Secretary of State.

Leave is divided into ordinary leave and special leave.

Ordinary Leave.

Class II, section A: Officials of this class will be entitled to one month's leave of absence per annum on full pay, which may be accumulated for four years only.

Officials in receipt of a salary of not less than 100 rupees per mensem (exclusive of allowances) who have accumulated three months' leave, that is to say, after thirty-

three months' service, will be allowed a second-class passage to the country of their domicile, provided that, in the case of officials proceeding to India or elsewhere in Asia, the cost of such passage shall not exceed the cost of a second-class passage by sea to Bombay; and in the case of officers proceeding to Europe, America, or any British Colony or Possession outside Asia, shall not exceed the cost of a second-class passage by sea to London.

In cases where passage is provided, a quarter of the salary of the official will be deducted for the purpose of providing an allowance for his substitute.

In the event of an official, who would be entitled to a passage, being compelled, owing to illness, to proceed on leave before he has become entitled to three months accumulated leave, a proportion of the expenses of his journey, not exceeding one-half of the cost of the passage to which he would have been entitled had three months accumulated leave been due to him, and a similar allowance on his return to his post may be granted him by the Secretary of State.

Class II, section B: Members of this section will be allowed one month's leave of absence per annum on full pay, which may be accumulated for three years only.

Special Leave.

Special leave is intended to meet those cases in which officials domiciled outside the Protectorate may, for exceptional reasons, require to visit their homes for a longer period than is obtainable under ordinary leave, and to allow officials domiciled in the Protectorate the opportunity of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. It will be but sparingly given when due.

Members of both sections A and B may be allowed six months special leave on half-pay after six years continuous service.

General.

On the termination of ordinary leave, salary ceases unless the official is granted an extension on sick certificates, in which case he is placed on half-pay.

Special leave cannot be taken in extension of ordinary leave, nor ordinary leave in extension of special leave.

No salary can be claimed for any period of absence from duty extending beyond six months; nor can an official claim as a right salary for the period of his leave if, during or after that period, he resigns the service of the Protectorate without returning to his post.

Leave will be granted in accordance with these Regulations so far as the exigencies of the Public Service may permit. It cannot be claimed as a right.

No. 17.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 72.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a paraphrase of a telegram which I have received from Captain Harrington on the subject of obstruction offered to the survey party on the Abyssinian survey by local Chiefs and the steps which he has taken to overcome it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jibuti, April 9, 1900.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5, I have now to report that Austin, after much obstruction on the part of a petty Chief, has been stopped at Goré. I have made strong representations to Menelek, insisting that the offender be publicly

punished here. He made a promise to this effect, but I said I could not believe him until I had seen it fulfilled. Austin is doubtful if survey can be continued; I have begged him to go on if possible. Menelek has issued fresh instructions to Abyssinian Chiefs ordering all persons to assist survey party in every way, and threatening severe punishment in case of disobedience.

This obstruction must be put down to the insubordination and greed of frontier Chiefs; I am sure that Menelek himself is in no way responsible. Good effect will be produced by public punishment of offenders.

No. 18.

Viseount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 74.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 14, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the "Soudan Gazette," No. 10, of the 1st April, 1900.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Extract from the "Soudan Gazette" of April 1, 1900.

Proclamation.

WHEREAS it has been brought to the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General of the Soudan that certain persons, taking advantage of the want of money in the Soudan, are acquiring lands from the inhabitants at prices below the actual value, notice is hereby given that until such time as it may be found possible to establish a land register, as contemplated by section 2 of "The Title to Lands Ordinance, 1899," all contracts for the purchase of lands should be submitted to the Mudir for approval, and that power will be given to Land Commissions which may be appointed under the provisions of the said Ordinance to revise the terms of any sales which may be proved to have taken place under the circumstances aforesaid, and of which notice shall not have been given to the Mudir.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

An Order putting the Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance in Force.

Whereas a Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance has been prepared, and copies thereof have been, or will shortly be, placed at the Mudiriehs and Governorates;

And whereas such Ordinance is expressed to take effect in such parts of the Soudan as the Governor-General may from time to time, by notice published in the "Soudan Gazette," order:

It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. The said Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance shall take effect in the Provinces of Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, Sennar, and Kassala, and in the districts of Wadi Halfa and Suakim, as from the 1st day of April, 1900, or from the date (if later) at which copies thereof may be placed in the hands of the officers charged with the administration thereof.

2. Until further order, the following provisions shall take effect:—

(1.) The provisions of the Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance relating to any act or proceedings to be done or taken by or before any Magistrate or Court shall be applied, with such modifications not affecting the substance as, in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court, the circumstances may render necessary.

(2.) The duties under this Ordinance of Mamurs acting as Magistrates of the third class shall be performed according to instructions, conformable to the spirit of

the Ordinance to be issued, with due regard to all the circumstances of the case, by the Mudir or administrator of each province or district.

3. Copies of the Code shall be open to inspection at the Mudirieh or Governorate of each of the said provinces and districts.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

Finance Circular.

Finance Circular No. 1, as promulgated in "Soudan Gazette" No. 5, is hereby cancelled, and the following substituted for it :—

Governor-General's Order No. 1.

1. *Financial Secretary.*—The Financial Secretary to the Soudan Government is responsible for the general control of the revenue and of the expenditure, and all questions connected therewith will be submitted to him.

2. *Revenue.*—Revenue in the Soudan is in money and in kind. Receipts in money are accounted for in the ordinary course through the monthly abstracts, to which a statement of the treasure in the safe at the close of each month is annexed.

Revenue taken in kind, whether as royalties or as ushr, is, in like manner, a receipt to be accounted for to the public chest. But until value has been received by sales it will not appear in the cash accounts of the revenue, but it will be taken on charge in the store accounts under the Regulations prescribed in paragraph 5 below. No sales or issues of revenue received in kind may take place without authority.

3. *Expenditure.*—No expenditure may be incurred without authority. The fact of the inclusion of any sum or sums in the annual Budget or other form of credit does not convey or imply any authority to spend such sum or sums. The specific authority of the Financial Secretary must be obtained for all increased expenditure over and above that for which sanction has been given, nor may anything be done which will throw a liability, either direct or indirect, on the public chest without authority previously obtained.

4. *Appointments.*—In case of vacancies, Mudirs may appoint Sarrafs from the locality. Appointments to such posts must in all cases be reported to the Governor-General, and his approval must be obtained of the Sarrafs guarantees.

All other appointments will, except where a standing authority has been given, be made by the Central Government, and no salary (or increase of salary in case of promotion) will be payable otherwise than from the date specified in a letter or Gazette as approved by the Governor-General.

5. *Controller of Stores.*—The Controller of Stores will take charge of all revenue taken in kind and arrange for its disposal. He also is the channel for supplying all Government establishments in the Soudan with stationery and furniture, and has charge of the clothing and equipment of the police. He also controls the issue of rations and forage when such are given in kind, and is the authority to deal with the Army Supply Departments for all articles either received from or delivered to them. The Controller will keep the Financial Secretary fully informed upon all matters which affect the sale of revenue in kind, and will obtain his approval before disposing of the same.

A qualified Mulazim Katib in each Mudirieh will enable the Mudir to keep up all Returns, and to carry out all work in the Mudirieh connected with the Controller's Department.

The following Returns will be rendered monthly to the Controller :—

(1.) Return of all receipts in kind from ushr royalties and all other sources.

(2.) When rations or forage are issued in kind, the ordinary ration Return will be sent in.

A ledger will be kept in the Mudirieh of all articles received from the Controller.

6. *Grants of Loans.*—It may occur from time to time that grain taken as revenue will be utilized for grants for relief of distress or for seed loans. For all such matters

application will be made direct to the Governor-General, and no grants (except in case of great emergency) or loans may be made under any circumstances without sanction previously conveyed by him. The question of loans must be dealt with with the utmost caution. Grave objections exist to the placing of the public authority in the position of a lender. Should, however, an application for a loan be entertained, it will be the duty of the Mudir to see that the security is adequate, and, if money is advanced, that it is laid out to the best advantage. If grain is issued, care must be taken that the borrower returns a fair equivalent with reference to prevailing prices; otherwise a portion of the loan becomes a dole in disguise.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

No. 19.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 9. Africa.)

Cairo, April 14, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a letter recently addressed by M. Maskens, the Belgian Consul-General at Cairo, to Sir Reginald Wingate, together with the reply which, after consultation with myself, the Sirdar has sent to him.

I trust that the terms of this latter communication will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

M. Maskens to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

Vendredi, le 13 *Avril*, 1900.

Mon cher Sirdar,

VOUS pouvez me rendre un service personnel en me procurant rapidement une réponse pour la question de transport sur le Nil, dont je vous ai parlé dernièrement.

En effet, ma femme désire beacoup que j'aille la rejoindre très prochainement, et je crains qu'on ne m'accorde pas de congé avant que la question dont il s'agit soit réglée dans un sens ou dans l'autre.

Je vous serais en conséquence très reconnaissant si, malgré le poids des affaires qui vous accablent, vous aviez la bonté de consulter le plus rapidement possible Lord Cromer sur la question que je vous ai posée.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) LÉON MASKENS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 19.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to M. Maskens.

Cairo, April 14, 1900.

My dear M. Maskens,

I HAVE spoken to Lord Cromer on the question of the transport of supplies viâ the Nile to the Congo Free State, to which you referred when last we met, and he sees no reason why we should not come to some mutual arrangement by which the wishes of the Free State Government may be met. At the same time, in view of the complicated conditions resulting from the various African Agreements, he would prefer that the Free State Government should address the British Foreign Office, with whose views he is not yet familiar, directly. With regard to the transport of any stores and supplies, exclusive of trade goods, he thinks it might be arranged that provisional facilities should be accorded for their immediate dispatch. without prejudice to the general question. Such goods would of course, I apprehend, be subject to the Egyptian customs duties on landing at an Egyptian or Soudanese port.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) F. R. WINGATE.

No. 20.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 25, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you Queen's Regulations, which have been allowed by the Secretary of State, dealing with the importation, manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors in the Somaliland Protectorate.

You are authorized to issue these Regulations in accordance with the instructions contained in Lord Salisbury's despatch No. 9 of the 31st January.

Fifty copies of the Regulations are inclosed for use in the Protectorate.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 21.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 107.)

My Lord, *Brussels, April* 26, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 147 of the 9th July, 1898, and to previous correspondence, I have the honour to report that an extraordinary general meeting of the "Société Anonyme Belge" for the development of commerce in the Equatorial Provinces of Abyssinia, which Count Leontieff came to Brussels to attend, was held here on the 14th instant.

The report of which I inclose copy, and which was read at the meeting, contains the translation of an autograph letter from the Emperor Menelik, in which His Majesty says: "With regard to your understanding, I trust that for the future you will have confidence in my protection. As far as I can, I will not fail to help you to the best of my power, and as your Company is working in the interests of my Government, I pray God to grant you His Holy protection."

The Board of Directors propose that advantage should be taken of Count Leontieff's return to his Government at an early date to despatch a mission with him to place the commercial affairs of this Company on a sound basis, and that the mission should be formed of persons capable of making a geological survey, and of studying the best means of forming ways of communication.

The Board also propose to forward a small sternwheeler to explore the navigable rivers as far as Lake Rodolph.

The Directors state that 18 tons of ivory will arrive at Djibouti within the next four months, and that 320 kilog. have already been dispatched to Antwerp.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

No. 22.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord, *Berbera, April* 12, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the detachments of Bombay Native Infantry were finally withdrawn, and returned to Aden on the 7th instant.

As the Royal Indian mail-steamer "Minto" was in Bombay and therefore not available for transport, I arranged with Messrs. Cowasjee, Dinshaw, and Brothers to convey the detachments to Aden in their local steamer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 23.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, April* 13, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, extracts from two news-letters from Mr. Gerolimato to my address.

It will be observed that amongst the killed and wounded of the Mullah's followers at Jig Jiga a number of Gallas and Harraris were found, some coming from a distance of two days' march from Harrar on the road to Addis Abbaba, and that there is considerable excitement at Harrar as to the future development of this movement.

This is the first intimation I have received of any of the Gadabursi having joined the Mullah. The Zeyla tribes have hitherto held aloof from him, and if any have now joined him, it can hardly be more than in isolated instances. At the same time, by the mail which brought me Mr. Gerolimato's letters, Lieutenant Harold reports that the Abyssinians killed two Zeyla Mullahs and their sons at Jig Jiga, and that there is probably secret sympathy with this movement in Zeyla.

The little news that has come lately from the Ogaden bears out what Mr. Gerolimato reports as to the attitude of the tribes towards the Mullah. This, however, only refers to the western Ogaden and the tribes from the Scaebele, who suffered at Jig Jiga. They are reported to have gone south again, and to have refused to try conclusions again with the Abyssinians. The Rer Ali are reported to have sought shelter with the Habr Awal tribes—whom they lately looted—not so much against the Abyssinians as against the Mullah.

The eastern Ogaden tribes, according to the reports I have received, were but sparsely represented in the fight at Jig Jiga, and I have previously reported that the Mullah's immediate following from the Dolbahanta tribes was purposely kept in the background, so as to preserve them from defeat in case he has to retreat towards Bohotele. There is no reason to assume that any of the above have left him, and the position of affairs in the Ogaden and the Abyssinian border continues to be serious. The Abyssinians will doubtless be able to repel any attack the Mullah may make on them at Jig Jiga, but unless they receive large reinforcements, they are hardly likely to move against him into the Ogaden.

Mr. Gerolimato's remarks on the trade of Harrar show that the opening up of the Soudan has already begun to tell on the trade of the Harrar Province, and that goods can now be imported to the districts which used to trade with Harrar by cheaper routes than the Zeyla-Harrar caravan road.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch and accompaniments is being sent to Viscount Cromer.

J. H. S.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

Vice-Consul Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

My dear Sir, *Harrar, March* 27, 1900.

BY last mail I informed you that Garazmach Bante, after having looted all the country of Girad Abdi (Abbasgul) because he is a follower of the Mullah, returned to Jig Jiga where he built a large zariba of thorns; and it seems that the Somalis (?), seeing that the Abyssinians are in very small force (about 1,000 men only), came about 6,000 in number and attacked the zariba, taking all the sheep, cows, &c., looted before by the Abyssinians. The Somalis (?) entered the zariba; they had not a rifle between them, and the Abyssinians killed 2,650 of them, but Girad Abdi escaped.

The day before yesterday, Sunday, the Abyssinians fired ten cannon for their victory . . . . Bante has sent for reinforcements, but there are no troops here; yesterday and to-day they sent more than 800 rifles to Jig Jiga on camels.

It is very strange that amongst the Somalis killed or wounded they found a good many Gallas, from the neighbourhood of Harrar, as from Garamoolata (two days' march from here on the road to Addis Abbaba), and Nolis, Goorgouras, and Harraris. The Abyssinians are very much afraid that it is a general conspiracy for revolution, and they are sleeping in the streets here with their rifles.

They found also amongst the killed Somalis a good number of Gadabursis, but the Mullah is unfindable—no one can give me any news of him. An Abyssinian Chief told me that the Mullah was in the fighting alone, without his men, and that he had sent word to Bante to expect him, and that he will return to Jig Jiga to fight.

The Abyssinians pretend that the Mullah has some rifles with him, given to him by the Italian Government at Lugh. I do not believe this, as there are no Italians at Lugh.

M. Ferrandi (ex-Agent at Bienenfield in Harrar) was there, but he left Lugh some months ago, and is now in Italy; but the Abyssinians, it seems, fear the Somalis very much. I have never seen men so afraid as they now are; they have given rifles to children to show the Harraris they have troops here. I think there will be more fighting soon at Jig Jiga, and that the Mullah will collect all his forces, knowing that there are only about 1,000 men, and attack them again at Jig Jiga. I not think the Abyssinians will be able to catch him unless they send more troops, and there are none here at present; it is reported that some 4,000 men are coming from Addis Abbaba to reinforce Bante. I cannot ascertain whether they have left Addis Abbaba yet or not, but it is certain they will send reinforcements, as they cannot let Harrar be threatened by the Somalis of the Mullah or the Ogaden tribes.

About the trade of Harrar, it has nothing to do with these expeditions. The real reason is that Abyssinian merchants are not now coming from the interior to buy goods or sell them in Harrar. Before, there were rich Abyssinian merchants in Addis Abbaba sending goods here and buying from here, and also giving money at interest to small merchants for trading. Now those rich merchants have all left Addis Abbaba and taken with them the smaller merchants, and gone to Gondar and Godjam, and are trading with Metammah and Hassi-es-Cheiba, our Soudanese frontier, as they find more profit.

Formerly all the Galla countries bought their goods here, and if you take into consideration that one corregia (twenty pieces) of American cloth from Aden is charged with 40 to 45 dollars expenses in reaching those provinces, and that the same can be got by the Nile from Alexandria, or viâ Suakin for 20 dollars in carriage, you will see that it is impossible for those provinces to buy their goods again in Harrar, and my opinion is that after one or two years, when good communication is made between Suakin or Alexandria and the Soudanese frontiers, the trade of Harrar will be nothing more than the local trade of the province. After one or two years Harrar will be unable to compete with Metammah, Famaka, &c., and I cannot guess what will be the revenue of the French railway.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Vice-Consul Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

My dear Sir, *Harrar, April* 3, 1900.

IT is certain now that the Abyssinians defeated the Ogaden Somalis, and that the Mullah and Girad Abdi and his followers escaped. The Abyssinians pretend that the Mullah was not present in the fight at Jig Jiga; it seems that the Somalis took away only a small number of camels and cattle, as I see the Abyssinians coming every day from Jig Jiga with a good number of camels, sheep, &c.

It is rumoured that the Ogaden tribes are very angry with the Mullah, who is the cause of all this fighting and looting, and that they have killed him; but that is only a rumour amongst the Somalis here, the Abyssinian authorities knowing nothing about it. It is stated that more than 2,650 of the Ogaden were killed at Jig Jiga.

An Abyssinian Chief told me that Ras Dargue, the King's uncle, is dead, and that they keep it a secret, as there is a prediction amongst the prophets of the King's Court that the King will die the same year as Ras Dargue.

It is rumoured also that Ras Mangasha is to be forgiven and return to his estates, and that Ras Makunan is to come here. Another rumour is that after the return of Garazmach Bante from Jig Jiga, an expedition is to go against the black Aysa on the border of the Dankali country, but nothing yet is certain.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

No. 24.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul-General for the Somali Coast,* submitting draft Regulations for leave of absence of officers of the Protectorate.

Lord Salisbury considers that Colonel Sadler is justified in his reasons for not following the Regulations for East Africa.

I am to request that you will submit the draft Regulations for the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 25.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, April* 30, 1900.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury your letter of the 16th instant, with its inclosures, on the subject of the apportionment between the revenues of India and of the Somali Coast Protectorate respectively, of the pensions of officers who have served in the Protectorate partly under the Government of India, and partly under the Imperial Government.

In reply, I am to request you to inform the Marquess of Salisbury that their Lordships agree to the proposed method of apportionment, on the understanding that Protectorate funds will only pay the difference between the entire pension (calculated in accordance with the principles of the Superannuation Act of 1892) and the portion paid by the India Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS MOWATT.

No. 26.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, March* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that King Menelek informed me to-day of the result of an expedition from Harrar against the Somaliland Mullah. The expedition under Gerazmatch Banti entered the Ogaden, but met with no opposition, the Mullah's forces having dispersed. On their return the Abyssinians were attacked near Jig Jiga, and the Mullah's forces were dispersed with a loss of 2,800 killed. The Mullah was not captured. The above is the Abyssinian version of the expedition. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Consul-General, Somali Coast.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

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* No. 16.

No. 27.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, March 24, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9, of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have drawn the King's attention to the statements made to the newspapers by M. Leontieff and his employés, and pointed out to him that were the true history of M. Leontieff's doings to come to light, they would do considerable damage to His Majesty's reputation.

His Majesty's reply was that what M. Leontieff did was contrary to his orders, and that there were several cases pending against him which would be inquired into on his return.

His Majesty seemed anxious to know whether M. Leontieff would succeed in raising money to return to this country. He stated that M. Leontieff's country had been given to another officer.

This may be true, but I am inclined to think that should M. Leontieff return, supplied with the funds necessary to quiet his enemies and conciliate the King, the past will be forgotten, and we shall again have him devastating the country in the neighbourhood of Lake Rudolph, unless Her Majesty's Government take some steps to show that they consider such country as being within their sphere of influence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 28.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, March 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to communicate, for your Lordship's information, that the state of affairs in Tigre still remains in the same unsatisfactory condition.

Ras Makunan is meeting with considerable opposition on the part of the local Chiefs in his attempts to settle the country.

It is impossible here to obtain accurate information as to the truth of the various reports which circulate concerning affairs in Tigre, but there is no doubt that the situation is decidedly unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 29.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 39.)
My Lord,

Berbera, April 18, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that Captain E. J. E. Swayne arrived at Berbera, and received charge of his duties as Commandant of the Somali Coast levies this morning.

A delay of a fortnight occurred in his reaching this, owing to a break down on the Uganda Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 30.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 42. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, April* 21, 1900.

I HAVE but little news to report in connection with the progress of events in the Ogaden.

The Mullah is reported to be inactive at Harradiggit, having failed to induce the tribes to make another venture in the direction of Jig Jiga, where the Abyssinian expedition remains intrenched. Native reports are that the Mullah will return towards Bohotele, but nothing certain is known as to his plans or intentions.

It is reported from Harrar that the reinforcements from Addis Abbaba have been countermanded, and that, as the hot weather is approaching, the Abyssinians do not propose to make any further expeditions into the Ogaden.

A few caravans from the Rer Ali have commenced to come into Bulhar.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 31.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord, *Cairo, April* 28, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a telegram which I have received from Sir William Garstin.

It was thought desirable to publish this telegram at once, in order to put a stop to the various incorrect rumours circulated by speculators in cotton.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Supplement to the Egyptian "Journal Officiel" of April 28, 1900.

Sir W. Garstin to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, April* 27, 1900.

I STEAMED up the Bahr-el-Jebel for about 217 miles from Lake No with Major Peake, and arrived within about 20 miles of Shambeh. Our return was necessitated by shallow water and want of fuel. Major Peake's party has removed fourteen blocks of sudd in all in length of 83 miles of river. I think the Jebel would be navigable to Gondokoro in an ordinary year. Free navigation is obstructed by low water this year. Between miles 137 and 162 from the Nile junction the Jebel River has left its true channel for a distance of at least 25 miles, and now flows through a series of open lakes and a network of shallow branches. The true channel is entirely blocked by sudd, and appears to have been thus closed for years. We determined the position of the two ends of this closed portion, and Peake's men are now engaged at the northern extremity. It is, I fear, too late to clear the obstruction away completely this season, as there is no current to assist the operations, and it is evident that the rains on the Upper Nile will commence shortly. I feel sure that a similar stretch of lost channel exists at mile 217, where we turned back. In each case there is a complete similarity in the state of the river. In both these places the water suddenly shoals from 18 or 19 to 5 feet, and the river is divided into a number of channels. It is probable that this block reaches to a spot in the vicinity of Shambeh. It was not possible to prove this fact, but I am convinced that the Nile now follows false channels in this spot. The works can easily be completed next winter. No water is actually lost, except that due to the evaporation of the lakes. I

informed Major Peake that, in my opinion, the only operation necessary to be done this season would be to clear away the projecting angles and corners in those reaches of the river where he had cut through the sudd. A surprising amount of excellent work has been carried out by Major Peake and his officers, despite very difficult circumstances. It would not be possible for men to work in this region during the rains. The steamers afford no kind of protection against the rains, and the climate is most unhealthy. By the 8th April, though the real rains had not yet begun, we experienced incessant thunderstorms, accompanied by drenching showers. There were strong winds from the south, and the sky was overcast in all directions. These storms are probably the forerunners of regular rains, which seem likely to begin very early this season. In my opinion, it is absolutely necessary that two, and if possible three, steamers shall patrol the Jebel River constantly during the period of the flood if it is to be kept free of sudd. It is necessary that one steamer should always remain down stream below the sudd, in order to be able to help the others, in case they should be imprisoned. On our return down the Jebel River we found ourselves thus shut up by a mass of sudd, which had completely closed the river to the north of us. Had it not been for a steamer which had remained behind to bring wood, and which was north of this barrier, we might have been imprisoned for an indefinite period. When we passed up no obstruction existed at this spot, and on the 6th April a steamer which was following us found the river clear. On the 9th April the wood steamer could not pass, and when we arrived on the 10th April the block in the river was about 500 yards in length, while the average thickness of the last 100 yards was 15 feet. The block was caused by storms, which had detached several hundred acres of floating sudd from the neighbouring lakes. These were carried into the deep channel, and, being compressed in a narrow space, entirely closed the river to navigation. Accidents of this kind must always be expected, and it would be unsafe for a steamer to go up the river during the period of storm without another being ready to give her assistance if required.

Considerable fluctuations in the levels in the White Nile were caused by the removal of different blocks of sudd; lagoons on either side were drained into the river by the clearance of certain of these blocks, and a temporary rise of water was thus brought about. Since all fourteen blocks have been removed the lagoons between miles 162 and 137 are draining, and these have occasioned the present rise, which I hope may be maintained until the flood comes.

I understand that the most exaggerated reports have been current in Cairo, such, for instance, as that the White Nile had risen 4 feet. This is absurd. The total rise at Base Camp, 54 miles down stream from Lake No, between the lowest level on the 3rd March and that of the 15th April was 72 centim. Between the 29th December and the 15th April the total rise has been 36 centim. This rise has passed down north. On the 17th April the gauge at Fashoda marked 50 centim. above the lowest level. Unfortunately, the old gauge there had been removed, and the new one was only set up on the 8th March. It is difficult to follow the rise between Fashoda and Khartoum, as the gauges are somewhat vague. At Duem a rise of 21 centim. was registered between the 3rd and 21st April, but I was told by the English Commandant that the total rise was 40 centim. The lowest point registered by the Khartoum Palace gauge was reached on the 16th April. Since that date there has been a rise of 13 centim., and to-day the gauge marks 1 centim. lower than it did on the 1st April. The present levels at Lake No will bring about a fresh fall should the flood-water not arrive before the lakes have been drained off. I feel almost certain, however, that the flood will catch up and overlap the lake water. The rains must very shortly cause a rise in the Upper Nile, and as the lakes are of considerable extent, they will act as reservoirs, and drain off slowly. Unless, therefore, there is a failure of rain for this year, which, however, there seems no reason to anticipate, I do not apprehend any further fall in the levels of the White Nile. Whether the levels rise quickly must depend on the flood, more especially on the Sobat. No rise has yet been marked in this river. It is difficult to say what effect will be caused at Khartoum by the drainage of the lagoons. The trough of the Nile is so very large for a long distance south of the junction that I fear the rise may not be as great here as further up stream. However, great good will have been brought about if only the fall is arrested, and it is possible that the clearance of the Jebel River may allow the flood-water to pass down more rapidly. The most important factor in the situation must, as I have always maintained, be the Sobat River. On the 17th April I ascended this branch for 12 miles, in order to measure its discharge, but found it quite stagnant. The gauge at Nasser registers a fall of 14 centim. between the 31st March and the 4th April, but I am informed by Lieutenant Gwynne, who recently crossed it at a spot two days distant from the Sobat fort, that there was hardly a perceptible current in this river.

I measured the discharge of the Jebel, first at the point above the sudd, 180 miles south of Lake No, and found it to be 6,377 cubic feet per second; and a second time at a spot below the sudd, 10 miles from the White Nile junction, thus including all the drainage from the lakes. I found the discharge here to be 8,050 cubic feet per second. The discharges of the Zeraf and Ghazal I found to be respectively 1,145 and 1,197 cubic feet per second. The total discharge which passes Fashoda is, therefore, approximately, 10,400 cubic feet per second.

We steamed up the Ghazal River to within a few miles of Meshra-er-Rek. The river was quite free from sudd, but it was impossible to reach the Meshra, owing to the shallowness of the water. For the same reason, we were prevented from getting more than 50 miles up the Zeraf, and 12 miles up the Bahr-el-Arab. I met Commandant Henry in the Belgian steamer and Uganda launch. He was working his way up the Jebel, about 160 miles from Lake No. He had dragged his boat across the marshes of the Zeraf, and reached the Upper Nile, returning down the Jebel to meet his steamer. He told me that the Zeraf was practically dry, and that for 170 kilom. from the point where it leaves the Jebel it had no defined channel.

The dhurra crop in the Nuer, Shillouk, and Dinka countries has almost completely failed.

The White Nile is now navigable for steamers, excepting a reach of 15 miles south of Abu Zeit.

No. 32.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 14.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 2, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that a case of some importance, in so far as it affects the recognition by the Mixed Courts of the existence of the present political status in the Soudan, has recently been decided by the Court of First Instance of Cairo.

Mr. Guido Levi, about whose nationality your Lordship wrote to me a short time ago (see No. 5, Treaty, of the 24th March), received permission from the Governor of Suakin, in September 1896, to enter the Soudan.

On the 21st of that month the Commandant of the Fort at the Atbara gave Mr. Levi a permit to go to Khartoum at his own risk and cost with 200 bales of merchandize. Mr. Levi accordingly went to Omdurman and then returned to the Atbara. He then wished to make a second journey to Omdurman. On the 27th December, 1898, permission to make this journey was, under instructions received from Lord Kitchener, refused to him, and he was ordered to leave the Soudan.

He subsequently brought an action against the Egyptian Government to recover the losses which he alleged to have incurred by reason of this order, which he declared to be illegal.

The decision of the Court of First Instance is favourable to Mr. Levi. I need not, however, enter into the details of the case, as, for the purposes of my present argument, they are of no great consequence. Moreover, appeal will be made against the Judgment.

What is more important is to note the ground on which the Court claims jurisdiction. On this branch of the subject, I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to the remarks made by M. Bernardi, the Legal Adviser of the Egyptian War Office. It will be observed that the claim to jurisdiction is based on the fact that the acts of which Mr. Guido complains were performed prior to the signature of the Convention of the 19th January, 1899.

It would, perhaps, be going too far to say that, in taking up this ground, the Court has recognized the validity of the Convention, but the Judgment, more especially in view of the fact that it was prepared and delivered by a French Judge who is notorious for his Anglophobe sentiments, would appear to indicate a tendency to abstain from contesting its validity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Remarks on the Judgment in the Case of Guido Levi.

POUR ce qui concerne les exceptions préliminaires opposées par le Gouvernement Égyptien le Jugement dont il s'agit a décidé :—

1. Que le Gouvernement Égyptien ayant son domicile légal au Caire il peut être assigné devant les Tribunaux du Caire (Mixtes ou Indigènes respectivement) pour n'importe quelle action personnelle—même lorsque l'action a sa base et son origine sur des faits accomplis au Soudan ;

2. Que les circonstances que le Sirdar avait sous ses ordres les troupes Britanniques faisant partie du corps expéditionnaire ne changeait pas le véritable caractère du Sirdar, c'est-à-dire de fonctionnaire Égyptien et partant pouvant engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement Égyptien ;

Que cela prémis, le Jugement a soin d'ajouter :—

"Que ce n'est que par la nomination faite en vertu de la Convention du 19 Janvier, 1899, et partant postérieurement aux faits qui ont donné lieu à l'action actuelle, que cet état de choses a été modifié."

Qu'en effet, en vertu de la Convention Anglo-Égyptienne du 19 Janvier, 1899, le Gouvernement du Soudan a été séparé du Gouvernement Égyptien et constitué en un Gouvernement à part *sui generis*.

Conséquemment on ne pourrait plus actionner le Gouvernement Égyptien pour répondre des agissements des fonctionnaires du Gouvernement Soudanais. Il faudrait actionner ce dernier à son domicile légal, qui est à Omdurman, devant les juridictions et suivant les lois en vigueur au Sondan.

Lorsque la même personne est investie de la double qualité de Sirdar du Gouvernement Égyptien et de Gouverneur-Général du Soudan il n'est pas difficile de distinguer les actes accomplis dans l'une ou dans l'autre des dites qualités. En effet, s'agit-il d'actes ayant trait au Gouvernement du Soudan ? Il est évident qu'ils doivent émaner du Gouverneur-Général du dit pays. S'agit-il au contraire d'actes concernant l'Égypte proprement dit (au nord du 22^{e} parallèle) ? Ils ne peuvent émaner que du Sirdar qui seul a qualité de donner des ordres sur le territoire Égyptien, en engageant la responsabilité du Gouvernement Égyptien.

En application de ces principes si l'expulsion du Sieur Levi du Soudan avait eu lieu après le 19 Janvier, 1899, elle n'aurait pu être ordonné que par le Gouverneur-Général du Soudan, et partant le Sieur Levi n'aurait pu s'adresser qu'aux Tribunaux du Soudan en invoquant l'application des lois en vigueur au Soudan.

Sous le bénéfice de ces considérations et dans ces limites le Jugement dont il s'agit paraît conforme aux principes et ne porterait aucune atteinte à l'état de droit tel qu'il résulte de la Convention Anglo-Égyptienne du 19 Janvier, 1899.

No. 33.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 1, 1900.

ON the 9th ultimo I addressed to your Lordship a telegram (No. 71) on the subject of the construction of barracks, both permanent and temporary, for the British troops at Khartoum.

I am now able to furnish some further information on this subject, which is one of great importance. I would earnestly beg that it be taken into consideration with the least possible delay.

The facts, as they at present stand, are as follows :—

Until a few weeks ago, a British detachment of about 250 men was stationed at Khartoum. After consultation with Sir Reginald Wingate and General Talbot, I arrived, though very reluctantly, at the conclusion that the detachment should be withdrawn for the present. This decision was based wholly on the fact that no barrack accommodation suitable for occupation by British troops during the summer months exists at Khartoum. I cannot conceal from myself the risk which is thus being incurred. It cannot be doubted that it is considerable.

Looking to the condition of affairs in the Soudan, and the composition of the

Egyptian army—both points on which I need not perhaps now enlarge at any length—I have no hesitation in expressing a very decided opinion that a garrison of at least one British battalion should be stationed permanently at Khartoum. In this view Sir Reginald Wingate fully concurs. We recommend, therefore, that steps should be taken to construct suitable barrack accommodation for this force.

If, however, for whatsoever reason, the War Office authorities are not prepared to entertain this proposal, we then recommend that steps should be taken to construct permanent barracks for at least two companies. I wish to repeat that the latter recommendation is put forward not because we think a garrison of two companies is sufficient, but because it is preferable to have even a very small British garrison rather than none at all.

In either case, some temporary arrangements will have to be made. A sum of 600*l.* has been already granted. From the inclosed papers,* which have been communicated to me by Sir R. Wingate, your Lordship will observe that the cost of temporary barrack accommodation is now estimated at 1,050*l.*

In view of the importance of this question, I would again earnestly beg that it should be treated with as great expedition as possible. I need hardly say that any expenditure in connection with the British troops at Khartoum will have to be borne by the British Treasury. It is, in my opinion, quite out of the question that any demands should be made on the Egyptian Treasury.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

No. 34.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 17.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, May* 17, 1900.

A TELEGRAM has just been received from Peake, stating that he went as far south as Fort Berkeley.

No. 35.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 18.)

Sir, *War Office, May* 16, 1900.

WITH reference to your complimentary note of the 9th ultimo, inclosing a telegram from Lord Cromer, No. 71, dated the 9th April, concerning the provision of barracks for a British garrison of two companies of infantry at Khartoum, I am to inform you that the Secretary of State for War has issued instructions for immediate steps to be taken to provide the necessary buildings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. KNOX.

No. 36.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April* 1, 1900.

IN my telegram No. 6 of to-day's date to Lord Cromer, I have had the honour to report briefly the detention of Major Austin and his party at Goré. The details of the case are as follows.

Major Austin reached Goré about the 2nd March, and wrote to me on that day, stating that he had been very well treated by all the Abyssinians with whom he had come in contact, and that every assistance had been given him in procuring supplies and transport. So grateful was he for the treatment he had received, that he forwarded to me for transmission to Dejasmatch Tesama Nadoo, the Ruler of the country in which

* Inclosures not printed.

Goré is situated, a letter thanking the Dejasmatch for the assistance he had received from the local officials, and telling him that he would send him a present from England if he would let him know what he would like to have.

In his letter to me, Major Austin said that he was organizing his transport, which had suffered considerably, and that as soon as this was done, and he had recovered from a severe attack of sunstroke and fever, from which he was suffering, he intended to continue his journey to Lake Rudolf.

Last night (the 31st March) I received another letter from him dated Goré, the 19th March, saying that a disagreeable change had taken place in the demeanour of the local Abyssinian officials since he last wrote. The friendliness which they had shown on his arrival had disappeared; promises of assistance had never been fulfilled, and after parting with their watches, revolvers, and other personal effects in the hope of propitiating what Major Austin described as "these sharks" all their endeavours to obtain transport had been frustrated by active opposition of the local officials. Finally, when no further presents were forthcoming, and when the party could not move for lack of transport, Kanyasmatch Walda Gabriel, the local official, had bluntly told Major Austin that he could get away as best he could, and that he would give him no assistance. Major Austin says that he fears that his expedition will consequently be a complete failure, and that owing to the approach of the rainy season he has no choice but to return to the Sobat by the way he has come.

This morning I read Major Austin's letter to the King, who had with him Dejasmatch Tesama Nadoo. They both expressed indignation at what occurred, in defiance to His Majesty's orders, which I had the honour to communicate to your Lordship in my despatch No. 65, Confidential, of the 2nd November, 1899.

I pointed out to His Majesty in what an anomalous position the action of his officials had placed him. Although Major Austin was a British officer, his work was of as much importance to Abyssinia as to the Soudan. The accomplishment of the desire which His Majesty had expressed for the definite settlement of his frontier had been indefinitely retarded solely through the action of his own officials. Relying on His Majesty's promise of assistance the survey parties had been sent out with small escorts, and officers of conciliatory disposition had been put in charge with a view to reducing the chance of friction. Yet both parties had been subjected to obstruction and annoyance, amounting almost to insult, at the hands of petty frontier officials. If our officers had not shown the greatest self-restraint and tact, very serious consequences might have arisen.

I told His Majesty that I was perfectly well aware that these vexatious events had occurred contrary to his orders. At the same time I felt bound to call his attention to the fact that Her Majesty's Government had always dealt with him as the Head of an organized State, and that they had relied on the paramountcy of his authority throughout his Empire. The disregard of his orders by his officials and the consequent annoyance caused to British officers, could not but have a painful effect. Did not His Majesty therefore think that the exemplary punishment of the offending officials was imperative ?

The Emperor at once said that he would have the Kanyasmatch brought here to be punished. He expressed great regret for what had occurred, and begged me to ask Major Austin to continue his work if possible. At the same time he sent a letter to both survey parties ordering all officials to offer them every assistance on pain of severe punishment. Of these letters, which are identical, I have the honour to inclose a copy.

Although the incidents are in themselves regrettable, I venture to think that if the King keeps his promise, of publicly punishing the offenders, the ultimate effect, as regards British prestige, will be good. The matter touches His Majesty's vanity, which is a strong factor with him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON,
Captain.

Inclosure in No. 36.

Letter from King Menelek to his Officers at Goré, &c.

(Translation.)

(Seal of Emperor Menelek.)

THE Lion of the Tribe of Judah hath prevailed. Menelek II, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia. My salutations to all who see this letter, and to my officers.

Captain Gwynne, who is now in Dejasmatch Demisi's country (Major Austin, who is now in Dejasmatch Tesamma Nadoo's country), is an officer of the English Government. Let him go by whatever route he wishes, and do not stop him. If he wants to buy animals to slaughter, or horses, or mules, or donkeys, over and above what you give him in token of friendship, provide him with animals which he can buy; should he want to hire men to carry his baggage, find the necessary men; if he wants to buy grain, find the grain, and bring it to him to buy; in all ways in which he may require help, help him, and see that he gets on all right.

All officers who are in my country under my Chiefs! If you do not act according to this order of mine, mourn for yourselves for I shall punish you severely.

Written April 3rd, 1900, at Addis Abbaba.

No. 37.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April* 7, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a translation of a permit granted by the Emperor Menelek to a British Indian named Jivajee to import arms and ammunition. Jivajee has asked me to place him in communication with arms merchants in England, and I have told him that I will lay the matter before your Lordship.

This permit definitely opens the question whether we shall allow a trade in arms and ammunition through the British port of Zeyla or not, as permission having been granted to one British Indian merchant probably means that permits will be sought by and granted to others.

Under the Rodd Treaty of 1897, we are bound to permit the passage of arms and ammunition destined for the Emperor Menelek, but not such stores destined for private traders. On the other hand, any person is at liberty to import arms and ammunition through the French port of Jibuti. Consequently so long as we refuse permission to merchants to pass arms and ammunition through Zeyla, they will, it being their interest to do so, engage in the trade through Jibuti. This has the result of increasing other trade through Jibuti, because if forced to keep an agency there for their arms business, it is cheaper for them to transact all their business through that port than part there and part through Zeyla.

The chief trade in arms, up to date, has been in arms of war, such as the Gras rifle. This trade, owing to the overstocking of the market, is not now very profitable, and a small trade in better classes of arms, such as sporting large and small-bore rifles, and revolvers, &c., has sprung up.

It is, so I understand from Jivajee, this latter class of trade, and not military rifles, that the Indian merchants wish to share in, as owing to their lesser expenses in living, they see their way to underselling their French rivals, in whose hands, and that of Greeks and Armenians, the trade in arms at present is.

The local rules which govern the trade in arms in Abyssinia require that a Shoan should have a permit to purchase, before a rifle is sold him, and Gallas are prohibited from owning fire-arms. Even semi-independent, feudatory chiefs, such as King Tekla Haimanot of Gojam, cannot purchase weapons without the Emperor's permit.

Menelek may, therefore, be said to exercise a fairly effectual control over the importation and distribution of arms.

As a signatory to the General Act of the Brussels Conference, it appears that the Emperor is within his rights in licensing a trader within his territory to trade in arms, and any action on our part in the sense of prohibiting such a licensed trader from importing arms and ammunition through our ports would be difficult to justify.

Undesirable as it is, that the Abyssinians should become possessed of arms which may eventually be used against us or some other European Power, the fact remains that under existing circumstances, there is no means of preventing it.

I venture to think that the matter resolves itself into the question whether it is desirable to countenance the participation of British and Indian merchants in a trade which is openly carried on by our rivals, and which we cannot suppress.

A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to Consul-General Hayes Sadler.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 37.

King Menelek to Mr. Harrington.

THE Lion hath prevailed from the tribe of Judah. Menelek II, the Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia. I give my salutations to all who see this letter. Jivajee, the Indian, says that he will bring rifles, ammunition, and gunpowder from England; therefore I have given him my permission to do so.

Written on the 29th March, 1900, at Addis Abbaba.

No. 38.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, May* 3, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office despatch No. 44, Confidential, transmitting for my observations copy of a letter from the Intelligence Department of the War Office relating to the importation of warlike stores into Abyssinia.

The defeat of the Italians at Adowa placed a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, and some light field guns into the hands of Menelek. For years past the French have been pouring arms and ammunition into Jibuti, where a free sale has been permitted and encouraged; and by our Treaty with Abyssinia we authorized the transit through our ports of fire-arms and ammunition destined for the Emperor's use. The consequence has been that Menelek, availing himself of the facilities afforded him, has succeeded in accumulating a vast supply of military stores, and glutting the country with small arms, which with ammunition are still coming in.

These are no new facts. It is evident that the military position in Abyssinia constitutes a grave danger to us, and an immediate menace to our frontiers, in the event of a rupture in our relations, hitherto friendly, with Menelek. But it is not easy to suggest a solution of the problem. So far as this Protectorate is concerned our action has been limited to affording Menelek the facilities of transit to which he is entitled under the Treaty, and to nothing more as my despatch No. 7 of the 2nd February last shows.

So long as our relations with Menelek continue friendly we cannot go back on Article V of the Treaty, and if we put difficulties in the way of the working of Article V we should merely irritate Menelek and accentuate the suspicions he already entertains as to our intentions, without the main issue being affected in any way, so long as the transit of arms continues through Jibuti.

It was from October 1898 to May 1899 that Menelek imported his munitions of war through Zeyla. Since May 1899 no arms or ammunition for Abyssinia have passed through Zeyla, but importation has continued viâ Jubuti. I cannot help thinking that this is somewhat significant; it looks as if Menelek were not over anxious to attract our attention to his requisitions for warlike material. It is true that one reason why arms were imported through Zeyla was that, during the period mentioned there were troubles on the French caravan route; but, still, the complete cessation of any importations through our ports for the last year is remarkable. The 8,000 rifles Léontieff tried to pass through Zeyla were probably not destined for the Emperor, and, in their case, it will be observed from my despatch No. 7 that Léontieff was furnished by Menelek with a letter to the Governor of Jibuti requesting that facilities for their transit be afforded.

Nor does the matter end with the facts revealed by the Intelligence Department, serious as they are. The connection between the Jibuti Railway and the present question will doubtless not have escaped the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Hitherto Menelek has been enabled to accumulate large quantities of small-arms and ammunition, but, with the exception of some light field guns, he has no artillery. Once the French railway penetrates Abyssinia, he will be able to obtain field artillery of the most modern description and heavy guns of position, and I should not be surprised if the facilities which will thus be afforded by the railway had been present from the first to his mind, and possibly exerted no small influence in his decision to grant the Concession.

I would particularly invite attention to the naturally strong position of Harrar, which could easily be rendered impregnable by guns of position.

The only means by which the further importation into Abyssinia of supplies of warlike material could be stopped, and what I may call the second stage of military preparations in the country—the accumulation of modern artillery—be averted, would be to revise our Treaty with Menelek and come to an agreement with France on the subject. For neither of these measures would the conditions at present appear to be in the least degree favourable, and the one without the other would be worse than useless.

As the matter stands, it seems that all control over the armaments of Abyssinia has passed out of our hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 39.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, May* 4, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit my observations on the question raised in Captain Harrington's despatch to your Lordship, No. 17, Confidential, of the 7th ultimo.

Whether we should accord permission to import arms and ammunition through our ports to Indian traders, who have been licensed by Menelek to import the same into Abyssinia, is a matter which might conveniently be considered in connection with the general question of armaments in that country, on which I submitted my remarks in my despatch No. 45 of yesterday.

If the position be admitted that, situated as we are, we are unable to exercise any control over the importation of arms and ammunition into Abyssinia, then the main question is not affected by allowing their transit through Zeyla, and I agree with the view taken by Captain Harrington that, under existing circumstances, it would be difficult to justify a refusal in the present instance.

Another point has to be considered. If this permission be accorded to Jivajee it will soon be followed by other applications. Very probably Messrs. E. W. Carling and Company will apply to import military stores through Zeyla. Behind all lies the fact that there is nothing to prevent arms and stores being imported in any quantities through Jibuti.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 40.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, May* 5, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit extract from a note to my address from Lieutenant Harold of the 3rd instant, which shows that the construction of the Jibuti Railway is being rapidly pushed forward, and that its effect on the trade of the Protectorate is likely to make itself felt at an early date.

Lieutenant Harold writes:—

"The news I get from Jibuti is disquieting. The work of the railway is being

pushed on with renewed vigour, and it is said a settlement has been arrived at with the Aysa tribe, not that this tribe could stop the work, but it could make it more difficult.

"Trains now run some 84 miles, and rails are laid for a good bit beyond that distance. This is what they call the first section of the line, and it has been completed. Arrangements are now being made for the opening of this section to traffic, *i.e.*, camel transport will only be required at the railhead some 84 miles from Jibuti, and half the distance to Gildessa will have thus been covered by the railway.

"Our merchants are watching all this with interest, and those who have not agents in Jibuti have been going over there to see things for themselves. In a month or two we may see this first section of the railway open to traffic, and, of course, all our trade must go there. I hear, too, that the railway are arranging for a steamer to run between Aden and Jibuti, and if this is affected, Cowasji Dinshaw's steamers will have to take the run to Jibuti.

"A large deputation of the black Aysa visited Jibuti the other day. They were entertained right royally, and on their departure were given a present of 1,000 francs. It is rumoured that the Aysa have sold the land required for the railway to the Company, but the price is not yet agreed upon. This may or may not be. I myself do not believe the Aysa are reconciled to this railway, but they can of course never stop it. Menelek threatens them on one side, and the French on the other.

"1900–1 may prove to be a very disastrous year for Zeyla. Things seem to point that way. There can be little doubt from what I hear that the railway work is going on faster than ever.

"The Greek who ran the liquor shop here has closed it and left."

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

J. H. S.

No. 41.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May* 12, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a telegram addressed by Colonel Jackson to the Sirdar. The news contained in this telegram is based on a letter from Captain Harrington, dated the 30th March. This letter deals with the same circumstances as are narrated in Captain Harrington's despatch to your Lordship, No. 16, of the 1st April.

It seems clear that, owing partly to sickness and partly to the obstruction of the Abyssinian authorities, Major Austin has been able to do little or nothing towards the accomplishment of his mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Colonel Jackson to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum* [*received May* 12, 1900].

HARRINGTON, on 30th March, forwards to Talbot letter from Austin of 19th March from Goré, which he places at latitude 8° 9′ and longitude 35° 33′, and 231 miles east of Nasser, which he left on 7th January. He reached Faidherbe, in Gambila district, 150 miles east of Nasser, 28th February, and was met there by Abyssinian messengers inviting him to go to Bure, where everything had been prepared by Menelek's orders.

Scarcity of water made progress south impossible till rains. He accepted, with great difficulty, owing to badness of road, reaching top of plateau on 8th February. There he fell seriously ill but recovered enough to go by easy stages on 25th February.

Degaz Samma was away at the capital, but his representative, Gabriel, received them royally, and up to about 2nd March nothing could have exceeded the kindness of the Abyssinians. Since that date Abyssinians have been trying what they can get out of them, and have refused them assistance to move. He wrote a complaint to Harrington, who is seeing about it. Austin fears he will not be able to do more than return straight to Nasser, where he may arrive any date. Peake has been informed of return of Austin's party, and has been asked to render all assistance and to send a steamer, if possible, to Nasser.

No. 42.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 21.)

(No. 141. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Brussels, May* 19, 1900.

I LEARN from the inclosure in your Lordship's despatch No. 64, Africa, of the 16th instant, that Viscount Cromer sees no objection to an arrangement being come to by which the Congo State may receive by the Nile supplies for its garrisons in the leased territory.

Your Lordship knows from the frequent questions which I have at various times reported as having been addressed to me by those connected with the Congo, that the King attaches the utmost importance to obtaining this concession, and, if it would suit Her Majesty's Government now to make a general arrangement by which His Majesty would abandon his shadowy claim to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal against a right of passage for supplies and reinforcements along the Nile, this, it seems to me, might be a good moment for doing so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

No. 43.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 19. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April* 14, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60, Confidential, of the 30th August, 1899, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a further Memorandum on the Jibuti–Harrar Railway, embodying various considerations which were not dealt with in my previous Memorandum.

Strenuous efforts are being made by M. Ilg and M. Cheffneux, who are now in Europe, to raise money for the completion of the railway. Considerable pains have been taken to render interesting the Abyssinian Section at the Paris Exhibition, with a view to attracting subscribers for the Company's shares.

The line has already been laid for a distance of 55 kilom., and, if sufficient money is found in France to carry on the work from this point, I venture to think that the transfer of the control of the railway, and the very large interests involved, from French to British hands will become a difficult and costly matter.

The possibility of the acquisition by France of the control of the main outlet of Abyssinia appears to me to bear so directly on the development of British commercial and political relations here that I trust I may be pardoned for again laying the matter before your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

Inclosure in No. 43.

Memorandum by Mr. Harrington.

IN the Railway Concession granted by King Menelek to MM. Ilg and Cheffneux, the conditions which call for chief notice are Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

Article 1 grants the right to make a line in three sections: from Jibuti to Harrar, Harrar to Antoto, and Antoto to Kaffa and the White Nile.

Article 2 states that present Concession only applies to Harrar–Jibuti section.

Article 3 states that the Concession is granted for ninety-nine years for each of the sections from the date of its completion, and gives the Company the *monopoly* of railway construction in Abyssinia.

Article 4 confirms the concessionnaires in their rights under the Concession once they have laid only 1 mile of track.

Article 8 grants to the concessionnaires the right of fixing their tariffs.

Article 9 grants the concessionnaires the right to levy a tax of 10 per cent. on all goods passing over the railway towards guaranteeing the interest on the capital necessary to construct the line; this 10 per cent. can be levied once the line is laid to El Bah, at the foot of the Harrar Mountains. (Reference, Mr. Harrington's No. 1, 25th July, 1898, Inclosure No. 3.)

Article 10 insures to the concessionnaires that all goods exported from Harrar shall be carried by the railway, and protects the railway from competition that might come from British Somali Coast ports, because wherever else goods may arrive they are to be taxed as if they came by railway—that is to say, that this Article gives to the French port of Jibuti a monopoly of all trade between South Abyssinia and the Gulf of Aden.

Article 11 grants a valuable property to the Company constructing the line.

The Articles quoted above demonstrate the value of the Concession which has been obtained, and its conditions are more than exceptionally favourable to the concessionnaires.

The country whose subjects are the possessors of the railway made under this Concession must infallibly, in course of time, control Abyssinia politically and commercially; *politically*, because, once the railway reaches Harrar, it will be sufficient to threaten Menelek with the loss of Harrar to make him yield any demand short of his independence and refuse the demands of any rival Power. Moreover, presuming that French subjects own the Jibuti–Harrar Railway, then Abyssinia's independence only exists at France's mercy, and ends the day that France cares to go to war.

When one remembers the history of the Italian–Abyssinian war, that Menelek was prepared to yield to all Italy's demands, and would have done so, only that his Swiss adviser, M. Ilg, used all his influence in favour of war with Italy, to serve and safeguard his own personal interests, it seems safe to presume that, for the same reason, Ilg, if he has not by then realized his interest in the railway, will counsel Menelek to yield to France's demands, should the latter threaten war to gain her ends.

Should there arise a war between France and Abyssinia, which to an outside observer seems the inevitable result of the railway, owing to the conflicting interests of France, England, and Italy, in Abyssinia, it may be said that it is to England and Italy's advantage to prevent France from deriving too great an advantage from the war. To do so might, and would probably, entail an European war, as France would naturally refuse to yield rights over Abyssinia that she would have obtained at the sacrifice of much blood and treasure.

France's position would be that she had only gone to war to maintain the rights of her subjects under the Railway Concession; and, though opposition on the part of England and Italy might prevent her actually obtaining any territorial acquisitions in Abyssinia, still France's position as owning the railway monopoly throughout Abyssinia would enable her to reap from Abyssinia practically the same political and commercial rights that actual possession would give her.

Commercially, because under the terms of Articles 8, 9, and 10 it will be in the power of the Railway Company to so arrange the tariffs that trade would be impossible for other than French subjects. From the wording of Article 10 it appears that should the Company, supported by the French Government, insist on the strict application of the terms of the Concession, goods entering the country from any other point than by the railway to Harrar would be liable to the same tax as those entering viâ Harrar. This would inevitably kill all trade other than that through Harrar. Trade from the Gulf of Aden through British Somaliland ports could not possibly compete against the railway if it has to pay the same taxes as trade over the railway. The terms of the Concession are

clear on this point, so that the present trade between Red Sea and Gulf of Aden coast ports, amounting to about 600,000*l.* a-year, must be conducted through Jibuti with a consequent loss of revenue to the British Somaliland Protectorate of about 12,000*l.* a-year.

It seems clear that if the influence which France will gain, even if the line does not proceed further than Harrar, is fully made use of, it will be absolutely useless for the subject of any other Power to acquire commercial interests in Abyssinia, because his situation can be made untenable.

That the French are not ignorant of the commercial prospects of the Jibuti–Harrar railway is evident from the following significant extract from the "Moniteur Officiel du Commerce" of the 9th February, 1899, in an article on the subject of Abyssinian trade:—

"Actuellement les transactions s'opèrent principalement par la voie Zeyla–Aden; mais le chemin de fer en cours de construction, qui doit relier Harrar à Djibouti, doit incontestablement amener sur ce dernier point la presque totalité du commerce de l'Abyssinie."

To sum up, the situation caused by the grant of the Railway Concession, it is that the Power whose subjects build the railway must in course of time become the inevitable possessors of Abyssinia, both commercially and politically, unless prevented by war.

In the Memorandum submitted with my despatch No. 60, Confidential, of the 31st August, 1899, I suggested three courses which seemed open, to avoid the danger with which the completion of the Jibuti Railway threatens Imperial interests. Nos. 1 and 2 were declared undesirable, as, even if adopted, they entail competition with a French line. Moreover they necessitate demanding a Concession from Menelek, which the French Government would prevent him granting by threatening war, and which the influence of M. Ilg, would also be used against. Moreover, the conditions of the present Concession are such that the chances of competing successfully with the opposition railway are remote, if not nil.

The third plan suggested was "to buy up the rights of the French Company and transfer the line to Berbera."

If the statements of the concessionnaires, MM. Cheffneux and Ilg, to me are to be relied on, both of them are in favour of such a plan, though to insure the transfer of the line to Berbera, Her Majesty's Government would probably have to guarantee Menelek's possession of Harrar, which, considering we have by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1887 debarred ourselves from taking, ought not to be difficult.

In the Memorandum referred to it was pointed out that a Government guarantee would be necessary, that is to say, a guarantee for the portion of the line within British Somaliland, to enable this plan to be carried out, and the financial prospects of the line were also discussed. Since last year I have further studied the question, and, from further inquiries made, I am inclined to think that in my Memorandum of last year I underestimated the volume of trade. Further investigation leads me to believe that I am not over-estimating tbe present volume of trade between French and British Somali Coasts and Harrar at 600,000*l.* per annum. As shown in the Memorandum referred to, 5 per cent. freight charges on the commerce would yield traffic returns of 30,000*l.* per annum. That the trade could bear transport charges of 5 per cent. on its value was shown in the Memorandum, and it was pointed out that much of the trade could bear $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 per cent.

That these figures are not excessive is evident from the "Note on the 3 per cent. 500 fr. shares in the Compagnie Impériale des Chemins de Fer Éthiopiens" (Inclosure 5 in my Memorandum of the 25th July, 1898), wherein it is stated that Abyssinian coffee is worth, at its lowest, 750 fr. per ton at the port of shipment, and it is calculated that this can pay 150 fr. per ton for transport, or 20 per cent.

A point which escaped my notice was that the Railway Company has the right of levying a tax of 10 per cent. on all goods which pass over the line. In previous Memoranda I have not discussed this point, as I was under the impression that Menelek had given the concessionnaires the Harrar customs as part guarantee of interest on the capital expenditure. This is not the case, as Article 9 gives the right to the concessionnaires to levy this tax, and yet leaves Menelek free to levy his customs as at present. That this is the correct reading of Article 9 is proved by the Convention signed between the French Colonial Minister, M. Lebon, and M. Cheffneux at Paris on the 12th March, 1897. By this Convention the Railway Company are allowed to collect a 10 per cent. tax in French territory on all goods passing over the line. Calculating traffic returns at 5 per cent. on the value of the trade and the value of the 10 per cent. tax permitted by Article 9 of the Concession, the railway not allowing for any development of trade is certain of a revenue of 90,000*l.* per annum to pay working expenses and interest on

capital. This amount is sufficient to pay 3 per cent. on 2,000,000*l.*, and leave 30,000*l.* per annum for working expenses. These figures show the financial prospects of the railway are better than they were shown to be in my Memorandum of 1899, and demonstrate that the financial liability of Her Majesty's Government under a guarantee for the portion of the railway in British Somaliland would be small; in fact, the chief value of the Government guarantee would be that it would insure public subscription of the capital required to make the line.

The Concession is such a good one that I cannot understand how it is that the Company have not succeeded in raising the necessary money in France.

Though Consul-General Sadler seems to think that the Somali Coast Protectorate from its revenues could not assist in the construction of the railway, considering that the Protectorate will, if the Jibuti–Harrar Railway is completed, have a revenue of about 12,000*l.* per annum less than at present, and will require a grant-in-aid towards its administration from the Imperial Exchequer, it does not seem unfair to ask that any revenue, over and above the present revenue of the Protectorate, which may result from a Berbera–Harrar Railway should be applied towards guaranteeing the British Somaliland portion of the line.

The only danger that the proposed plan apparently has is that, when the control of the Railway Company is obtained by British financiers, Menelek might refuse to sanction the transfer of the terminus from Jibuti to Berbera. This danger is only nominal, as we should have the support of MM. Ilg and Cheffneux, who are only anxious to realize their interest in the Concession, and Menelek would scarcely dare refuse the transfer were British control established over the Railway Company, and the British Government insisted on the transfer.

At the present moment 55 kilom. of the line are laid, and every day's delay in carrying out the proposed plan increases its cost.

In conclusion, if it is impossible at present for Her Majesty's Government to take steps to secure the control of the Railway Company and the transfer of the railway to British Somaliland, then the Railway Concession is likely to have such a tremendous political value in the future solving of the destinies of Abyssinia that it would seem advisable that British capital should be induced to obtain a considerable interest in the existing Railway Company, so that should difficulties arise between France and Abyssinia on account of the Railway Concession, we may be able to have an equal voice with France in any settlement that ensues.

If it is impossible to take action in the matter, then once the frontier questions are settled British interests in Abyssinia will be nil, and all that remains is to see France gradually extending her power over Abyssinia until it is virtually, if not actually, a French Protectorate, unless we are prepared to take the risk of war in attempts to avoid such an eventuality.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

April 14, 1900.

No. 44.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, May* 7, 1900.

CAPTAIN HARRINGTON has sent me by this mail a copy of his despatch to your Lordship No. 19, Confidential, of the 14th ultimo, and of his Memorandum on the Jibuti-Harrar Railway inclosed therewith.

I have written so much on this question during the last three years that I must crave your Lordship's indulgence if I venture to offer a few more remarks on this important subject.

My views on the Jibuti–Harrar Railway generally, the effect its completion cannot fail to have on our trade and prestige in Somaliland, and the suggestion that the Protectorate should guarantee railway construction within its limits, were principally dealt with in my despatch of the 4th June to the Political Resident, Aden. (Inclosure in No. 99 of Red Sea and Somali Coast Printed Papers for 1898), and in my despatch to your Lordship No. 18 of the 29th March, 1899.

There is, indeed, little to be added to what has already been said on the subject. It has been shown that the French railway will take all our trade with Harrar and Southern Abyssinia to Jibuti. The trade of Zeyla will be reduced to one of purely local require-

ments; and France will gain in prestige and influence in this part of Africa, whilst we lose correspondingly in both.

Captain Harrington has dealt with the matter both commercially as touching British trade, and politically as affecting our position in Abyssinia and our relations, present and future, with that country.

It would seem that the possibilities of Abyssinian trade as affording a mart for British goods should ere this have attracted the attention of our Chambers of Commerce, from whom some action for the protection of commercial interests might be looked for; possibly since the opening up of the Soudan, attention may have been diverted towards the western outlet of Abyssinia, but that is no reason why the capabilities of the old-established Harrar route should be neglected.

Of the various schemes which have been put forward to counteract the French Railway, but one would now appear to remain for consideration—the purchase by an English syndicate of the rights in the Concession acquired by MM. Ilg and Cheffneux. I have always been in favour of this project, though doubtful how far the interests the French have acquired in Jibuti would allow of its practical realization.

In my despatch No. 18 of the 29th March, 1899, I explained the reasons why I was unable to recommend that financial aid be given by the Protectorate to Mr. Lane's scheme. The finances of the Protectorate could not stand the charge.

Captain Harrington now suggests that the Protectorate should set off any increment to its present revenues, which would accrue from the construction of a railway line, as a guarantee for the Somali portion of the line.

In 1898–99 our revenue was, in round numbers, 3,80,000 rupees. The revenue for 1899–1900 was slightly in excess, and but for disturbances inside and outside the Protectorate should have reached a higher figure; we may say the present revenue is 4,00,000 rupees or 26,666*l.*

Unless valuable mines are discovered in the Protectorate—when railway enterprise would at once become necessary—I do not see that, situated as we are, we have any means of materially enhancing our revenue, whereas if the French line is completed, we are at once confronted with certain loss, and the ground for further development in our trade will, so to speak, be cut off from under our feet.

I do not, therefore, think there would be any unwarrantable risk in acting on Captain Harrington's suggestion. I would further be ready, subject to your Lordship's approval, to afford a British Syndicate purchasing the rights in the French Company all possible assistance in the matter of mining and other licences in the Protectorate.

But the question would arise as to whether such a guarantee would be sufficiently definite. Should it not be considered so, and presuming that the scheme to purchase the rights in the French Company be found practicable, I venture to suggest whether the importance of the issues at stake would not justify further consideration of the question of a guarantee from Imperial funds. If matters are allowed to run their course and the French line reaches completion, the political results will, in my opinion, be more serious than the commercial.

If there be any chance of getting possession of the rights of this Concession, I think we should use every endeavour to acquire them before it is too late, and that to this end the question of the guarantee merits consideration.

In conclusion, I would invite attention to Article 10 of the Concession. The Concession was granted three years before our Treaty was made with Menelek; but I think it may be questioned how that Article, and the monopoly it gives the railway, can be held to accord with our rights under Article III and IV of the Treaty.

The effect of Article 10 will apparently be to double the dues on British trade entering Harrar. At present this trade pays 10 per cent. customs duties at the Harrar frontier. When the railway is finished, such camel-borne trade as is left will pay an additional 10 per cent. on account of the railway, which it has not used.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Text of Article 10 *of the Jibuti–Harrar Railway Concession, and of Articles III and IV of our Treaty with Abyssinia of* 1897.

Jibuti–Harrar Railway Concession, March 9, 1894.

ARTICLE 10. Sa Majesté le Roi des Rois d'Éthiopie donnera l'ordre que toutes les marchandises payant des frais de transport, partant de Harrar ou venant de Djibouti, soient désormais transportées par le chemin de fer. Dans toute localité où pourraient arriver des marchandises, des douaniers du Gouvernement, chargés de la surveillance, prélèveront le droit sur place.

Treaty with Abyssinia of May 14, 1897.

Article. III. The caravan route between Zeyla and Harrar by was of Gildessa shall remain open throughout its whole extent to the commerce of both nations.

Article IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, on the one hand, accords to Great Britain and her Colonies, in respect of import duties and local taxation, every advantage which he may accord to the subjects of other nations.

On the other hand, all material destined exclusively for the service of the Ethiopian State shall, on application from His Majesty the Emperor, be allowed to pass through the port of Zeyla into Ethiopia free of duty.

No. 45.

Consul-General Sadler to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

(Confidential.)

My dear Sir Thomas Sanderson, *Berbera, May* 7, 1900,

HARRINGTON has sent me a copy of his despatch No. 19, and further Memorandum on the French Railway to Harrar.

I have submitted my observations officially, but there is really little to add to what has already been written on the subject.

The question of the purchase of the rights in the French Company, apparently the only effective means of counteracting the French scheme, seems to rest on two premises: (1) that Ilg and Cheffneux are acting straight and are sincere in their overtures; and (2) that presuming all this the scheme could be carried out in practice. As to (1) I have no information; whilst as regards (2) I have always been, and still am, doubtful whether the French would ever allow the transfer to take place in view of the interests they have in Jibuti and the money that has been poured into the place. The railway taken away, Jibuti would naturally collapse.

I hope, however, that if my deductions are wrong, and it be found possible to proceed with the scheme, that all that is possible may be done to carry it through.

The matter seriously affects this Protectorate, and, I venture to think, has a very direct bearing on our future position as regards Southern Abyssinia.

Yours sincercly,

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 46.

Viscount Cromer to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

My dear Sanderson, *Cairo, May* 15, 1900.

I INCLOSE from Harrington. I am at the same time forwarding a despatch from him, No. 19 of the 14th April.

Harrington overstates the case. After Fashoda, one never can be certain that great events may but arise out of apparently small things. I do not, however, think it probable that Europe will be convulsed even if the French do make their railway to Harrar.

Still, although I am generally rather disinclined to recommend projects of this nature,

I adhere to the view which I have previously expressed on this subject. It seems to me a matter of some importance.

In the first place, when the railway is made, we shall almost certainly lose the Zeyla revenue.

In the second place, I would much rather the French should not occupy the predominant position in Abyssinia, which the construction of the railway will probably give them. They are sure to cause us trouble of one sort or another.

Is it not possible to do something? The matter is really worth considering. I have written to Rodd, and have asked him to speak to you.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

Addis Abbaba, April 14, 1900.

Dear Lord Cromer,

I HOPE you will not think me insupportable with my further Memorandum on the railway question, but I am haunted with fears that Ilg and Cheffneux may raise the necessary money in France.

If you take the same view of the importance of the political value of the railway that I do, might I ask you to say a supporting word on the subject to Lord Salisbury.

Surely if Lord Salisbury were to signify his wish to some financier such as Rothschild, Hamboro, or Cassel, some definite proposal could be made that Her Majesty's Government might be able to entertain.

I see from the newspapers that Rodd has gone up the Nile.

I believe the Italians will get the Mareb-Belesa-Samuna frontier after all, though what *quid pro quo* they are giving for it I do not yet know.

I am inclined to think that fear of us has a good deal to do with Menelek's coming to terms with Italy.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 47.

Sir R. Rodd to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 25.)

17, *Stratford Place, London, May* 25, 1900.

Dear Sir Thomas,

WITH reference to the despatches from Harrington and Sadler respecting the Jibuti Railway, I may mention that when I saw M. Ilg at Lucerne he confirmed the report that the Railway Company had now two small steamers running between Jibuti and Aden.

He told me, however, that they had decided not to take the railway to Harrar, owing chiefly to the expense of the gradients on that side. He considered that trade would come down to the railhead, and the line would skirt the slopes of the plateau, and so penetrate further into the heart of the country. The trade of Harrar province itself was not likely to be so remunerative as to make it worth their while to take the line there.

He admitted that the trade of Zeyla would be doomed when the railway was opened, but thought there would still be a considerable volume of trade going down to Berbera, which would also be capable of development, and some day there might be room for a line from Berbera to Harrar.

As to the arms question, I think as long as we go through the form of requiring an application from the Negus, we should admit arms to Abyssinia, otherwise the Brussels Act merely will become then what it is in the rest of Africa, a self-denying ordinance on our part in favour of the natives. At Jibuti any one can obtain arms without difficulty, and Arabs from the Yemen come over in dhows to buy them.

Should not the system of stamping all arms imported be adopted, and any found in Somaliland not stamped and licensed by the Government (and therefore introduced from Jibuti) be confiscated?

Any attempt to stop Menelek's armaments entering through Somaliland would only excite suspicion of our intentions, and serve no useful purpose, as he would get them through Jibuti.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

No. 48.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 101.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1900.

I RECEIVED in due course your Lordship's despatch No. 9, Africa, of the 14th ultimo, inclosing correspondence between the Sirdar of the Egyptian army and the Belgian Consul-General at Cairo respecting the transport of supplies by the Nile to the Congo Free State, and I approve the terms of the Sirdar's communication to M. Maskeus.

A copy of your despatch was forwarded to Her Majesty's Minister at Brussels, and I now transmit to you, for such observations as your Lordship may wish to offer, a copy of a communication which has been received from Sir F. Plunkett on the subject.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 49.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, April 20, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have learnt on very good authority that M. Leontieff, before leaving for Europe, obtained permission from the Emperor to import boats for the navigation of the Omo. Subsequently M. Leontieff told several Abyssinian officials that he intended to take his boats into Lake Rudolph.

When the Emperor heard this he is reported to have been displeased, anticipating, as he said, that M. Leontieff's proceedings would again create difficulties with Great Britain.

I have. &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

No. 50.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 22. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, April 20, 1900

I HAVE the honour to report that my Italian colleague has told me that, in conversation with him, the Emperor complained that the French refused to avail themselves of the right reserved to them by their Treaty with him to judge all disputes in which French subjects are concerned.

It appears to be certain, therefore, that the French have stipulated for the protection of their subjects by means of Capitulations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON,
Captain.

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* No. 42.

No. 51.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 94.)

Cairo, May 20, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram communicated by the War Office from Major Peake reporting his proceedings on the Upper Nile.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Major Peake to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) [*Undated.*]

HAVE visited Belgian posts of Kiro, Lado, and Regaf, and met Inspector Chaltin, commanding Nile and Werle districts of Congo Free State, also Fort Berkeley, of Uganda Protectorate, under command of Captain Dugmore. Owing to exaggerated reports of bad navigation south of Lado, only took gun-boat "Tamai" as far as Lado, and went on in Uganda launch to Gondokoro, Regaf, and Fort Berkeley; distance, some 25 miles. In my opinion, river is navigable for gun-boats at all seasons up to Bedden. Left for Berkeley on Monday, 7th May, nilometer reading from Fort Berkeley by post. I granted passage from the Upper Nile to Commandant Henry and Engineer Mulders, of Congo Free State, and to Dr. Donaldson Smith, an American, who was at Fort Berkeley. I did this as a friendly act, and hope you will not disapprove.

The sudd is now finished exactly according to Sir W. Garstin's wishes.

I await your replies on further questions at Gebelani.

No. 52.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 95.)

Cairo, May 20, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Report which has been received from Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable M. G. Talbot on the subject of his recent negotiations with the Governor of Erythræa for the settlement of a frontier between that Colony and the Soudan, together with Memoranda dealing with the cognate matters arising from this question.

I venture to suggest that these papers should be communicated to Sir Rennell Rodd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Lieutenant-Colonel Talbot to the Civil Secretary, Cairo.

(Strictly Confidential.)

Civil Secretary,

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

I FORWARD herewith a Report on my visit to Asmara for the purpose of negotiating with his Excellency the Governor of Erythræa the boundary from Sabderat to Todluk, with separate Memoranda on the following questions which arose during my interviews:—

1. The grazing question.
2. The Karora cultivation.
3. The Kassala Post Office.
4. The assessment of import duties at Kassala.
5. Signor Martini's proposed visit to Kassala next December.

A résumé of all of these was sent direct to his Excellency the Sirdar by registered letter from Asmara on the 12th April, and has, I trust, reached him safely.

A copy of my map of the Gash frontier was sent you by Bimbashi Boulnois, and I am now preparing a larger compilation embracing the results of my visit to the Setit, which will show the whole of the territory under dispute. I hope to submit it in a few days.

I return to you all the papers on the boundary and grazing questions that were brought to Kassala by Bimbashi Boulnois.

I wish to express my deep sense of the extreme kindness that I received from all officers and officials in Erythræa, from his Excellency the Governor and Colonel Trombi, commanding the troops, downwards, and especially from Lieutenant Colle, the Administrator of the Baraka, who personally conducted me from Agordat to Asmara and back. Nothing could have exceeded the courtesy and hospitality I met with everywhere.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Talbot on his Visit to Asmara in connection with the Negotiations regarding the Frontier between the Soudan and the Italian Colony of Erythræa.

I REACHED Asmara on the evening of the 29th March, 1900, and discussed the boundary question with his Excellency the Governor, Signor Martini, the next day.

He stated that he could not possibly consent to give up the portion of country between the Gash and the Atbara, bounded on the north by the line of the Protocol of 1891, viz., from a point on the Gash, 20 English miles above Kassala, to a point on the Atbara in latitude 14° 52′, and bounded on the south by a line Todluk to Tomat.

I informed him that my orders did not meet this case, and that I must telegraph for further instructions.

At first I thought he was not really serious in his refusal to adopt the line of the Gash, and was only trying to see what he could get in exchange. But after further discussions with Lieutenant Colle, the Administrator of the Baraka, who was his expert adviser, I gathered that nothing but an order from the Italian Government would induce the Governor to consent to the cession of the territory between the Gash and the Atbara.

I think it possible that his adoption of this line may be due to a desire not to stultify his previous political utterances, as he told me he had always opposed the retrocession of Kassala.

On the evening of the 10th April I received orders to return to the Soudan, and on the morning of the 11th April I informed Signor Martini that, as my instructions had been drawn up on the basis of the Agreement arrived at by Sir Rennell Rodd with the Italian Government at Rome in December last, and as he (the Governor) did not feel justified in accepting the interpretation put upon that Agreement by the Egyptian Government, the matter had to pass out of the sphere with which I was empowered to deal.

Though it was obvious that there was no chance of our coming to any agreement, we rediscussed the whole question.

Signor Martini did not claim any of this country on behalf of the Bazas, nor did he lay much stress on the claims of the Beni Amer, Italian subjects, who undoubtedly have some grazing rights south of the Gash, but dwelt on the great concessions Italy had already made, and urged that the adoption of the line of the Gash meant simply a cession of territory, while his instructions mentioned only a rectification of boundary.

He also dwelt to some extent on the loss of prestige that would accrue to Italy amongst the natives by the cession of this territory, though a few minutes after, in an argument on another question, he stated himself the undoubted fact that all the natives at present believe it to belong to the Soudan.

He showed clearly that he greatly regretted the loss by Italy of the triangle bounded by the Tomat–Todluk line on the north, the Setit on the south, and the Abyssinian frontier on the east; and the only rectification of frontier that he would allow as feasible involved the retrocession of this triangle to Italy, as soon as the Anglo-Egyptian Government had concluded its frontier with Menelek.

I pointed out that such action on our part would probably damage our relations with Menelek, would cut the Hamrans in two, and that even if they got this triangle it would be of little use to them.

Of course, if ever they were able to annex Tigre, this portion of country might be of some value to them, but as things are at present it would only be an incubus, and almost impossible to administer for want of communications.

In reply to his arguments, I dwelt little on the disadvantages to us of the Italians retaining the portion between the Gash and the Atbara, but showed the absolutely unworkable nature of such a frontier, the inconvenience it would cause the Italians themselves, and the innumerable questions that would arise between the two Governments, as it would be impossible to demarcate the northern and southern boundaries except by the great expense of cutting and keeping open defined lines of many miles length through the bush and grass. That though the Beni Amer have some grazing rights on the left bank of the Gash, they had little or none on the Atbara (I have since learnt from Colonel Collinson that they have none on the Atbara), and that whatever rights they may have on the left bank of the Gash they had managed very well without them during the Dervish occupation.

That the bulk of the country belonged to the Hamrans, who would thus be cut in two; and that the cession of a territory like this, whose administration expenses would far exceed its revenue, could not be regarded as much of a sacrifice to friendship.

He admitted more or less the force of all these arguments, but would only reply, "Then give us down to the Setit; that will make it all right."

Colonel Collinson has, I understand, pointed out to his Excellency the Sirdar the danger of leaving the course of the Gash below Todluk in the hands of even a friendly Power, for fear lest irrigation works should be undertaken on a sufficient scale to deprive Kassala of an appreciable portion of the Gash flood.

From what I saw of the course of the Gash, I do not think the danger is a very pressing one, but I should be sorry to say that it could be altogether neglected.

An Italian Engineer officer had hurriedly taken a few measurements to determine the position of the 20th mile of the Gash, but under very disadvantageous circumstances. His results differed considerably with mine, but his Excellency the Governor courteously agreed to accept my map, and to measure the 20 miles along the Gash taking the centre between the two belts of Dom palms, which fringe the true banks of the river bed.

I placed my map at the disposal of the Italians and gave permission for it to be copied, but I do not know if this was done or not.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 52.

1. *Memorandmm on the Discussion of the Grazing Question with the Italian Authorities of Erythræa.*

IN discussing this question after a certain amount of cross purposes, it came out that Signor Martini had sent to the Italian Consul-General at Cairo, in his letter of the 22nd February, 1900, for transmission to Lord Cromer, a claim for several thousands of dollars under Article 1 of the Parsons-Martini Agreement of the 7th December, 1898.

This was the first I had heard of this claim; consequently, when Signor Martini offered to denounce the Parsons-Martini Agreement if the Anglo-Egyptian Government would undertake to pay this new claim, as well as the previously submitted one, for 5,500 dollars under Article 7, it was impossible for me to do anything but telegraph for instructions.

Thinking, however, that the Parsons-Martini Agreement must eventually be denounced, and knowing that the present Administrator of the Baraka, Lieutenant Colle, was about to return to Italy, I thought it advisable to utilize his experience and undoubted good faith in drawing an outline of our views as to what would best replace the Parsons-Martini Agreement should it ever be denounced.

Though I had had little experience of the subject I was in possession of Colonel Collinson's views, and I think the draft we prepared embodies the framework of an Agreement that will produce a minimum of friction between the Governments and of hardship to the natives, should it ever replace the present Agreement.

A copy in French was shown to the Governor, who found no objection to it.

It is, of course, not in any way binding on any one; but as it resulted from a comparison of views between Lieutenant Colle and myself, and has been approved by the Governor of Erythræa and Colonel Collinson, I trust it may serve usefully as a basis for whatever Agreement eventually supersedes the Martini-Parsons Agreement.

Inclosure 4 in No. 52.

Draft of proposed Agreement.

1. The Parsons-Martini Agreement of the 7th December, 1898, shall be considered as denounced from the date of the ratificafion of the following Agreement by the two Governments in question.

2. Each of the two Governments reserves to itself the right of permitting or of forbidding any of its subjects to cross the frontier with their animals in search of pasturage; and of permitting or of forbidding any of the subjects of the other Government to enter its territory for the same purpose.

3. If either of the two Governments allows any subjects of the other Government to enter its territory for grazing, it shall have the right to impose a tax on them proportional to the number of animals they bring with them.

4. This tax shall in no case exceed the following limits:—

For each camel 1 dollar Maria Theresa.

For each head of cattle $\frac{1}{2}$ dollar Maria Theresa.

For each twenty sheep or goats $\frac{1}{2}$ dollar Maria Theresa.

In the case of camels or cattle, only those animals that have been weaned shall be liable to the tax.

This tax is not to be levied on transport animals employed in the conveyance of merchandize.

5. This tax is to be levied annually; and the maximum period, for which its payment shall entitle any herd or flock to remain in the country, is eight months. After the expiration of this period the Government, in whose territory the animals are, shall have the right to insist on the proprietors either removing their animals to their own country, or making a declaration of a change of nationality.

Any such declarations will be at once communicated to the Government to which the owners originally belonged.

6. Each Government reserves to itself the right to withdraw from the owners of animals the permission granted to them to graze their animals in its territory, even after they have paid the tax, if it considers that political reasons or the interests of its subjects render such a course necessary.

7. The tax is to be collected by the Government in whose territory the animals are, and responsibility whatever for its collection attaches to the Government to which the owners of the animals belong.

8. As soon as possible, after giving permission for any animals to graze in its territory, each of the two Governments shall inform the other of the number of persons, the tribes to which they belong, the number of animals with them, the amount of the tax levied on them, and any other details that their common interests may suggest.

9. Any persons crossing the frontier in search of grazing for their animals will be subject to the laws of the Government in whose territory they are, and must submit to the local authorities any complaint they may have regarding what has happened to them while in that territory.

10. The two Governments undertake to inform their subjects of the terms of this Agreement as soon as it has been ratified.

11. This Agreement shall come into force from the date of its ratification by the two Governments; but no tax shall be levied on animals that may happen to be across the frontier till forty-five days after such date.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

Inclosure 5 in No. 52.

2. *Mémorandum on the Question of the Cultivation on the Karora.*

AT one of our first interviews the Governor showed me a rough sketch, of which a copy by eye is attached, to illustrate a question of boundary under dispute in the neighbourhood of the Karora wells.

He claimed that the cultivation shown was in Italian territory, and complained that the Egyptian authority had levied taxes on it.

When I looked into the question it appeared to me to be clear that the real boundary, as demarcated, ran from M. Alibai (our J. Halibai) to M. Gaber Kelli (the same as our J. Ergeba in some sketches), and that the cultivation was therefore in Egyptian territory.

I pointed this out to the Governor, who still maintained that the right bank of the Karora was the boundary. He sent, however, for Captain Buon-Giovanni, the officer who accompanied Major Walter when the pillars were erected, who at once stated that my view was correct, and that looking from Gaber Kelli to Halibai all cultivation on the left of that line was in Egyptian territory and all to the right was in Italian.

I think there can be little doubt of this, as Major Walter, in his first Report on the boundary, mentions expressly that the line had been so taken as to leave Egypt practically all the cultivation in the Karora.

At the same time, from a remark on a sketch marked (D), attached to Bimbashi Burgess' Report forwarded by the Administrator S. Suakin, with his letter of the 17th January, 1900, to the Governor-General, it appears that Bimbashi Burgess is under the impression that the right bank of the Khor Karora is the boundary.

The note referred to is as follows:—

"Between J. Ergeba (which seems to be identical with M. Gaber Kelli of the Italian map) and J. Halibai right bank of Khor Karora marks the boundary, and left bank and Khor Egyptian territory."

The matter is of considerable urgency, as the natives have either already paid to both Governments, or are likely to do so very soon. Signor Martini accepted my contention, and undertook to have refunded any taxes erroneously collected.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 7, 1900.

Inclosure 6 in No. 52.

3. *Memorandum respecting Question of Kassala Post Office.*

BY an annex to the Act of Retrocession of Kassala, it was agreed that a post office should be established at Kassala for communication with Erythræa.

Signor Martini asked me to call the attention of the Governor-General to the fact that as yet only a post office for letters had been established, and that there was no means of transmitting money through the post to Kassala from Massawa.

He argued that the intention of the Agreement was that a post office in the full sense of the term should be established for the transaction of all business usually conducted by post offices.

I promised to do as desired.

4. He informed me that merchants complained to him that in assessing the 8 per cent. import duty at Kassala no notice was taken of the invoices, and that the duty was levied on values arbitrarily assigned to goods. I mentioned this to Colonel Collinson on my return, who has perhaps communicated with you on the subject.

5. Signor Martini asked me to mention, pending his official communication on the subject, that he proposed, if agreeable to the Governor-General, to visit Kassala next December with several officers to inaugurate the monument to his compatriots buried at Kassala.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

Inclosure 7 in No. 52.

Copy of Eye Sketch, without Scale or North Point, furnished by his Excellency the Governor of Erythræa.

[Not printed.]

Inclosure 8 in No. 52.

(D.)—*Rough Sketch of Boundary near Karora Post, with Boundary Pillars between Jebel Ergeba and Halibai, right bank of Khor Karora, marks Boundary left bank and Khor, Egyptian territory.*

[Not printed.]

No. 53.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 29.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, May* 29, 1900.

ERYTHRÆAN frontier.

The Mudir of Kassala asks if he is to regard the Tomat-Todluc line as the southern Italian frontier. Sir R. Rodd's opinion on this point would, I think, be useful. It appears that the chief village of the Hamran tribe is situated on the Settite at a point about 35 miles from its confluence with the Atbara, on the north bank.

I understand that this Tomat-Todluc line had been accepted by the Italians, but the negotiations which took place at Rome leave the question in ambiguity. It would, I think, be advisable to communicate with Rome before sending any instructions to Colonel Collinson if there is really any doubt as to whether the Italians have agreed. It is clear that there exists a good deal of friction between the local Soudanese and Italian authorities. Some correspondence on this point went home by last mail.

No. 54.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 16 of the 1st ultimo, reporting the circumstances under which Major Austin and his party were detained at Goré by the local Abyssinian officials.

I approve the steps you have taken to bring this matter to the notice of the Emperor Menelek, and the language which you held to His Majesty on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 55.

Foreign Office to Intelligence Division.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Intelligence, and is directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to him the accompanying copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia and Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast on the subject of the importation of arms into Abyssinia,* to which attention was drawn in Sir John Ardagh's communication of the 12th ultimo.

It appears from these despatches that Colonel Sadler and Captain Harrington are

* Nos. 37, 38, 39, and 40.

agreed that, as arms and warlike stores nre freely imported in large quantities through Jibuti, there is no reason why the importation of such articles through Zeyla should not be allowed.

Sir Thomas Sanderson is to request that Sir John Ardagh will be good enough to furnish Lord Salisbury with his opinion as to whether, since the prohibition against the transit of arms through Zeyla is practically ineffectual, it would not be desirable to permit the trade through the Protectorate and thus gain whatever commercial advantage may result from the removal of the prohibition.

Foreign Office, May 30, 1900.

No. 56.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 2.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May* 26, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a correspondence on the subject of certain differences of opinion which have arisen between the Italian Governor-General of Erythræa and the Government of the Soudan. I venture to suggest that this despatch and its inclosures should be sent to Sir Rennell Rodd.

The discussion has been suspended owing to the temporary interruption of telegraphic communication between Omdurman and Kassala.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 56.

M. Tugini to Viscount Cromer.

Cher Lord Cromer, *Le Caire, le* 20 *Mai*, 1900.

J'AI reçu hier au soir les deux télégrammes ci-joints de M. Martini.

Veuillez me mettre a même de lui télégraphier que vous donnerez les ordres nécessaires au Commandant de Kassala pour qu'il n'entrave pas la libre entrée des caravanes de l'Érythrée, et qu'il s'abstienne d'actes qui seraient de nature à provoquer des incidents fâcheux entre les postes Italiens et les postes d'askaris Soudanais.

Je suis sûr que je recevrai de Rome un télégramme me chargeant d'insister auprès de vous dans ce sens.

Bien, &c.

(Signé) TUGINI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 56.

M. Martini to M. Tugini.

(Télégraphique.) *Asmara, le* 19 *Mai*, 1900.

GOUVERNEUR de Kassala défend entrée des caravanes provenant de l'Érythrée, à cause de la peste. Je vous prie de faire cesser cette prohibition non-justifiée, vu que l'Érythrée est indemne et que toutes les mesures ont été prises pour la conserver telle.

Inclosure 3 in No. 56.

M. Martini to M. Tugini.

(Télégraphique.) *Asmara, le* 19 *Mai*, 1900.

COMMANDANT de Kassala se trouve à Mogato sur l'Atbara en territoire Italien; il a réuni les Chefs des tribus qui y demeurent. Peu loin, il a établi des postes d'askaris qui surveillent le passage des caravanes provenant de Gedarif, en les forçant d'aller à Kassala. Un poste Italien étant à peu de distance, et les troupeaux des tribus appartenant à l'Erythrée se trouvant là aux pâturages, il est fort à craindre

que l'attitude du Commandant de Kassala, contraire à tout droit, ne provoque quelque grave incident dont le Gouvernement Érythréen doit décliner toute responsabilité. J'ai télégraphié dans ce sens à Rome.

Inclosure 4 in No. 56.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 403.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, May 23, 1900.

YOUR telegram *re* Erythræa.

Talbot says Mogato, if what we call Mogatta, is on the left bank of the Atbara, and is, therefore, not in Italian territory.

Inclosure 5 in No. 56.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 404.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, May 23, 1900.

YOUR Lordship's telegram *re* Erythræa.

Collinson wires:—

"With reference to your second telegram mentioned by you, I entirely deny statements contained in the Governor of Erythræa's telegram. I have been to Mogatta, which is on the left bank of the Atbara, and I have never entered any territory claimed by the Italians. The Heads of tribes I saw at Mogatta were all from Gedarif. There is no post of askaris on the Atbara, except at Sofie,* which is 12 miles south of the junction of the Setit and Atbara. I most strongly protest against the Governor of Erythræa calling any of my acts illegal. With reference to the statement that caravans from Gedarif are forced to Kassala, there is no proper recognized trade road from the Atbara eastwards, except viâ Kassala. Several attempts were made at the commencement of the year by agents of Massowah merchants to convey gum, on which royalty had not been paid, across the Atbara near Mogatta into Italian territory, on which I issued an order that all gum caravans from Gedarif were to travel viâ Kassala, where their roads and way-bills are checked."

Inclosure 6 in No. 56.

Viscount Cromer to Colonel Jackson.

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 24, 1900.

YOUR telegram No. 404.

Article I of the Protocol of 15th April, 1891, provides that the frontier ascends the Atbara from latitude 14° 52′, to the confluence of the Kakamot. From the maps it would appear that Mogatta is an island. I think it must be held that the frontier runs along the most western of the two branches forming the island. Has Collinson been treating the island itself as Soudanese territory? I should like explanation on this point. As regards the other points raised in the second Italian telegram, Collinson seems to me to be quite within his rights. My only doubt is about the frontier at Mogatta. I should also like an answer to the first Italian telegram about stopping communications by reason of plague.

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* This is apparently the place marked in the maps as "Roumeli-Sofie."

Inclosure 7 in No. 56.

Colonel Jackson to Major Pedley.

(No. 407.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, , 1900.

KINDLY show following wire received from Collinson to Lord Cromer :—

"Following for Lord Cromer's information :—

"Up to quite lately no Italian soldiers or subjects have ever been into the country between the Gash and the Atbara now claimed by Italians. Within the last month they have sent several Beni Amer tribes with their flocks to graze, thereby establishing grazing rights. The district in question belongs to the Hadendowa and Hamran Arabs. The district has recently been visited by Italian officer and escort, and a post has been established on the Gash, near Gulsa. I also think that the main object of the Italians is to open a more direct route to Gedarif, so as to draw the bulk of the tribes of the Eastern Soudan to Massowah."

Inclosure 8 in No. 56.

Viscount Cromer to Colonel Jackson.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 25, 1900.

YOUR No. 407.

Have you and has Collinson got a copy of the Protocol of 15th April, 1891? If not, I will send you each one with a map marking the frontier. The line goes from a point on the Gash 20 miles south of Kassala to the ford on the Atbara situated at 14° 52′. South of that line the Italians can act as they please in the country lying between the Gash and the Atbara. North of it they cannot establish any posts or exercise any interference with the tribes.

No. 57.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 2.)

(No. 99.)

Cairo, May 27, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the "Soudan Gazette," No. 11, containing the accounts of the Soudan Government for the year ending the 31st December, 1899, and other notifications of public interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 57.

Extract from the "Soudan Gazette" of May 1, 1900.

Accounts of the Soudan Government for the year ended December 31, 1899.

BUDGET ACCOUNT.

RECEIPTS.

	£ E.	£ E.
From the Mudiriehs—		
Khartoum	14,098	
Berber	6,083	
Dongola	25,329	
Sennar	1,093	
Kassala	2,221	
Suakin	19,535	
Halfa	4,195	
Fashoda	..	
Central, by sales, &c.	6,479	
		79,033
Posts	6,847	
Telegraphs	3,984	
Soudan Military Railway	31,190	
Registration of trade, Halfa*	5,542	
		47,563
Total receipts		126,596
Credit from Egyptian Government for deficiency of Soudan revenues for civil expenditure		134,317
Revote from special credit of 1898		6,296
		267,209

EXPENDITURE.

	£ E.	£ E.
Khartoum	15,958	
Berber	7,713	
Dongola	12,405	
Sennar	6,513	
Kassala	6,214	
Suakin	26,382	
Halfa	1,292	
Fashoda	1,029	
Central	17,990	
Secret service	1,274	
Purchase of durra for relief, supplies, &c.	8,398	
		105,168
Public buildings	5,000	
Posts	9,903	
Telegraph maintenance	10,167	
Soudan Military Railway maintenance	100,000	
		125,070
Expenditure of 1898	..	6,296
Total expenditure	..	236,534
Surplus	..	30,675
		267,209

* A portion of the receipts under this head are in respect of 1898. The registration of trade fee has now been abolished.

The following is a statement of the receipts under specific heads:—

	£ E.
Land tax	21,949
Date tax	9,432
House tax	1,267
Boat tax	2,610
Royalties	11,339
Customs	16,038
Miscellaneous	16,398
Posts	6,847
Telegraphs	3,984
Railway..	31,190
Registration of trade*	5,542
Total	126,596

Special Credit Account.

	Credit voted.	Expended.
	£ E.	£ E.
Reconstruction of Khartoum	20,000	27,388
Equipment of police	7,829	7,829
Telegraph construction	9,000	15,133
Completion of Soudan Military Railway, including Atbara Bridge	300,000	339,973
	336,829	390,323
Deficit on special credits	..	53,494
Deduct surplus on Budget	..	30,675
Net deficit	..	22,819

In addition to the sum of £ E. 140,613 shown above as the deficiency of Soudan revenues in respect of civil expenditure, a sum of £ E. 281,455 is charged against the Soudan on account of War Department expenditure, making up the total of £ E. 422,068 shown as "insuffisance des revenues du Soudan" in the General Account of the Egyptian Government, published on the 17th instant. For the year 1900 the "insuffisance" stands at £ E. 134,317 in respect of civil, and at £ E. 282,852 in respect of military expenditure. There is also a special credit of £ E. 15,000 for further capital outlay in connection with the railway.

By order of the Governor-General,
(Signed) E. G. HARMAN,
Financial Secretary, Soudan Government.

Soudan Audit Office, Cairo, February 25, 1900.

No. 58.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 2.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, in answer to his letter of the 30th instant, inclosing copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, and Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast, is of opinion that we may assume that the interests of France are—

1. To arm and strengthen Abyssinia as a thorn in the side of England and Italy;

* A portion of the receipts under this head are in respect of 1898. The registration of trade fee has now been abolished.

2. To arm and strengthen the native population in the British and Italian spheres of influence;

3. To promote French commerce in competition of that with other nations.

These aims are diametrically opposed to the interests of England and Italy. We are, however, under an obligation to permit arms for Menelek to pass; and, if we stop the imports of arms for others through British Somali ports, the result will simply be a diversion of the channel of entry to Jibuti, and the consequent loss to our own trade in arms. The actual diminution in import owing to our prohibition would be insignificant.

Unless we make a rival railway to the Jibuti–Harrar line—the transport facilities of the latter must attract all the inland trade to Jibuti, including the arms trade, and there will be but little left of the latter to prohibit in the Somali ports.

Under these circumstances, unless a railway is made in our territory, there would be very little gained in raising the prohibition against arms, and it does not appear to Sir John Ardagh that it would compensate for the sanction which our opening of our ports to trade in arms would confer on the immoral proceedings of the French in this respect. If British commerce were largely interested in moving the restrictions, the aspect of the question would be different; but it must be anticipated that the trade will flow by the line of least resistance, *i.e.*, the Jibuti Railway, and that the general commerce of the British ports, particularly Zeyla, will materially decline, and with it the revenue of the Protectorate, which with a railway would probably have increased.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
June 1, 1900.

No. 59.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 86.)

Rome, May 31, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a précis of an article which appeared in the "Tribuna" of yesterday's date, based upon a conversation said to have been held with M. Ilg, who is reported to have declared that a satisfactory settlement of the frontier between Erythræa and Abyssinia had been arrived at.

M. Ilg is also said to have stated that there was no foundation for the rumour that Italy was to pay compensation to Abyssinia for maintaining the existing frontiers, and to have denied that King Menelek intends to visit the Paris Exhibition.

I have sent a copy of the précis to Lord Cromer for his information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Extract from the "Tribuna" of May 30, 1900.

THE FRONTIERS OF ERYTHRÆA.—Our Zurich correspondent sends us the following telegram:—

"*Zurich, May* 28, 1900.

"The Engineer Ilg has received a letter from Captain Ciccodicola by the messenger from Addis Abbaba, from the the tenour of which it seems that the difficulty in regard to the boundary delimitations has been smoothed to the satisfaction of both sides. The Captain now only awaits the ratification of the Italian Government for the Treaty with Menelek to become an accomplished fact.

"M. Ilg did not enter into details, but led me to suppose that the Italian frontiers would remain as they are at present (Mareb-Belesa-Muna).

"On my inquiry as to the amount of truth there might be in the rumour of an indemnity to be paid to Abyssinia as compensation for maintaining existing frontiers, he replied that it was purely a newspaper invention.

"You may also deny, he added, that Menelek is preparing to come to Europe in order to visit the French Exhibition."

The importance of this news cannot escape our readers. The recognition of actual frontiers by the Negus, while it closes the saddest period of our colonial policy, shows

that it is easier to arrive at a satisfactory result by a dignified, yet firm, policy, than by insisting on irritating proposals which are entirely out of place under the circumstances.

Italy is now established on the Ethiopian Plateau with the approval of the Emperor, and our Government must seriously consider how to deal with a question which has been so fortunately concluded.

It is not easy, yet by no means impossible. The political conditions of Ethiopia render relations with European Powers far easier than they used to be.

Before the increasing power of the Emperor, militarism and feudalism are rapidly giving way.

A railway is built from Jibuti towards Addis Abbaba, and another from Massowah to the plateau; while neither meet with opposition. The telegraph and telephone are working to the capital of the Negus, and are likely to be extended further.

The moment seems, therefore, come to penetrate into Ethiopia commercially, and to create interests of a lasting nature between Erythræa and Ethiopia on which to base the future of our Colony. When once this is accomplished we may rest in quiet.

No. 60.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 9.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward, for his information, a copy of a telegram, dated the 7th June, from the General Officer Commanding at Aden, referring to ammunition at Jibuti.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, S.W., June* 8, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 60.

General Officer Commanding at Aden to Secretary of State.

Aden, June 7, 1900.

(Telegraphic.)

REFERRING to small-arm ammunition at Jibuti: On the 25th May there were 2,226 boxes on the wharfs, 1,500 have since been landed from steam-ship "Arabistan," 400 have been sent to Harrar, and 200 removed to private premises. Rest remains and is believed to be for King Menelek.

No. 61.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 147.)

Kismayu, May 6, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that an Embassy from Boran arrived here yesterday evening. It consisted of some seven or eight Chiefs, the four principal ones being respectively named Bare Godana, Idokiso, Okataro, and Bule Ido.

Their object in coming to this province was twofold. They desired to conclude a definite peace with the Ogaden Somalis, their neighbours on the immediate south, between whom and themselves a long feud had existed, leading to numerous raids, the last of which, as your Lordship may remember, occurred in 1897, notwithstanding Mr. Jenner's prohibition. They were also instructed by King Afalata to implore the protection of Her Majesty's Government (within whose sphere of influence they had been led many years ago—I imagine as far back as the days of the Imperial British East Africa Company—to believe that their country was situated) against the oppression and cruelties to which their people were being subjected by the Abyssinians.

In the first of these two objects they were entirely successful. They were very well received on their passage through the Ogaden country, the only exception to this good treatment being the detention of some ivory belonging to them by Hersi Degaja, an Ogaden Chief, who happened to be close to the frontier, and who, whilst welcoming them to his camp and killing a bullock in their honour, appropriated several of their tusks.

On hearing of this incident, Sultan Ahmed-bin-Murgan at once started in pursuit of Hersi Degaja, who fled on learning that he was coming. Mr. Farrant, who was at the time on tour in the Ogaden country, also followed, and met both the Sultan and the Boran Envoys at Melkabula, about 40 miles to the west of Affmadu. Assurances were given to them that the ivory taken by Hersi Degaja would be restored, an agreement was entered into that peace and mutual facilities for trade and travel within each other's countries should exist for the future between the Boran Gallas and the Ogadens, and Afalata's Envoys were promised by Mr. Farrant a welcome at Kismayu, whither Sultan Ahmed-bin-Murgan undertook to escort them, and where they were lodged on arrival at the house of the Chief Government Interpreter.

Their official reception by me took place this afternoon at a Durbar, at which the two Somali Sultans and their principal followers were present, the Ogadens being seated on my right and the Hertis, with the Cadi of Kismayu, a Shereef much respected by the Somalis, on my left. The Envoys were, most of them, tall, handsome men of the ordinary Galla type. When they arrived at Melkabula they were scantily clothed in skins, but the Ogadens had provided them with white cloth, which they wore in the toga fashion universal among the Somalis.

I made them a speech, in which I expressed the satisfaction with which I welcomed them to British territory and had heard the news of the termination of the feud between their people and our Somali subjects, and I requested them to inform Afalata on their return of our desire to encourage and develop as far as possible commercial intercourse between his country and the coast. In reply, they immediately plunged into their grievances against the Abyssinians, whereupon I checked them, observing that their present reception was a public formal ceremony, and that the discussion of the political purposes of their visit would be more fittingly conducted at a private interview, which I should be glad to give them the same evening after sunset.

The four principal Envoys accordingly came to the Residency at the appointed hour, and entered upon the object of their mission. They stated that 300 Abyssinian troops were in their country occupying in detachments the following towns: Hego, King Afalata's own residence, Lei, Arer, Dubullu, Egollej, and Wajille (I spell these names as nearly as possible as they pronounced them). The Abyssinian flag flew over all these places, all of which were I gathered from them about 15 miles from one another, and their inhabitants were not only treated by the invaders as a conquered race, but subjected to every kind of oppression and cruelty. Their cattle, their camels, and every species of property possessed by them were looted, and the elephants on whose ivory their trade with the coast depended ruthlessly shot down, whilst remonstrances were only met with further acts of violence. The senior Envoy, Bare Godana, stated that when after an ivory caravan belonging to himself had been plundered in September last by Abyssinan soldiers at Lei, fifteen days north of our Ogaden frontier, King Afalata had told the Abyssinian Commander that he should complain to the English Government, whereupon the Commander had contemptuously replied that all the English and Somalis were subjects of Abyssinia, and had redoubled the outrages previously complained of in order to teach him to talk of English protection.

"Afalata," continued the Envoy, "wishes me to say to you that the Abyssinians have placed a rope round his neck, and that he begs the English Government to remove it. Our position is most dangerous, and unless something is done, and done quickly, to help us the Boran Gallas as a people will be exterminated."

The speaker and the other Envoys then fell on the ground and seized me by the ankles, telling me that they had been specially instructed by their King to do this as a sign of his appeal to the Queen, whose subjects they considered themselves, for protection against these raids and robberies.

I replied that I should report to the high Government the message they had brought, but that it was not within my province to interfere in the affairs of Boran, over which Her Majesty had given me no authority. I was merely one of many servants of the Queen, administering dependencies scattered all over the world, and the northern limits of the country in which she had instructed me to maintain order and carry on the Government were the Somali frontiers and the Juba Valley as far as Serenli. If she chose to extend my province or to direct me to expel the Abyssinians from Boran, I should be quite willing to do so, but for the present I could not send askaris there without orders. I told them, however, that Her Majesty had an Agent at the Court of King Menelek who was now engaged there in settling many questions as to our frontiers with the Abyssinians on the side both of the Soudan and Harrar,

and that I believed that the question of the southern frontier would not be lost sight of. They must remember that in the eyes of the High Government, which had vast territories and millions of subjects in India, South Africa, and elsewhere, Boran and Abyssinia were very small and insignificant countries, and that their affairs had constantly to wait until those of the Queen's more important dominions had been settled. I felt sure, however, that their happiness and welfare were not really a matter of indifference to Her Majesty or her counsellors, but I preferred not to make any promises to them as to immediate or early intervention on their behalf which they might afterwards complain had not been kept.

The Envoys said the matter was a small one—a very few of our askaris would frighten the Abyssinians away. Last year, when Mahomed Akid, one of Mr. Jenner's native officers, entered Boran with a handful of men, the Abyssinians had fled before him, and had left some of their rifles in his hands.

I told them I had no doubt of our power to expel the Abyssinians, if Her Majesty were to give an order to that effect, but that until she was pleased to do so I could undertake no operations in their country, whether on a large or small scale. I should, however, gladly promote trade relations between them and us, and if any of them wished to settle within the limits of the Jubaland province I would afford them every help and facility in doing so. I added that I should be glad to send back by them, as a mark of good-will, a present for Afalata, if they would let me, or, in my absence, Mr. Farrant know, what they thought would be most acceptable to him. They thanked me cordially, and promised fully to explain all I had said to the King on their return.

Should the ultimate settlement of Abyssinia's southern frontier involve the division of the Boran country between King Menelek and ourselves, I think it very likely that a large proportion of the Boran Gallas will, to escape Abyssinian robberies, cruelties, and slave raids, cross the dividing-line into our sphere. In the meantime pending a settlement, or the examination of the proposed frontier by a Joint Commission, it might perhaps, I would venture to submit, be arranged that both we and Menelek should, without prejudice to any rights already claimed by either side, abstain from actual military occupation of any places within the debateable land, and that any Abyssinian soldiers already holding such places should, as a friendly and courteous act, be withdrawn. This would relieve the people of Boran from the oppression under which they are at present groaning, and prevent a country, a portion of which will probably be incorporated at a future period within our East African dominions, from being converted into a desert. We could perfectly undertake on our side until the frontier had been definitely settled to establish no garrison or posts in Boran which might thus become a sort of neutral zone, until after the termination of the South African war, when Her Majesty's Government will doubtless have more leisure than at present to consider how the country should be dealt with.

Of one thing I feel pretty certain, that should the occupation of Boran, or a portion of it, and its constitution into a province of this Protectorate be eventually decided on, it will prove an easy and fairly cheap undertaking as far as the natives themselves are concerned. Three hundred Abyssinian riflemen already keep them in absolute subjection, and the advent of Europeans, bringing with them a just and merciful administration, would now be hailed throughout the country with delight. In the meantime the result of Adam-bin-Musa's trading expedition, in which he made after paying all expenses about 8,000 rupees, and the cessation of the old quarrel between the Boran Gallas and the Somalis will stimulate the Boran trade with the coast. Already Sheikh Ali Nahar, the principal Chief next to the Sultan of the Herti Somali tribe, is organizing a trading expedition of his own to Boran, and I have, at his request, given him formal permission to proceed there, on the understanding, of course, that we assume no responsibility on his behalf beyond the limits of our administrative authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 62.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

Camp, Sheikh, May 18, 1900.

My Lord,

I LEARN from Mr. Gerolimato, under date the 7th instant, that Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, was then absent from Harrar escorting, as far as the Hawash River, some 30,000 rifles destined for Addis Abbaba.

These rifles are far in excess of the numbers noted in the Tables which accompanied the Memorandum of the Director of Military Intelligence to the Foreign Office of the 12th April last as under shipment to Jibuti, whence they have been doubtless imported. Whether they are recent importations or not I am unable yet to say.

I have asked Mr. Gerolimato for further information regarding this consignment, and have requested him to be good enough to keep me informed of particulars of all consignments of arms passing through Harrar in any quantities for Addis Abbaba.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 63.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 100.)

Cairo, May 29, 1900.

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 98 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to inclose copies of (1) a further telegram which I have received from Colonel Jackson, (2) of a note which I have addressed to M. Tugini, the terms of which will, I trust, meet with your Lordship's approval.

As I am in some doubt as to the answer which should be given to Colonel Collinson's question as regards the Tomat-Todluc frontier, I have telegraphed to your Lordship on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, May 28, 1900.

YOUR Lordship's Nos. 147 and 151.

The following from Collinson, for your Lordship's information:—

"On receipt of your telegram No. 417, informing me of plague at Suakin, merchants were informed that all caravans coming from Suakin and Massowah would be stopped outside Kassala and medically examined, and that if plague increased, caravans would probably be prohibited altogether. No order was given prohibiting caravans. On the 19th all restrictions were removed.

"Your No. 420. Map is wrong; there are no islands at Magatta, nor have I located any island in the Atbara as Soudanese territory. I have no copy of Protocol of the 15th April, 1891. Talbot's map of the Settite and Atbara should be taken for showing where 14° 52′ cuts the Atbara; all other maps are hopelessly incorrect as to the position of both Fasher and Mogatta. Will you ask Lord Cromer if I am to consider the Tomat-Todluc line as the southern Italian border, as this question affects the Hamran Arabs, whose head village is on the north bank of the Settite, about 35 miles from its junction with the Atbara."

Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

Memorandum sent by Viscount Cromer to M. Tugini.

ON the 20th May M. Tugini sent me copies of two telegrams, each dated 19th May, which he had received from M. de Martini.

In the first of these telegrams M. de Martini complains that, by reason of the plague, caravans had been stopped from going to Kassala.

On this subject Colonel Collinson, the Commandant at Kassala, telegraphs to the Acting Governor-General at Omdurman as follows:—

"Upon receipt of your telegram informing me of plague at Suakin, merchants were informed that all caravans coming from Suakin and Massowah would be stopped outside Kassala and medically inspected, and that, if plague increased, caravans would probably be prohibited altogether. No order was given prohibiting caravans. On the 19th all restrictions were removed."

The complaints made in M. de Martini's second telegram are twofold. In the first place, it is stated that caravans from Gedarif are obliged to proceed viâ Kassala.

On this subject Colonel Collinson says:—

"With reference to the statement that caravans from Gedarif are forced to go to Kassala, there is no proper recognized trade road from the Atbara eastward except viâ Kassala. Several attempts were made at the commencement of the year by agents of Massowah merchants to convey gum, on which royalty had not been paid, across the Atbara, near Mogatte, into Italian territory, on which I issued an order that all gum caravans from Gedarif were to travel viâ Kassala, where their road and way-bills are checked."

The second and more important complaint of M. de Martini is to the effect that the Commandant of Kassala "se trouve à Mogato sur l'Atbara sur territoire Italien."

On this point Colonel Collinson says:—

"I have been to Mogatta, which is on the left bank of the Atbara, and I have never entered any territory claimed by the Italians. The heads of tribes I saw at Mogatta were all from Gedarif. There is no post of askaris on the Atbara except at Sofie, which is 12 miles south of the junction of the Settite and Atbara."

Mogatta is shown in the maps as an island formed by two branches of the Atbara. It occurred to me that the discrepancy between M. de Martini's and Colonel Collinson's statements might be due to the fact that the former had taken the western and the latter the eastern branch of the river as the frontier. I asked Colonel Collinson, therefore, whether he had occupied the island, at the same time expressing my opinion that the western branch was the frontier indicated by the Protocol of the 15th April, 1891.

To this Colonel Collinson replies:—

"Map is wrong. There are no islands at Mogatta, nor have I located any islands in the Atbara as Soudanese territory."

Colonel Collinson adds that, with the exception of the map recently made by Colonel Talbot, of which I have not yet seen a copy, "all the maps are hopelessly incorrect as to the position of both Fasher and Mogatta."

I am sending Colonel Collinson a copy of the Protocol of the 15th April, 1891, and requesting him to conform strictly to its terms. As Colonel Collinson appears to have kept to the left bank of the Atbara, M. de Martini must, I think, have been misinformed in respect to the violation of Italian territory.

I have to express my regret at the delay which has ensued in dealing with these questions. It has been caused by a temporary interruption of telegraphic communication with Kassala.

Cairo, May 29, 1900.

No. 64.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 103.) *Cairo, June* 2, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a report addressed by Major Peake to the Sirdar.

With reference to the remarks contained in Sir Francis Plunkett's despatch No. 141,

Africa, of the 19th May, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 101 of the 25th May, it will be observed that Major Peake says: "Both the Belgians and the English are very anxious for regular communication viâ the Nile." I have written privately to Sir Francis Wingate to consult him on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 64.

Major Peake to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *May* 16, 1900.

IN continuation of previous reports of the 17th April, I left Hillet Nuer on board the "Tamai" in company with Lieutenant Drury, R.N., on the 19th April, and proceeded south. We did not arrive at Shambe until the 25th April owing to accidents; we got aground several times owing to not knowing the channel, and twice bent our rudders and had to take them off and heat and strengthen them. From the 25th April till the 29th we were filling up the gun-boat with wood at Abu Keeka.

On the 30th April we passed Bor and the remains of the old Dervish dem; about 10 miles south of Bor we came to our first really dry ground on the right bank.

On the 2nd May we arrived at the Congo Free State Station of Kiro. The Belgians have built good red brick bungalows on a high bluff in a bend of the river; from about 5 miles north of Kiro the left bank is high and thickly wooded; this was our first really dry ground on the left bank. The Belgian cantonment is surrounded by a wooden stockade with emplacements for guns and Maxims; though to all appearances it should be a healthy place, it is very much the opposite: ordinary fever is common, and there is also prevalent a most pernicious form of hæmaturic fever, which carries off men in about three hours. During the first week in April last they lost four European officers from this fever. The Belgians report all their stations on the Nile are unhealthy, but from what I saw their sanitary arrangements are very bad; the river bank in front of each house is the refuse pit; and I saw at Reggaaf a latrine built to fall straight into the river.

I was most hospitably and kindly received at Kiro by Inspector Chaltin, who is in command of the Nile and Welle districts. I read to and gave him a true copy of the document concerning the lease of the portion of the Nile Valley sent to me on the 19th December by Director of Military Intelligence.

On the 3rd May I left for Lado, Inspector Chaltin accompanying me on the "Tamai." Of the old town there are only a few foundations left, but the old ditch and parapet are very clear still. A most unhealthy-looking place, almost surrounded by swamp, and much reminding me of Fashoda. Gebel Lado, visible for many miles north, is about four hours' march from the river.

Hearing that the river south was very low and full of rocks, I decided to leave the "Tamai" at Lado and go on in the Uganda launch "Kenia;" the difficulties of the river were exaggerated, and I think our gun-boats will be able to get to Fort Berkeley at all seasons of the year. On my suggestion Captain Dugmore is going to make a chart of the river from Lado to Fort Berkeley.

We arrived at Gondokoro midday, the 4th May; the only remains of Baker's cantonment is the ditch and parapet on a high bluff. There are also a few lemon trees; healthy-looking situation. I found a small temporary post of the Uganda Rifles here. From Gondokoro we went in Belgian steel boats to Reggaaf, arriving there on the 5th May. The Belgian cantonment is situated under Gebel Reggaaf, close to the water edge.

Having breakfasted with the officers we crossed the river and rode, horses having been sent by Captain Dugmore from Fort Berkeley, some four hours. The fort is about 300 yards from the river, and the Commandant's house about 500 yards. The country is undulating, rising gradually up from the river. I stayed at Fort Berkeley until the 7th May, when I left for the north, bringing with me Dr. Donaldson Smith from Berkeley, and Commandant Henry and Engineer Mulders from Kiro. I arrived at base camp, Gabt el Megahid, at 8 A.M on the 14th May.

Belgians.—The total strength of the Belgian force now in the Nile is about 1,500 men, distributed at Kiro, Lado, Reggaaf, and this last place being about 20 minutes from

the river. Opposite Dufile there are six European officers at Kiro—2 at Lado, 2 at Reggaaf, and 2 at Afuddo.

Kiro is at present head-quarters, but I understand they are going to make Lado in the future. The Belgians in every place are busy building and making themselves comfortable, and I could see no sign of any movement of troops to occupy other territory.

Chaltin told us that he himself considered the occupation of the Nile Valley a mistake; the length of their lines of communication may be judged by the fact that it is a three and a-half months' journey from Kiro to Boma, their post on the sea.

Both the Belgians and the English are very anxious for regular communication viâ the Nile.

Inspector Chaltin appears most anxious to encourage the natives to cultivate the land, and generally wishes to improve everything; there is no doubt, however, that the natives dislike the Belgian rule; this is accounted for by the fact, I think, that the Belgians live on the country, as a rule taking food from the natives without paying for it. I had personal experience of their manner of travelling on the night I spent in the boats. Inspector Chaltin is very strict in his orders as regards keeping his officers and men on his own bank; there appears to be a very good feeling indeed between Inspector Chaltin and Captain Dugmore.

The River.—Some 5 miles south of Hillet Nuer the river breaks into various channels and lakes for a distance of some 25 miles; the real bed of the river has practically disappeared; the opening up of this 25 miles would be quite different to clearing the obstructions that we have hitherto met; there is no current, and though the obstruction is very light and easily moved, each piece has to be dragged out into the current; it took Lieutenant Drury ten days to clear 400 yards. Some 15 miles north of Shambe much the same thing has occurred; on our way south we took the wrong channel, but thanks to Commandant Henry we found an excellent channel on our way back; also Commandant Henry showed the entrance of the Bahr-ez-Zeraf, which is completely blocked up. As we went up these two channels where the river was dead low in the lowest year in record, I think it may be safely said that they will always be navigable.

From Shambe to Bor the river is deep and broad, but has the most extraordinary sharp turns; I recommend that our big boats be never sent to this part of the river, as they are bound to knock themselves about.

About 20 miles south of Bor the river divides up into various channels in which there is not much water; from this point up to Reggaaf the river is in several different channels. The sketching of this river will require some considerable time. I should say it will take three months to sketch it from Lake No to Fort Berkeley. It certainly ought to be sketched, as the present maps are useless; in sketching, care should be taken to put in all the channels and lagoons.

The hardest question as regards navigation from Lake No to Berkeley is the wood question. From my present base camp at mile 551 from Khartoum up to Abu Keeka, about 850 miles from Khartoum, there is practically no wood; there is plenty of wood between present base camp and Sobat; the only thing is for steamers to be always provided with a sandal or boats full of wood. The Nile first began to rise at Fort Berkeley in the middle of March, and then, I understand, fell again until the middle of April, from which date I attach the Nilometer readings. It will be noticed that it is most erratic; perhaps this is attributable to its being at the foot of the rapids.

We had a good deal of rain. In two days we had steady very heavy rains for ten hours; as a rule the storms only last for two or three hours. The Belgians inform me that the regular heavy rain season has not yet commenced.

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 64.

TABLE of Computed Distances and Wood Chart between Lake No and Fort Berkeley, Uganda.

	Miles.	From Khartoum.
		Miles.
Lake No	..	612
Hillet Nuer	133	
First false channel	138	
Good water; true Nile	163	
Second false channel	217	
Shambe	230	
North end, Abu Keeka	265	
South end, Abu Keeka	277	
Dervish Dem at Bor	360	
Good wood station, high bank right	366	
This good wood lasts until	373	
Good wood right bank	405	
This good wood lasts until	410	
Good wood left bank	428	
Kiro	435	
Lado	460	
Gondokoro	469	
Reggaaf	479	
Fort Berkeley	489	
Total	..	1,102

This is calculated by steaming time, and on account of the changes in the strength of the current in different places must be inaccurate.

There is a little wood procurable at Shambe, but Abu Keeka is an excellent wooding place.

Good wood is procurable pretty well everywhere after Kiro.

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam*.

May 16, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 64.

NILOMETER Readings, Base Camp: Mile 551 from Khartoum.

Date.	Centimetres.	A total rise since lowest Nile of—
		Centim.
1900—		
April 16	118	72
" 17	120	74
" 18	119	73
" 19	120	74
" 20	120	74
" 21	120	74
" 22	121	75
" 23	121	75
" 24	124	78
" 25	123	77
" 26	124	78
" 27	124	78
" 28	125	79
" 29	126	80
" 30	130	84
May 1	133	87
" 2	133	87
" 3	135	89
" 4	136	90
" 5	137	91
" 6	139	93
" 7	140	94
" 8	140	94
" 9	142	96
" 10	143	97
" 11	143	97
" 12	145	99
" 13	149	102
" 14	149	102

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

been abandoned, and it is now intended to carry it along the country on a lower level towards the interior of Abyssinia. The effect of the railway on the commerce of the British Protectorate will, however, continue to be highly detrimental, and it seems very probable that unless some steps are taken to give the ports of the Protectorate competing advantages the Protectorate may, before long, become dependent on grants-in-aid from Imperial revenue to meet administrative expenses.

Lord Salisbury thinks it therefore worthy of serious consideration whether some effort should not be made, by such means as are suggested in Consul-General Sadler's despatch of the 7th May, to promote the construction of a railway line from Berbera to Harrar.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 66.

Mr. J. W. Johnston to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 14.)

46, *Leadenhall Street, London, June* 14, 1900.

Sir,

REFERRING to your letter of the 19th March, the reason for my apparent neglect to write you further, was, that I desired to have something more definite to submit to you as justification for my application for a concession of lands in the regions of the Sobat River and Valley of the Tumat.

As explained verbally, I have for many years performed services for the Belgian Government in an honorary way, such as collecting information respecting European port charges and other commercial topics.

On one occasion, when I had the honour of being received by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, I remarked that I was much interested in rubber growing in the Crown Colony of British Honduras; and that I was also anxious, when the Valley of the Nile got settled, to apply to the British Government for a concession of lands between Abyssinia and the east bank of the White Nile.

Asked upon what terms the English Government would grant my request, I replied that there was my difficulty, and that I hesitated to make an application till I could give a distinct gain, but that if I could persuade His Majesty to let the transport of the material for the extension of the Congo Railway, pass by the Nile, instead of the Congo, it would be such a grand thing for the Egyptian Government that I did not doubt it would consider it in the light of a *quid pro quo*.

Some authorities think the Nile will be the natural route for all the territories adjacent to it for many years to come. Doubtless this may be true from a geographical point of view, but one must not forget that there may be some difficulty in overcoming the Belgian proper national sentiment in favour of the Congo route.

With his usual kindness to English business men, His Majesty said my request would receive consideration.

The accompanying letter dated the 5th June from the Secretary-General of the Independent State of the Congo is the outcome of that interview, and I earnestly trust that you will share my opinion that it would indeed be a grand thing for the Egyptian Government generally, and the Nile route in particular, if the many hundreds of thousands of pounds which the transport of the railway material will cost, could be diverted from the Congo to the Nile.

May I venture to ask you to be so kind as to pass my letter through the proper channel, or to give me instructions how I should proceed in order to obtain the concession of the territories in question?

I may add that the people associated with me are quite competent to successfully accomplish anything they undertake.

Will you be so obliging as to consider this communication private, as I do not desire to promote any needless opposition in Antwerp?

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN W. JOHNSTON.

Inclosure in No. 66.

M. de Cuvelier to Mr. J. W. Johnston.

Bruxelles, 20, *Rue de Namur*, *le* 5 *Juin*, 1900.

Monsieur,

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer qu'il serait intéressant pour l'État du Congo d'être complètement renseigné sur la possibilité et les conditions du transport de marchandises et spécialement du matériel de chemin de fer jusque Lado par la voie d'Alexandrie et du Nil.

Si le coût du transport par la voie du Nil n'excédait pas celui par la voie du Congo, nous serions heureux d'entendre les propositions que vous pourriez nous faire pour le transport des marchandises et du matériel par Alexandrie et Karthoum jusque Lado.

Nous estimons, en effet, qu'en raison de sa proximité avec les provinces du nord-est de l'État du Congo, la voie dù Nil est appelée à un mouvement de transit considérable et qu'il se créera par là un important courant commercial. On peut évaluer, si les conditions du transport étaient favorables, à plusieurs centaines de milliers de livres sterling, l'importance du trafic qui, du Congo, trouvera par le Nil un débouché naturel.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Secrétaire-Général,

(Signé) A. DE CUVELIER.

No. 67.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp Sheikh*, *June* 15, 1900.

A FRENCH commercial expedition armed left Jibuti on the 10th instant to cross the Protectorate for the Ogaden despite my refusal to allow passage through the Protectorate. The Governor of Jibuti disclaims all responsibility.

I am dispatching Camel Corps to intercept.

Inger is either at Jibuti or is shortly expected there. A suspicious vessel has been lying off Jibuti for some days; I have informed Aden, and suggested that a watch be kept on her movements.

No. 68.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 15)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp Sheikh*, *June* 15, 1900.

PLEASE see Harrington's telegrams Nos. 9 and 10. The Governor of Harrar returned to Harrar on the 5th instant, and reported that the rumours were untrue as to the advance of the Mullah.

The latter is at Daghaboor, near Milmil. Two companies of the British Central Africa Rifles are proceeding with a Maxim to Hargaisa at once, and if necessary three more can follow.

I could take all available forces towards Hargaisa should the Mullah advance, but infantry could not be safely pushed into the Haud. Tribal levies could be collected; to be of any use they would require active support.

A strong force of Camelry, such as the Bikanir Camel Corps, would be wanted if we are to co-operate with the Abyssinians in the Ogaden.

Repeated to Harrington.

No. 69.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 23. Secret.)

Addis Abbaba, May 2, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 18, Secret, of the 23rd March last, forwarding details of arms and ammunition dispatched to Jibuti from Abyssinia, although it is impossible to ascertain the exact proportion destined for Abyssinia, my observations force me to the conclusion that the majority of such exports reach this country.

Recently King Menelek has been withdrawing muzzle-loading and worn-out weapons from his troops and those of his officers, and replacing them by Gras rifles.

Negus Tekla Haimanot of Godjam's troops have recently been rearmed with modern rifles, and at present the troops of Dejasmatch Balcha are being rearmed. This officer's country is to the south of Shoa and east of Lake Stephanie, and, I believe, includes portion of the Borana country.

From inquiries made I estimate the number of modern rifles, such as Gras and Remingtons, in the country at the lowest computation at 500,000, and the number of pieces of artillery at about ninety pieces. This number includes the guns captured from the Italians, the Krupp guns left by the Egyptians at Harrar, and about half-a-dozen Maxims and Mitrailleuses.

I do not consider these continued purchases of arms as denoting any hostile intent on the part of King Menelek. They are more with a view to self-defence, and as a precaution against the evil intentions our political enemies credit us with.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain*.

No. 70.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 24.)

Addis Abbaba, May 2, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that three of Major Marchand's boats have been brought to Addis Abbaba from the upper waters of the Baro. Two of the boats appear to be beyond repair; the third is repairable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain*.

No. 71.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 25.)

Addis Abbaba, May 2, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that Ras Oliye, brother of Queen Taitou, has been sent to Tigre to replace Ras Makunan who has been recalled by the Emperor Menelek.

Ras Makunan's recall is due to representations made by the Italian Agent. It seems that relations between the Governor of Erythræa and the Ras were not satisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain*.

No. 72.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 5, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that at an audience with King Menelek yesterday, His Majesty broached the subject of frontiers, and asked me what were the views of Her Majesty's Government on his proposals.

I replied that, so far as the Soudan frontier was concerned, he might look on that frontier as practically settled. I remarked that no very great changes were likely to occur between Todluk and the Sobat beyond those which tribal and geographical conditions would demand. South of the Sobat I said it depended on the survey in operation whether His Majesty's proposals would be accepted, as we were desirous of satisfying ourselves that we possessed country over which we could make the Cape to Cairo Railway. His Majesty remarked: "But there is no objection to the railway going through my country."

His Majesty then asked: "What about Metemmeh?" I replied that in former times when the Egyptians were in Metemmeh the town was on two sides of a stream—the Khor Abuakara. The portion to the east of the stream was regarded as Abyssinian and that to the west Egyptian. We proposed making this stream the boundary, so that the former condition of affairs would continue.

His Majesty seemed considerably relieved at my statements, and remarked that if this was the state of affairs it did not matter if the survey did take some time. His Majesty seemed to be satisfied with the proposal as to the division of Metemmeh.

He then inquired about the southern frontier, and I informed him that when I left England no orders had been given, but the impression I had received was that His Majesty's proposals were not considered satisfactory. If His Majesty was prepared to submit fresh proposals, I was ready to put them before Her Majesty's Government, as I was convinced that with a little time and patience one would succeed in coming to an amicable settlement.

His Majesty replied that he would look at the map and see what could be done.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

No. 73.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Camp Sheikh, May* 23, 1900.

FOR many years the Mahomed Aysa sections of the Habr Awal, who occupy the country immediately round Berbera to the east and south, have been accustomed to levy a road fee on all caravans entering Berbera from those sides of 4 annas per camel, 2 annas per donkey, and 2 annas and 1 anna respectively, on cattle and sheep.

Though never actually sanctioned the levy of these road fees has been tacitly permitted by the Administration from the earliest days of our occupation, as partaking more or less of the nature of vested interests. The amounts collected in each year varied with the trade, but may be set down at about 2,000 rupees. The fees appear to have been originally levied in return for right of way and escort through the Mahomed Aysa country, but gradually the escort ceased to be afforded as our hold over the tribes became stronger, and eventually the collections found their way into the hands of a few Akils and those who were more immediately connected with their collection in Berbera, the Elders in the jungle and the tribes generally ceasing to have much interest therein.

These road fees have ever been a fruitful cause of quarrel between the Mahomed Aysa and their neighbours amongst the Habr Toljaala tribes who have always protested against the levy, and a certain impediment to trade generally. The difficulty which always presented itself in dealing with this question lay in the fact that we were not ready to abolish the levy by force, and a settlement by compensation would have cost money.

Last year when on tour in this direction I had several conversations with the jungli Akils on the subject, which confirmed me in the impression that they benefited but little from the levy, whilst they looked upon it as a nuisance as involving them with the Habr Toljaala. It was not, however, expedient to press the matter at that time both because of the connection of several of the Habr Toljaala tribes with the Mullah's movement, and because it was not advisable to risk the disaffection of any of the Akils with a measure which entailed pecuniary loss to them.

Opportunity was taken of the desire evinced by the Mahomed Aysa and the Habr Toljaala lately to settle up their differences left by last year's disturbances, to again bring the matter forward, with the result that a few days before I left Berbera an influential and representative deputation of the majority of the Mahomed Aysa sections appeared before me, represented that they now recognized that any permanent settlement with the Habr Toljaala would not be possible so long as the road fees continued, and asked that they be now stopped by the Administration. This was at once done, and the fact was proclaimed in the Berbera bazaar that the road fees had now ceased. We are thus rid of a long-standing vexed question at the initiative of the parties concerned. Amongst the deputation were the Akil who benefited chiefly by the levy, and others who shared in the collection.

Similar fees which used to be levied by Sultan Nur on caravans passing through the Habr Yunis country were stopped by the Administration when Nur set himself against us last year, and will not be allowed to be reimposed. There only now remain the road fees levied by the Adan Aysa on the western routes, and I am hopeful that this tribe may soon follow the example set by the Mahomed Aysa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 74.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, May* 30, 1900.

THE Acting Consul at Zeyla has forwarded to me a request made to him on the 23rd instant by the Governor of Jibuti for a passage, with the usual facilities, to be accorded through the Protectorate to M. Joubert, who wishes to proceed from Jibuti to the Ogaden with a commercial caravan, accompanied by three companions and twenty followers.

I have to-day written to the Governor, regretting that I am at present unable to meet his wishes, as the state of the Ogaden is quite unsuited for commercial enterprise or the entry of caravans led by Europeans.

I trust that this will meet with your Lordship's approval.

A somewhat serious question is, however, raised by this request. It is most undesirable just now that French travellers, commercial or otherwise, should be hanging about the Ogaden, but the Ogaden is not our territory. The French are presumably as well aware of the state of the country as we are, and should another application of the same nature be received, backed up by permission from Menelek to enter the country, we might have some difficulty in refusing a passage through our territory.

The difficulty might, perhaps, be best got over if a hint were given to Menelek that it would be advisable, in view of the disturbed state of the country, to refuse for a time permission to any European to enter the Ogaden from this side.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 75.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 88.)

Rome, June 4, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 27th January last, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship an extract from the "Italie" of the 2nd instant in regard to the Society which has been formed to work gold mines in Erythræa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Extract from "l'Italie" of June 2, 1900.

LES MINES D'OR DE L'ÉRYTHRÉE.—La Société Érythréenne pour les mines d'or pour l'exploitation du quartz aurifère découvert dernièrement dans la Colonie, s'est constituée avec un capital de 2,000,000 lires divisés en 80,000 actions de 25 lires chacune, souscrites pour la moitié par des capitalistes Italiens, et parmi lesquels figurent pour les sommes les plus importantes, la Société Italienne pour le commerce des Colonies, le Crédit Italien de Gênes, &c.

La Société Érythréenne pour les mines d'or aura son siège à l'Asmara; le service de banque sera fait par le Crédit Italien de Gênes, et le contrat avec le Gouvernement pour le permis d'exploitation aura la durée de trente ans.

Le Gouvernement a mis une taxe de 5 pour cent sur le produit brut des mines.

No. 76.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 109.)

Cairo, June 10, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two telegrams which I have received from Captain Harrington on the subject of a proposal put forward by the Emperor Menelek for a combined movement by his forces and those of Her Majesty against the Mullah of Dolbahanta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

MENELEK has suggested that Her Majesty's Government combine with him in suppressing the Somaliland Mullah. The Mullah is reported to be threatening a movement on Harrar at present. If it is possible to attempt diversion on Mullah's flank with forces now at disposal of Consul-General, such action is to be recommended, as our political opponents represent us as encouraging Mullah's action.

Copy of this telegram sent to Consul-General for Somali Coast.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

SINCE my telegram No. 9 I have seen Menelek. He informs me that he has delayed moving against the Mullah until he receives reply of Her Majesty's Govern-

ment. I have explained that present season is unfavourable for operations, which would be easy in cold season. If Mullah continues his advance it would be politically advisable to attempt diversion.

Sent to Sadler.

No. 77.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, June* 18, 1900.

I HAVE received a telegram from Captain Harrington informing me of his departure from Addis Abbaba on the 8th instant. The Doctor of the Mission remaining behind at the request of King Menelek, in consequence of the illness of the Queen.

Captain Harrington adds that he brings with him more favourable proposals as regards the southern frontier.

No. 78.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 19, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant, transmitting two telegrams from Captain Harrington referring to the Emperor Menelek's proposal for a combined attack on the Dolbahanta Mollah.

It would be prudent to abstain from further military entanglements for the present, while Her Majesty's forces are fully engaged in South Africa, China, and Ashanti, and the danger of their being needed in the Soudan is never absent.

(Also sent to Colonel Sadler, No. 1, the 19th June.)

No. 79.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 122.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 20, 1900.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 100 of the 29th May last, transmitting correspondence with Colonel Jackson and M. Tugini on the subject of the complaints of the Governor of Erythræa against the Commandant of Kassala.

I approve the terms of your note to M. Tugini in regard to this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY

No. 80.

Messrs. Little and Johnston to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 21.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, 46, *Leadenhall Street, London, June* 20, 1900.

AGREEABLY with the request made in your esteemed letter of the 16th instant,* I beg to subjoin herewith details of the privileges which my friends and I desire to obtain from the Government of the Soudan.

1. A Concession or grant of land or areas to be selected by us on the River Tumat, extending from 34° to 36° east longitude, and from 9° 20″ to 11° north latitude, as indicated in the accompanying map.†

* *Qy.* 19th.

† Not printed.

2. A Concession in the valley of the Sobat River, bounded on the north by 10° north latitude, on the east by 34° east longitude, on the south by 6° north latitude, and on the west by the White Nile and Bahr-el-Jebel, as shown on the inclosed map.†

As we shall have a large initial expense in the development of the country, we would respectfully ask that the Concessions should give to us exclusive rights for prospecting and acquiring mines, as well as for the collection and cultivation of india-rubber and other natural products.

I earnestly trust that Lord Cromer will consider the application as reasonable, and as commensurate with the great financial advantage which will accrue to the Government of the Soudan should I be able to divert to it the hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling which the transport of the extension of the Congo Railway viâ the Nile would involve.

It scarcely becomes me to assume that the letter of the Secretary-General of the Congo State, dated the 5th June, in your possession, is an absolute guarantee that the Nile route will obtain a preference over the Congo route; but as I know of the personal and earnest desire of His Majesty the King to assist me, I think I am safe in saying that the benevolent disposition evinced in the letter will take the shape of a practical assurance if the matter is decided soon.

Again I beg that my letter may be considered as confidential, as if my designs were known in Antwerp I fear considerable opposition might ensue, and my object may be defeated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN W. JOHNSTON.

No. 81.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 9, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26, Confidential, of the 2nd May, I have the honour to report that to-day I sent to King Menelek the extract from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General's Report on Egypt and the Soudan, dealing with relations with Abyssinia and the state of frontier arrangements.

When read to King Menelek His Majesty seemed pleased, and remarked that it was what I had already told him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 82.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbcba, May* 10, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Dejasmatch Tasamma Nadoo, whose province consists of the country on the upper waters of the Sobat River, has been promoted Ras over his own province and that of Dejasmatch Jote. The latter's country is Walega and the Galla country to the west.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 83.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 12, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Lagarde, the French Minister, left to-day. He is accompanied by Dejaz Biratu and Likamakwas Nadoo, who were members of the Abyssinian Mission who visited France in 1898.

Having failed to induce King Menelek to visit the French Exposition, and to obtain the company of a Ras, M. Lagarde has been forced to content himself with these small fry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 84.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, June* 6, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Lordship's consideration, a scheme for increasing the military police force of the Protectorate.

This increase is rendered necessary by the following considerations:—

(*a.*) The arming of the tribes contiguous to our frontiers on all sides of the Protectorate.

(*b.*) The necessity for guarding against a repetition of the disturbances caused by the movement of the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah.

(*c.*) The preservation of order in the hinterland, and the proper protection of trade and trade routes.

In these respects the conditions, both inside and outside the Protectorate, have materially altered within the last few years, and, indeed, since the proposals for police establishment contained in my despatch of the 28th June, 1898, were submitted.

As regards (*a*), we now see Abyssinia a formidable military Power teeming with arms. The tribes in and about the neighbouring French Colony of Jibuti are freely supplied with modern rifles, and the same may be said of the Mijjertein to our east, and, in a less degree, of the Ogaden tribes to our south. We do not, and could not, allow our tribes to arm themselves; but notwithstanding the fact that a certain number of rifles have been handed over by the tribes on the Zeyla side, there is reason to believe that both the Aysa and the Gadabursi are in possession of more rifles than we know of; and the fact is certain that, despite all the precautions we could take, should any serious cause of difference arise between either of these tribes and ourselves, or the peace between them which has on more than one occasion been threatened by aggressions on the part of the Aysa be ruptured, a want for arms would immediately be created, which, under the conditions existing at Jibuti, they would find little difficulty in getting met. In the same way, on the Berbera side, we hear of arms here and there amongst the tribes, certainly in insignificant numbers; but a recurrence of last year's disturbances or aggressions by armed tribes from across the frontier would lead to an influx of arms on this side.

From whichever point of view the situation be looked at, this question of arms has a direct bearing on that of protection. If we keep our tribes from supplying themselves, which in the long run we shall not be able to do with our present establishment, especially at any time of disturbance, the Protectorate will ere long lay as an island of unarmed people surrounded on all sides by tribes equipped with modern rifles. If our tribes do obtain arms, then an increased strain is thrown on our resources for the maintenance of internal order.

In connection with (*b*) the proceedings of the Mullah and the various phases of the movement he originated have been reported at length in my despatches from time to time. I need here only draw attention to the fact that for a time our authority was completely set at naught over a large portion of the eastern and central districts, that after disturbances in the heart of the Protectorate the movement culminated in an attack on a friendly religious community and tribes on the spot where I am now writing, and in our having to take special precautions for the protection of Berbera, the Mullah's forces penetrating as far as the maritime plain; and that after he left the Protectorate the Mullah was able to gather the tribes from the southern frontier down to the Webbe Schebele, and his influence over his followers was sufficient to induce them to attack an Abyssinian force of some 1,500 well armed men in position, an attack in which they lost heavily, and in which he was careful himself not to join. It is true that the religious bubble with which the movement commenced has burst so far as the large majority of our tribes are concerned, that his cause has been dealt a severe blow by the Abyssinians, and that he is for the present quiescent in the recesses of the

Ogaden. But we have had experience in other parts of our possessions of fanatical movements started by local Mullahs of no previous importance, and the most that can be safely said of them is that we never know to what such movements may not eventually lead.

In the present instance we have to guard, first, against the Mullah again establishing himself in the Protectorate, certainly in those portions within our reach; and, secondly, against raids and aggressions on our people by tribes actuated by the Mullah from across the border. For this our present strength is insufficient. We cannot afford our tribes the measure of assistance they have a right to demand, and without which it would be useless to expect them to move actively in their own defence if subjected to attack. It is the universal opinion throughout the Protectorate that disturbances will not cease, and that we shall have no security for trade on our frontier, until this Mullah is either captured or killed.

As regards (*c*), there are several considerations to be noted: our general policy in dealing with the tribes, and the extent to which, and the geographical limits within which our authority should be established and interference exercised.

Whilst the Protectorate was under the control of the Indian Government the policy laid down was to hold and protect the coast towns, to limit our interference inland to the protection of the caravan routes, which were always to be held sacred, and to depend for repressive measures on debarring refractory tribes from trading with our ports. Theoretically, this policy was sound enough—we had at the time no recognized boundary with Abyssinia, and the Government of India were naturally averse to incurring responsibilities in the interior, the exact extent of which they were unable to gauge; but, in practice, it has never been found possible to confine our interference on the Berbera side within the limits thus laid down.

I would here remark on the different systems of dealing with the tribes which obtain in the Zeyla and Berbera districts. In the Zeyla district there are only two tribes, the Aysa and the Gadabursi. In both clannish feeling runs strong; tribal matters are settled mostly by the tribes themselves, without asking for our intervention; and we only interfere of our own initiative in intertribal matters, or in tribal disputes which, if allowed to run on, would threaten the general peace of the district. Moreover, there is but one principal caravan route, that from Zeyla to Gildessa, which is, throughout its length, in the hands of the Aysa. On the Berbera side the conditions are quite different. The tribes are many, and divided into innumerable sections and sub-divisions, with no common Head or tribal feeling to keep them together, and there are several important caravan routes, on each of which, at every few miles, we find a different tribe or section, mostly with long-standing differences with its neighbours. Intercourse with the coast has ever been more frequent on the Berbera than the Zeyla side, and this, amongst other causes, has led to a greater and increasing demand for the exercise of our jurisdiction, whilst the conditions of the caravan routes continually call for our interference. At Zeyla the individual mostly looks to his tribe; on this side he comes in straight to us.

It has been continually represented by officers connected with the administration of the coast that we cannot decline to interfere with tribal disputes and at the same time protect the caravan routes. The two are inextricably mixed up. If disputes between tribes or sections holding portions of the caravan routes, or between them and the adjacent tribes, are not adjusted, reprisals take place, and, sooner or later, the safety of the caravan road must be affected. Under the old system we had no effective administration beyond a radius of a few miles from our port towns, and no visible signs of our authority south of the Golis, though peace and security were eventually well established over a large portion of the maritime plain. Matters drifted on with the tribes inland till every few years an expedition became necessary. The position has always been locally recognized as unsatisfactory, and, as long ago as 1894–95, definite proposals were submitted to India for increasing the camel corps and for the establishment of interior posts.

It may be admitted that since the transfer of the Protectorate to the control of Her Majesty's Government the principle has ceased to be recognized that the primary object of our occupation is to supply the Aden garrison with meat, and I venture to submit that the time has now come when we should properly consolidate our authority over the tribes with whom we are more immediately brought in contact, and afford our people and our trade a larger measure of protection against internal and external disorder than we have hitherto done.

This we should now be able to do over the whole of the Ishak country, which includes those portions of the Protectorate inhabited by the Habr Awal, the Habr

Toljaala, and the Habr Gerhajis tribes, the latter of which comprises the Habr Yunis and Aidagalla section. I except the Dolbahanta because, owing to the distance of the country, its inaccessibility, and the wildness of its inhabitants, no steps that we could at present take to effectually administer that province would be worth the cost and trouble which would be involved.

It may be asked: "Is it, after all, worth while to interfere in the interior at all? Have we anything to gain there, and would not our trade go on just as well if we merely occupy the coast towns and let the interior look after itself?"

To such a question the answer would be that our trade would not go on as well; that we cannot now afford to let the interior look after itself; and that our occupation of the country imposes on us duties towards ourselves and our people which we cannot ignore.

We are, indeed, at the present moment in a worse position for administrating the Protectorate by a mere holding of the coast towns than we have ever been. With a few exceptions we have for years been getting our authority exercised by the moral prestige attaching to our power rather than by any tangible signs of the enforcement of that power. This held good for a time, but the effect has not been all on one side. The Somali is an intelligent being, gifted with a fair sense of justice and proportion, a born orator, and an adept at making good his case. He knows that we are averse to harsh measures, and that expeditions are not resorted to till matters have reached a climax, and he sees that if a tribe or section maintains a refractory attitude it is able to do so, if not within our immediate reach, for some considerable time with little loss to itself and with a fair chance of ultimate impunity.

I have already had occasion to observe that debarring the tribes our ports is not altogether satisfactory. For several months in the year the tribes are independent of the coast towns, and at other times means of evading the ban by the help of tribes not under ban are easily found. The result is that trade is affected in a measure, and that until the tribe comes in, it is for the time being outside our control, affording a very undesirable example to the rest of the country at large.

The Mullah's movement, too, and the disturbances which resulted from it, have thrown the country back several stages in its civilising advance, and what is, perhaps, of greater moment, has given a rude shock to our authority over a large area of the Protectorate, which the work of the last six months has only partially remedied.

The means I would now employ for keeping order over the portions of the Protectorate above mentioned would be the establishment of interior posts, a measure long ago recommended which recent events have hitherto prevented my taking up, which could be quickly reinforced, where supplies of rations would be kept, which would form rallying points for the friendlies at a time of disturbance, and which would form the base for any move against a refractory tribe, and safeguard the caravan routes; and the retention of a force partly in Berbera and Bulharand partly within easy distance wherever the conditions of water and grazing may be most favourable at different seasons of the year, which would be all mounted and able to move rapidly in any direction; retaining present repressive measures at our ports when such may be necessary.

The present time is particularly opportune for consolidating our position in the nearer portions of the hinterland. We have now a well-defined boundary with Abyssinia, which has removed the principal objection to our regulating our own affairs with our own tribes south of the Golis. It is but a few years ago that the building of a small public works' shed at the foot of the Sheikh Pass raised opposition on the part of the Mahomed Aysa on the grounds that we were taking the country and would use the position to tax caravans. This feeling is now changed, and in this respect the Mullah's movement has been of service to us, it has removed the jealousy with which our establishing ourselves in the uplands might otherwise have been viewed. We have now the head-quarters and six companies of the British Central Africa Rifles over the Jerato Pass, and one company over the Sheikh Pass, located there practically in reply to a request from the tribes for assistance. Not a word of demur has reached me as to our occupation of these places, and there can be no doubt but that the tribes, generally, are glad to see us where we are. Further, it was not till it was known that I was leaving for Sheikh that the tribes who annually migrate to the Arori Plain and the Haud commenced to leave the maritime plain. Some have already moved south, others are in the vicinity of my camp waiting to see where I move, for as they tell me they know that anywhere in the vicinity of our camps they are safe from raids and loots. It is now recognized that the country has been taken over by the Sirkar, and I am convinced that in the parts of the Protectorate to which I have principally referred the more

responsible feeling of the communities is against raiding and looting, and at one with us in our endeavours to keep the tribes at peace. It is the young blades who get out of hand and do the mischief; the influence of the Elders is frequently insufficient to stop a raid, or to enforce the return of looted property after it has been made. I have no desire to what is commonly called dragoon the country, nor can I hold out any hopes that raids will altogether cease for many a year to come, but I do think that we should be in a position to insist on the due execution of awards in disputes brought to us for settlement by the tribes, and generally do more than we have hitherto done in the interests of peace and order. No radical innovation is proposed; I merely wish to bring our protective establishment more up to the level of present requirements, and by taking action promptly avoid severer and more expensive measures in the end. It has been time after time exemplified that with refractory tribes a show of force is generally all that is required, but we must be able to show that force, there will then be seldom any need for more drastic action.

The alternatives would be either to let matters drift on as they are, when, after the departure of the British Central Africa Rifles, we should have nothing to assist the tribes to oppose the Mullah should he again attempt a footing in the Protectorate, and we should continue in the unsatisfactory position of holding an authority we are in many cases unable to enforce; or, to retire for good and all to the coast towns, and cease from any interference with the interior. In the latter case, after the events of last year, I have little hesitation in saying that the hinterland would soon be in a state of chaos, trade would dwindle because the safety of the caravan routes could be no longer assured, and a principal duty we owe to our protected subjects would be neglected. A frequent change of staff, too, would be necessary, for we could not keep our officers for more than two, or at the most three years in the maritime plain without occasional change to the uplands.

In addition to the above arguments I would note that the late Treaty with Abyssinia imposes certain obligations on us with regard to the passage of armed forces across the border, which, under existing conditions, we are not in a position to carry out. Three times this year have the Habr Yunis, in spite of warning, raided across the frontier ostensibly to fight the Mullah, in reality to loot the Ogaden. I have now put a check on these proceedings by attaching some eighty camels looted in the last raid; this I was mainly enabled to do by the presence of our force at Adaleh, the Rifles were not called upon to co-operate, the fact of their being there was sufficient to insure compliance with my demands, and the animals were made over to a detachment of the Camel Corps sent out to collect them. It was otherwise with the Aldagallah who were further off, and who have not yet surrendered the thirty camels taken in the same loot.

The scheme which I have now the honour to submit, for your Lordship's consideration, is the result of careful deliberation for some time past as to the requirements of the Protectorate, and of consultation with Captain Swayne to whom I am indebted for the suggestion of employing mounted infantry. It provides for one additional British officer, for a small establishment of Indians for Berbera and Zeyla, for the location of three interior posts, and for having in readiness a rapidly moving body of 150 men without unduly depleting our coast towns of their means of defence. It involves an increase to present establishment of 172 of all ranks, at an additional annual cost of 71,608 rupees, and 53,950 in capital charges.

Details of the Scheme.

Item No. 1.—6,090 *rupees.*

Provision has already been made in the current year's Budget for the salary of the Commandant. It is now proposed to provide for another British officer to assist the Commandant. I would recommend that he be a subaltern belonging to the British service, who has served in India and who has at least some acquaintance with Hindustani, which next to Arabic and Somali is the most useful language for the Protectorate. I have suggested the salary at 350*l.* per annum. He would be supplied with quarters at Berbera, and with a tent, ordinary camp furniture and transport when in the interior, otherwise his salary would include all allowances.

A clerk will be required for the Commandant's office, and a small allowance of 10 rupees per mensem for stationery.

Item No. 2 (A).—18,346 *rupees.*

I confess that I should have been glad to avoid the expense and inconveniences connected with the enlistment of men in India, but so long as this Mullah's movement is on, it will be desirable to have a small body of men at Zeyla and Berbera who would be quite outside any local influences. It is proposed to locate sixteen at Zeyla to hold the military zariba and act as an escort to the Consul; the remainder would be posted at Berbera, where they would hold the zaziba and take portion of the guards with the military police.

The men to be entertained should be Sepoys of the Indian army who would be willing to take their discharge after three years' service and serve in the Protectorate on the terms offered. On the whole, the Punjabi Mahommedan will be the best suited for our requirements; he is good material, it is thought that he will get on with the people of the country better than Sikhs, and there would probably be less objection on the part of the Government of India to their employment. It is hoped that in view of the small number we should require the Government of India would be willing to let us enlist the men in the manner proposed.

Unless the subaltern officer be selected from a regiment now serving in India, in which case he would be ready on the spot, the cheapest way to obtain the men would be to ask the Government of India to allow us the loan of the services of an officer temporarily to visit the Punjab and enlist from such regiments as could spare us Sepoys, his pay and allowances for the time being defrayed by the Protectorate; but I understand that Sepoys volunteering for foreign service have a fancy for seeing the officer under whom they have to serve, it would therefore probably be necessary to depute Captain Swayne or the subaltern officer to India for the purpose.

The men should be enlisted for a term of three years; it is hoped that by that time we may be able to do altogether with local levies, but the scheme provides for re-engagement or further enlistment after the first three years should this still be necessary.

The terms offered would be pay at the rates entered in the scheme from the date of leaving Bombay till their return there; free rations and quarters, a good-conduct bonus of 20 rupees per man at the end of the three years, and certain leave and postal cessions.

The men would serve under regulations similar to those in Uganda and other African Protectorates, and they would be entirely under the orders of and at the disposal of the Administration.

Item No. 2 (B).—7,116 *rupees.*

This provides for forty infantry—Somalis—who would all be mounted behind the Camel Sowars when employed in the interior. When thus employed they would be given rations; at other times they would remain at Berbera and Bulhar, and help in the duties there.

Item No. 3.—7,356 *rupees.*

The addition of twenty-two to the Camel Corps will raise that body on the Berbera side to fifty-nine of all ranks, which will allow of fifty being always available for the movable force. These would be all Somalis; and of the fifty, forty would each carry an infantry man behind him on his double saddle.

Item No. 4.—12,180 *rupees.*

We are not quite certain yet how the plan of mounted infantry will work out. whether we can get men to bring in their own ponies, or whether these will have to be purchased. The whole body would be Somalis. The men who own ponies in Somaliland are generally the better off portion of the inland communities, they are therefore more independent, and it is feared that they find it more profitable to use their animals in looting than in serving us. The coast tribes have no ponies to speak of. One result of the late disturbances has been that those tribes who had previously sold their animals, for which they found no use whilst at peace with their neighbours, have now shown a

disposition to purchase ponies again, with the double object of securing their own property in the jungle and annexing what they can from others.

The rates of pay entered in the scheme are for those who bring in their own ponies. Those for whom ponies have to be purchased will be given the same rates, but a deduction of 2 rupees per mensem will be made for the Pony Fund, which will have to be started with the purchase money of ponies bought by the Administration.

If we can get the right men to enlist, this portion of the scheme should prove a great success, and it will certainly be a new departure in the Protectorate. The Somali pony is not accustomed to grain, and will, therefore, cost nothing to keep.

Mounted infantry would be a valuable aid to the Camel Corps, which is liable to be cut off in short distances by cavalry. The Camel Corps has done very good work in Somaliland, but it is somewhat expensive as the camels have to be procured from Arabia. A camel, however, carries two rifles, which the pony cannot. A mixed force of camelry and mounted infantry, with Maxims on trotting camels, would be just the composition for a rapid movable force best suited to the conditions of this country.

The rates of pay, as compared with the Camel Corps, are calculated on the assumption that rations will be given the mounted infantry all the year round. They will be located in the interior, generally in the maritime plain, within easy call, and where water and grass are sufficient.

Interior Posts.

I would propose to establish posts at Sheikh, Adaleh, and Hargaisa. These would cover the two principal passes to Berbera and Bulhar, and the main caravan route from those ports to the Harrar frontier. They should consist of a walled inclosure with a double-storied block house of stone and mud, the upper story being reached by a ladder which would be drawn up every night. The structures should be inexpensive; as a rough estimate I have allowed 1,500 rupees for the construction of each. For the present it will be sufficient to locate a small guard of thirteen men at Hargaisa, and six at Sheikh and Adadleh. In all, twenty-five men for interior posts.

The increase of 172 of all ranks now required is thus reached :—

	Requirements.				
	Indians.	Somalis.	Camelry.	Mounted Infantry.	Total.
Berbera and Bulhar	34	29	9	..	72
Zeyla	16	20	16	..	52
Interior posts	..	27	..	..	27
Movable force	..	42	50	60	152
Total	50	118	75	60	303
Present establishment	..	78	53	..	131
Increase required	50	40	22	60	172

Allowing for six additional Somalis. Amongst the Somalis are included the few Soudanese we have; these have not answered well, and I should not be inclined to repeat the experiment of introducing this element into our police. To the interior posts would also be attached a few of the Camel Corps, when not required for other duties.

In this reckoning I have not taken into account the civil police at Zeyla, and Berbera, and Bulhar. These men perform purely civil duties, and the force is over-worked as it is. We should have to increase the civil police if no addition be made to the military police. With the proposed addition to the latter, men would generally be available to assist the former. The military police have, at the present time, a guard of ten men over the sanitary station to prevent unauthorized communication with the town of Berbera, and another ten men have been lent to the civil police. We are able to do this as the Rifles are helping us with our guards. Should plague break out in any of our towns further assistance would have to be given the civil police.

General Annual Charges.—20,520 *rupees.*

The only item requiring notice is that of rations and transport. The sum of 10,000 rupees is calculated on the assumption that twenty-five men for the posts, sixty mounted infantry, and fifteen camelry, will be employed throughout the year in the interior. They will have to be given rations at an average rate of 5 rupees per man per mensem, and these rations will have to be carried. Also on the assumption that the rest of the movable force will be employed in the interior on the same charges for three and a-half months. Included in the above item are 525 rupees for a meat ration for the movable force when employed at the rate of 1 rupee per man per mensem. The want of meat is much felt by Somalis, absent from the coast towns. Shikar parties find it necessary to give their men a meat ration at least once a week, and this has been frequently done by our officers for their police escort at their own expense.

It is proposed to try a new experiment as regards the transport of rations for the police: and that is to make the police look after their transport animals themselves, giving them an allowance of 1 rupee for each trip of two camels, instead of employing camel men on 15 rupees a-month, plus rations, or hiring, which is expensive. The transport item is based on this pian, if it works well it will result in considerable saving of expense.

Capital Charges.—53,950 *rupees.*

A sum of 7,000 rupees is estimated for the equipment of the addition to the force. As regards arms it is fairly certain that after the Transvaal War the Martini-Henry will soon become as obsolete as the Snider lately was. As we shall have to get more arms I would propose that we get Lee-Metfords, and with them arm the sixty Indians, the seventy-five camelry, and the sixty mounted infantry. Our present stock of Martini-Henrys being used by the Somali infantry and the civil police.

The objection generally recognized in having two kinds of ammunition would be little felt with such a small force, and in time we might equip the whole of the military police with the newer weapon. The best arm would be a Lee-Metford carbine with magazine attachment. It is desirable that in the matter of arms we should not be behind our neighbours in Jibuti.

An item of 4,000 rupees has been entered for a Maxim gun for Zeyla. We have two Maxims in the Protectorate. It is proposed that one be kept permanently for Berbera, and one be mounted on trotting camels for use with the movable force. It would add to the security of Zeyla to keep one Maxim there, and I think this should be done.

Provision has been made for the purchase of sixty Somali ponies. Possibly we shall not require to buy so many, if men can be induced to bring in their own. The cost should not exceed 150 rupees each. For equipment we want nothing more than the rude country saddle and bridle to which the Somali is accustomed, with a carbine bucket attached. Here again in saddlery the mounted infantry will be less expensive than the camelry. The mounted infantryman will also carry his native weapon the spear, in the use of which he requires no teaching.

Of the thirty-five trotting camels for which provision has been made twenty-two are required for the addition to the camelry, seven to replace animals old and worn out, and three will be wanted for the Maxim and three for spare ammunition. I may mention that the mule equipment sent out with our Maxims was found to be two large for the class of mule obtained locally. It has, however, been found to answer very well for the Arab camels, merely requiring the lengthening of a strap here and there.

I have provided for the purchase of forty transport camels for the military police; six will be required for the permanent transport of the Commandant, and four for the Adjutant. This leaves thirty for the ordinary transport of rations to the posts, and the parties on duty in the interior.

As previously stated, it is not proposed to keep up any establishment for these animals, whose cost of upkeep will be limited to the initial purchase plus depreciation. The Commandant and Adjutant would each require one permanent camelman.

If this scheme be accepted it will raise the annual cost of the police of the Protectorate—including civil police— from 69,882 rupees to 141,490 rupees, together with capital charges of 53,950 rupees. And taking this year's Budget as a basis, and excluding capital charges, will cause the annual expenditure to exceed revenue by 17,067 rupees.

In this calculation I have not included in expenditure for the year the sum of 3,788*l.*, which was a charge incurred last year in connection with the proposed expedition.

Whilst commending this scheme to your Lordship's consideration the fact cannot be concealed that we are threatened with an eventual loss of revenue on the Zeyla side by the French railway now in course of construction from Jibitu to Harrar. Our staff has hitherto been kept at the lowest scale compatible with efficiency, and the want of an additional Vice-Consul to assist Lieutenant Cordeaux with the work of the large area comprised in the Berbera district, and the accumulation of cases left by the late disturbances, is beginning to be felt; and although increased security should result in an increase of trade on the Berbera side, unless the country is developed by mining interests which have yet to be found, our resources for enhancing the revenue are but slight.

On the other hand it has, I trust, been made sufficiently clear that we cannot carry on with our existing protective establishment any longer if we are to administer the Protectorate as it should be administered, afford a fair measure of protection to our tribes, and avoid an almost certain risk when the British Central Africa Rifles are withdrawn. Had it not been for the Mullah's movement I could have managed with fifty or sixty men less than the increase now suggested, which would have kept us within Budget limits; but as facts stand, so long as this Mullah is about, I consider the number proposed in the scheme as the minimum force we should have available to meet the purposes required. It should enable us to move at once against the Mullah, should he again establish himself in the Protectorate, with the assistance of friendlies who, seeing that we are prepared to act ourselves, would not hesitate to join us, and could then be relied on to act in their own defence. Unless, too, any grave emergency occurred, we should be self-reliant, and thus avoid the long delay and expense connected with a call for troops from outside.

As it is, this Mullah's movement has already cost the Protectorate some 56,000 rupees for Government of India charges in connection with an expedition which never came off; to this may be added another 20,000 or 25,000 rupees for increased military charges for the protection of Berbera, telegrams, and other miscellaneous items. We have thus been put to an expense of at least three-quarters of a lac of rupees for which we have absolutely nothing to show, either in preventive measures at the time or in increased security for the future.

I had hoped to so order the finances of the Protectorate as to keep expenditure within revenue, and thus avoid any request for financial assistance. Since the transfer it has been my main object to keep within these limits. But the circumstances of the past year have been altogether exceptional, and we have been confronted with difficulties which, I submit, the Protectorate could hardly be expected to meet unaided. I may perhaps be permitted to say that since the transfer a good deal has been done. The Administration has been reformed, establishments have been strengthened, the police have been increased and supplied with new arms and equipment, some very necessary buildings have been completed, and altogether a sum of nearly a lac of rupees has been spent on capital charges over and above ordinary annual expenditure. All this has been done out of our revenue, which for the last two years has shown a considerable rise.

I can only trust that the necessity for the increase in the police force now suggested may be, in part, but temporary, and that when we cease to be troubled with the Mullah such a reduction may be made as to bring our expenditure within our income. I am, however, convinced of this, that it will be cheaper in the long run for the Protectorate to be prepared in the manner indicated in this despatch than to have to depend on the costly dispatch of troops from outside, and this the experience of last year sufficiently illustrates.

On the 31st March last we had an accumulated cash balance in hand of 2,25,143 rupees. We have not yet received the account of the Government of India charges for the past two years, and there were a few bills remaining unpaid at the close of the year. I calculate that after paying the sum of 3,788*l.* on account of the charges for the proposed expedition, I shall still have enough to meet all present charges that could be made against the Protectorate, and leave a small balance in hand. An exact statement of the financial position of the Protectorate is impossible till I receive the Government of India charges, but the position as above explained may be taken as sufficiently accurate for present purposes.

Should your Lordship approve of the scheme now submitted, I would ask whether, in view of the facts I have explained, and particularly in view of the increased burden

thrown on our resources by the movement with which we have had to contend, Her Majesty's Treasury would assist the Protectorate by allowing it to keep the sum of rupees 55,605 : 3 : 10, which was the balance in the local Treasuries on the day the transfer took place, and by defraying the sum of 3,788*l.* for the charges incurred on account of the proposed expedition, and such further charges as may be made by the Government of India for military charges for the years 1898–99 and 1899–1900, which have not yet been received.

The Protectorate would then be accorded a fair start, there would be sufficient funds to meet this scheme and the further expenditure I am noting, and we should be left with a workable balance, out of which the small excess of annual expenditure over income would be met till the present pressure be relieved.

If it be not found possible to make a clean sweep of these charges so far as the Protectorate is concerned, I would ask that the sum of 3,788*l.* and the military charges for 1898–99 and 1899–1900 be treated as a loan, to be repaid by the Protectorate at the earliest opportunity. Her Majesty's Government have already paid a capital sum to the Indian Government on taking over the Protectorate, and I venture to submit that it would be well if these charges could be treated in the same way, and the Protectorate be left unhampered with a debt so soon after its entry on its new phase of existence.

The cost of a regular Somali regiment regularly officered would so much exceed the cost of the present scheme, that I have not thought it necessary to enter into details in connection with such a project. I may, however, say that should it be deemed desirable at any time to locate a regiment, which would also be available for service outside the country in these uplands which, in point of health and climate, would be ideal quarters for troops, there would be no difficulty in obtaining plenty of recruits of good material locally and at very short notice.

The cost of the appointment of another Vice-Consul would be partly met by the Budget allotment of 2,700 rupees for the Deputy District Officer—Berbera—which appointment has not yet been filled up. There would then be no need for the post of Deputy, who would not be able to perform all the duties required of a Vice-Consul. Berbera has a population of 30,000, and of itself gives quite enough work for one officer. We ought to have one Vice-Consul at Berbera, and one in the interior, who would also be available to fill leave vacancies.

As the question of increased expenditure is a main factor in this despatch, I would wish to briefly allude to a proposal I hope to shortly lay before your Lordship. It is to build warehouses at Berbera for the protection of grain and goods from the weather. The need for warehouses has been much felt, particularly during the last cold season, when much rice was damaged by the rain. By the plan I shall suggest of charging landing fees the work will repay itself in five or six years, but the cost of building, which will be about 30,000 rupees, will first have to be met. The proposal is not ready for submission as the plans and estimates are being checked in the office of the Consulting Engineer; I only allude to it here as involving expenditure which, if sanctioned, will have to be provided for.

In one respect I may have to modify the scheme set forth in this despatch. I am shortly proceeding to Burao; the Ishak tribes in the neighbourhood are both afraid of the Mullah and of raids from the Dolbahanta, where there is no safety for caravans. Caravans have now ceased to either come from or go to this province, and the Dolbahanta tribes are looting even their own caravans. If I find it expedient I should wish to lose no time in establishing a post of thirty men at Burao. There is reason to believe that this would now not only be not opposed, but would be actually welcomed by the tribes, and for the reasons I have previously given, if this is the case, the present would be the best time to establish ourselves there. The Kafila routes certainly require protection in that direction, and with the Ishak tribes with us, the post should be safe enough; it would form a valuable rallying point for the tribes in case of further disturbances, and it would command the water supply of the surrounding country.

The actual conditions will not be ascertained till I reach Burao; if I find them favourable I would solicit sanction to start the post at once. I shall have with me one or two companies of the British Central Africa Rifles, as a show of force in that direction will still be useful.

There would then be no necessity for a block-house here at Sheikh; the walled inclosure already built by the Rifles will answer our purpose. And we should only require forty mounted infantry instead of sixty, as I should propose to locate ten mounted infantry and twenty infantry in the Burao post.

This would reduce the movable force from 150 to 120, which would be more than compensated for by the hold over the country the position at Burao would give us.

I would solicit the favour of early instructions in connection with this scheme should it meet with approval, as the sooner it is started the sooner I shall be able to dispense with the 2nd British Central Africa Rifles. As it is, I do not require the whole battalion, and could well manage with half if employment could be found elsewhere for the rest.

I have the pleasure to report most favourably of the behaviour of the men since this battalion has been employed in the Protectorate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER

Inclosure in No. 84.

SCHEME for Increase of 172 Military Police (inclusive of 50 Indians).

Items.	Per Annum.	Total.	Sterling.	Remarks.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	£ s. d.	
Item 1—				
1 Adjutant and Quarter-master	5,250			
1 clerk, at rupees 60 : 5 : 75	720			
Commandant's office and stationery allowance	120			
		6,090	406 0 0	
Item 2—				
(*a.*) 50 Indian Infantry (1)—				(1) Enlisted for three years.
1 First-class havildar .. .. At 27 rupees ..	324			
1 Second-class halvidar .. .. „ 24 „ ..	288			
3 Naicks .. .. .. „ 20 „ ..	720			
1 Bugler .. .. .. „ 18 „ ..	216			
44 Sepoys .. .. .. „ 16 „ ..	8,448			
50				
Allowances to pay-havildar and kote-lance naick ..	60			
		10,056		
Good conduct bonus at end of three years, at 20 rupees per man per annum	1,000			
Free rations, at 7 rs. 4 a.	4,350			
		5,350		
Passages for fifty recruits from India and fifty time-expired men proceeding back to India	1,666 (2)			(2) Each passage, 50 rupees = 500 rupees in every third year. This item also provides for the grant of free passages to and fro for time-expired men who elect to re-engage and are granted leave to their homes.
Ditto, for 4 per cent. invalids, and for their reliefs ..	200			
Ditto, for coast reliefs between Berbera and Zeyla ..	234			
Ditto, and travelling expenses of one officer deputed to recruit men in the Punjub..	300 (3)			(3) Viz., 450 rupees to Punjub and 450 rupees back = 900 rupees in every third year.
		2,400		
Deputation allowance to the above officer	100 (4)			(4) 100 rupees per mensem for three months = 300 rupees in every third year.
Extra pay for fifty time-expired men and their reliefs ..	278 (5)			(5) Duration of pas-age, &c., 15 days coming and 15 days going back to India = 1 month's pay for 50 men = 834 rupees in every third year. In the case of men who re-engage this item provides for their leave pay for 1 month, or half-pay for 2 months.
		378		

Items.	Per Annum.	Total.	Sterling.	Remarks.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	£ s. d.	
Postal concessions, four letters free per man per month ..	162	162		
Total: Item 2. (*a.*) 50 Indian infantry	..	18,346	1,223 0 0	
(*b.*) 40 Somali Infantry (1)—				(1) No good conduct pay is estimated for, promotions from the lower to the higher rates for Sepoys being dependent on good conduct.
1 Havildar .. .. .. At 27 rupees ..	324			
1 „ .. .. .. „ 24 „ ..	288			
3 Naicks .. .. .. „ 20 „ ..	720			
1 Bugler .. .. .. „ 18 „ ..	216			
3 Sepoys .. .. .. „ 16 „ ..	576			
9 „ .. .. .. „ 14 „ ..	1,512			
22 „ .. .. .. „ 13 „ ..	3,432			
40				
Allowances of pay-havildar and kote-lance naick (2) ..	48			(2) The kote-lance naick has the care of spare arms and accoutrements, issues rations, and assists the pay-havildar.
		7,116	474 0 0	
Item 3—				
22 Camel Corps (Somalis) (3) —				(3) The rates of pay for all ranks in the mounted branches include 2 rupees per mensem for depreciation in value of animals.
1 Duffedar .. .. .. At 29 rupees ..	348			
1 Naick .. .. „ 22 „ ..	264			
20 Sowars .. .. .. „ 17 „ ..	4,080			
22				
Allowances of kote-lance naick	24			
Feeding charges for 22 camels, at 10 rupees per mensem	2,640			
		7,356	491 0 0	
Item 4—				
60 Mounted Infantry (Somalis)—				
1 Ressaldar .. .. .. At 52 rupees ..	624			
1 Duffedar .. .. .. „ 29 „ ..	348			
1 „ .. .. .. „ 26 „ ..	312			
3 Naicks .. .. .. „ 22 „ ..	792			
1 Trumpeter .. .. .. „ 20 „ ..	240			
4 Sowars .. .. .. „ 18 „ ..	864			
10 „ .. .. .. „ 16 „ ..	1,920			
39 „ .. .. .. „ 15 „ ..	7,020			
60				

Allowances of pay-havildar and kote-lance naick ..	60	12,180	812 0 0	
General—				
Items 1 to 4—				
Allowances of 1 assistant armourer, at 10 rupees ..	120			
Practise ammunition of 172 men (4)	2,700			(4) 100 rounds annually per man, and 100 rounds per recruit.
Clothing of 172 men	5,000			
Free rations and transport	10,000 (5)			(5) Exclusive of rations for Indians otherwise provided for.
Miscellaneous annual contingencies	2,700			
		20,520	1,368 0 0	
Grand total	..	71,608	4,774 0 0	

Capital Charges.

	Rupees.
1. Passage money, on joining, of Adjutant and Quarter-master	750
2. Equipment of 172 men, including camel saddles	7,000
3. Arms: 200 Lee-Metford rifles and sword bayonets	12,000
4. Reserve ammunition	3,000
5. 1 Maxim gun, ammunition, and saddle equipment (for Zeyla)	4,000
6. Miscellaneous capital charges	2,000
7. Buildings: 3 police posts	4,500
8. 60 ponies and saddles and bridles for mounted infantry	11,000
9. 35 Arab camels for Camel Corps, including 7 to replace worn-out animals, 3 for Maxim and ammunition, and 3 for reserve rifle ammunition	7,700
10. 40 Somali baggage camels and saddles, including 30 for the transport of police rations, &c., for paulines, &c., and 6 for the Commandant's camp, equipage, &c., and 4 for the Adjutant	2,000
Total	53,950

No. 85.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, June* 8, 1900.

NEWS was received from Harrar last week that the Abyssinians are preparing another expedition into the Ogaden against the Mullah, who is said to be somewhere between Haradiggit and Fafanyer, to the east of Haradiggit.

The strength and composition of the force is not known. I have to-day received information from Berbera, brought in by a caravan from Jig Jiga, confirming the news that the Abyssinians are again preparing to move into the Ogaden, but there were only 500 Abyssinian soldiers at Jig Jiga when the caravan left about ten days ago.

As rain has fallen plentifully in the Ogaden, an Abyssinian force would now encounter no water difficulties in an advance on Haradiggit.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 86.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 111.)

My Lord, *Cairo, June* 13, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in accordance with a request made to me by the Greek Consul-General, I have forwarded to Captain Harrington a letter from His Majesty the King of Greece to the Emperor Menelek, requesting that the British Representative may be allowed to take charge of Greek interests in Abyssinia.

I have instructed Captain Harrington to present this letter to the Emperor, and to assume charge of Greek interests upon receipt of a favourable reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

No. 87.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Cairo, June* 16, 1900.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 80 of the 15th instant, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Colonel Jackson, reporting the movements of Major Austin and his survey party.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) *Omdurman, June* 15, 1900.

MAJOR AUSTIN and survey party have arrived at Nasser. Austin has come on to Duem to get rations, as he had to abandon stores 150 miles up river beyond Nasser. Austin returns to Nasser, and will bring down men and transport. The following extract from Austin's telegram :—

"All well. Could you wire our safe return home to Foreign Office ?"

No. 88.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 18, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have to-day received a telegram from the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan, stating that the Commandant at Kassala telegraphs to him to the effect that Ras Mangasha has been removed from the Gondar district, and that a new Governor, named El-Samma Wad Mariam, has been appointed in his place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

No. 89.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 168. Africa.)

My Lord,

Brussels, June 23, 1900.

I THINK it right to call attention to the inclosed telegram from Paris published in the "Étoile Belge" this morning; although much of this information is not correct, it is desirable your Lordship should know the sort of news which is served up by the Belgian press with the view of prejudicing public opinion in regard to the Belgian claim to the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

Now that the sudd has been cleared away and the Anglo-Egyptian gun-boats can patrol the river up to Fort Berkeley, Her Majesty's Government must rely on the direct information procured through Cairo more than on any details which it may be possible for Her Majesty's Legation to glean from unwilling officials in Brussels.

The officer referred to in this telegram is Major Henry, whose journey down the Nile was reported in your Lordship's telegram to me No. 7 Africa, of the 22nd ultimo. He arrived here last week, and M. de Cuvelier, whom I have seen this afternoon, tells me that Major Henry had been admirably received by all the British authorities with whom he had come into contact, and was most grateful for all the kindness shown to him on his journey down the Nile.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

P.S.—The "Étoile Belge" to-day publishes the inclosed statement that no change has been made in the Congolese garrison on the Nile.

F. R. P.

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

Extract from the "Étoile Belge" of June 23, 1900.

D'APRÈS une information de source Anglaise, les forces de l'Etat Libre du Congo sont en train d'occuper très rapidement le Bahr-el-Ghazal.

Un officier Belge qui revient de cette région raconte qu'il y a en ce moment de ce côté 60 à 70 soldats Belges et 5,000 soldats indigènes armés de carabines à repétition.

Les Belges ont construit à Kéro un fort important armé de canons Krupp, de quatre Nordenfeldt, et de trois Maxims.

Ce fort est occupé par une garnison de 1,500 hommes. A Lado il y a une garnison de 250 hommes avec deux canons; à Rejaf, il y a 400 soldats avec trois canons; à Bohr, 200 soldats avec un Maxim, quatre cannonières battant pavillon de l'État du Congo naviguant sur le Nil et surveillant étroitement la rive de l'Abyssinie, où l'on dit que le Comte Léontieff agit en faveur de l'État libre.

Les autorités du Congo semblent croire que l'Angleterre s'est désintéressée complètement du Bahr-el-Ghazal et permettra au Roi Léopold ce que bon lui semblera.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

Extract from the "Étoile Belge" of June 24, 1900.

LES nouvelles publiées au sujet d'un renforcement des forces militaires dans l'enclave de Lado sont inexactes. Aucune expédition nouvelle n'est en cours ni au voie d'organisation; les effectifs de la région n'ont reçu aucune augmentation et restent fixés aux mêmes chiffres qu'antérieurement pour assurer la tranquillité dans le pays.

Il est évident, au surplus, que les Agents de l'État du Congo n'ont aucun rôle à remplir ni aucune mission à exercer du côté de l'Abyssinie.

No. 90.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(Received June 27.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, while returning Colonel Hayes Sadler's No. 53, Confidential, dated, Camp, Sheikh, the 30th May, 1900, wishes to bring to notice, that in Colonel Hayes Sadler's subsequent telegram to Foreign Office, dated the 15th June, 1900, he gives his opinion that Inger is probably connected with the French party.

Sir John Ardagh incloses a short note on this individual as tending to show that probably any undertaking by him will be of a very doubtful nature.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London, June* 26, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Memorandum on the "Soi-disant" Emir Soliman-ibu-Inger-Abdullah.

THE above individual, who formerly went by the name of Inger or Karlinger (his christian name being Karl) is well known to the Intelligence Department and to the Egyption authorities, who first made his acquaintance in October 1896. His history, stripped of a certain amount of fiction of his own invention, is as follows:—

Inger, the name under which he is generally known to us, was a native of Temisvar, in Hungary, and is now about 32 years of age.

He was a Lieutenant in the Austrian Army, but resigned his commission, voluntarily it is believed, in February 1895, and went to Morocco.

After vainly endeavouring for some months to get employment in that country, he went to Constantinople and Cairo, where he asked for employment of a military nature, principally on the strength of a drill book, which he had translated into Arabic.

In October 1896, he was arrested while attempting to join Osman Digna at Suakin. He was brought before a Court of Inquiry, but being considered more a fool than a knave, he was merely sentenced to be expelled from Egyptian territory.

Early in 1897, he landed at Jibuti, where, after intriguing for a time with some unimportant Somalis, he tried to enter the Soudan by Abyssinia.

He was ejected from Abyssinia by the Governor of Harrar, and next appeared in Constantinople, where, in September 1897, he was posing as the Chief of the Somalis and Danakils, supporting his pretensions upon a forged document bearing the signatures of several Sheikhs, who, he said acknowledged him as their Sheikh.

Next, Inger visited Hungary, raised a considerable amount of money, and formed a commercial Syndicate in Buda Pesth, on the strength of promised trading facilities. Meanwhile he sent two agents to Jibuti to prepare for his arrival, and to intrigue with the Somalis.

He imposed on numbers of Turkish and Hungarian officers by promises of employment in his "kingdom." With these he left Fiume late in June, 1899, and attempted to land in the Somali Protectorate, 25 miles south of Zeyla. Here he was met by Lieutenant Harold, who had heard of his proceedings, and was turned back to Aden.

The authorities there would not permit him or his party to land, and so they proceeded to Jibuti, where he soon came into collision with the French authorities. By

this time his dupes had discovered Inger's roguery, and deserted him; he was sold up and returned to Europe.

According to the statement of his followers, he intended to set up a kingdom in the country to the south of the Somali Protectorate, but it is not known exactly where.

Though the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir H. Rumbold that he considered Inger a worthless character, and that he did not want him or his friends back in Austria, Inger nevertheless returned to Hungary, and according to report, succeeded last July in raising more funds for another African venture.

On the 29th December last the Military Attaché at Paris, writing to the Intelligence Division, reported an offer made to him by Inger in Paris of 11,000 natives organised as carriers; also of sheep, goats, &c., from Somaliland, for our needs in South Africa. This offer, he stated, was to prove his remorse for the years he fought against England.

The above sketch of this adventurer's career needs no enlargement to show the sort of enterprise he is probably engaged in now.

(Signed) B. R. JAMES, *D.A.A.G.*

June 26, 1900.

No. 91.

The Anglo-Belgian Africa Company to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 29.)

46, *Leadenhall Street, London, June* 29, 1900.

Sir,

WE have acquired a Concession from His Majesty the King of the Belgians to collect rubber, &c., in the north-east portion of the Independent State of the Congo.

It was a source of great personal satisfaction to His Majesty to find that Englishmen were desirous to develop the district, and every encouragement and facility was afforded us for the purpose.

The absence of roads hitherto prevented our exercising our privileges, but now that these have been constructed we propose to send out six or seven men from Edinburgh, some of them gardeners, and others who have already had experience in African cultivation under the African Lakes Company and the British South African Company.

Previous to the Soudan campaign our intention was to send our employés by way of the Congo, but since the victories of the Anglo-Egyptian army, it is obvious that there is no other possible route to this corner of the Congo State than the Nile, where, moreover, British employés would enjoy throughout the whole route the protection of the British flag. Therefore we earnestly and respectfully solicit that the Secretary of State will be pleased to authorize any reasonable consideration and safe conduct being extended to our employés by Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo and the Soudan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LITTLE AND JOHNSTON.

No. 92.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 29.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp, Shuleh, June* 29, 1900.

REPORTS have been received that the French commercial expedition has returned to Jibuti after killing, in French territory, four natives.

Renewed disturbances have occurred on the railway, and the position is becoming like that of last year.

Inger is now said to be in Jibuti.

Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in North-East Africa and the Soudan. April to June 1900. TS Selected Foreign Office Files on Africa. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Nineteenth Century Collections Online. Web. 2 May 2016.

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